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Case No. 20090771 
in the 
Utah Supreme Court 
VON LESTER TAYLOR, 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
RESPONDENT/APPELLEE. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Taylor appeals from the denial of his second petition for post-conviction relief 
challenging his two convictions for Capital Homicide. This Court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(i) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the district court properly dismiss Taylor's successive post-conviction 
claims because they are procedurally barred? 
Standard of Review. This Court "review[s] an appeal from an order dismissing or 
denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower 
court's conclusions of law." Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, f 13, 156 P.3d 739 (internal 
quotations and case cites omitted). 
2. Do the newly amended provisions of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act apply 
to Taylor's successive petition? 
Standard of Review. 6m Whether a statute operates retroactively is a question of law, 
which we review for correctness without deference to the district court." Evans & 
Sutherland Computer Corp., v. Utah State Tax Comm., 953 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997). 
3. As an alternative basis for relief, may this Court affirm because Taylor's 
claims are time-barred under the PCRA and do not meet the "interests of justice" exception? 
Standard of Review. What meets the "interests of justice" exception to the PCRA 
time bar is a legal determination to be made in accordance with precedent from this court 
under a de novo standard of review. Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, If 8, 123 P.3d 400. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Copies of the following statutes and rules are included as addendum F. 
• United States Const. Amend. VI. 
• Utah Const. Art. I, § 12. 
• 28 United States Code § 2265(a)(1) - formerly § 2261(c). 
• Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102, 104 - 107 and 109 
• Former Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-102, 104 through 107 and 109. 
• Capital Sentence Cases, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-202. 
• Former Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202. 
• Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence, Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-402 
through 404. 
• Capital felony - Sentencing proceeding, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207. 
• Jurors selected from random cross section, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-103, 
formerly §78-46-3 
• Rights of Crime Victims Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-9(7). 
• Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C, Post-Conviction Relief. 
• Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(e) - Change of Venue. 
• Utah Rule of Evidence 606 - Competency of Juror as Witness. 
• Utah Rule of Evidence 1101(b)(3) - Applicability of Rules. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Taylor with two counts of capital murder for murdering Beth Potts 
and Kay Tiede. The State also charged Taylor with attempted aggravated murder of Rolph 
Tiede; aggravated arson; two counts of aggravated kidnapping of Linae Tiede and Trisha 
Tiede; aggravated robbery; theft of the Tiede's car; and failure to respond to an officer's 
signal to stop (TR2-5).1 
Taylor pled guilty to two capital homicide charges, and the State dismissed the other 
charges (TR105-116, 2517). A jury sentenced Taylor to death for each murder. State v. 
Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 683 (Utah 1997), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998) {Taylor I). 
After the jury imposed sentence, Taylor moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. The trial 
court denied the motion (TR250-51, 281). Taylor appealed. During the direct appeal, this 
Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on trial counsel's effectiveness. After six 
days of hearings, the trial court found that Taylor had not been deprived of his Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel (TR1134-52, 1179-94). This Court 
affirmed. State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681 (1998) {Taylor I). The United States Supreme Court 
denied review. Taylor v. Utah 525 U.S. 833 (1998). 
On February 23, 1998, counsel was appointed to represent Taylor in State post-
conviction proceedings (PCR 1105). One year later, Taylor filed his first State post-
conviction petition (PCR 1). The parties stipulated that Taylor could file an amended 
1
 TR refers to the record in the underlying criminal case. PCR refers to the post-
conviction record in the first post-conviction case. R refers to the post-conviction record in 
the second post-conviction case - the matter that is currently on appeal. 
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petition (PCR134). Over three years later, Taylor filed his First Amended Petition 
(PCR512). The State moved for summary judgment on all of Taylor's claims (PCR819, 
823). After full briefing and argument, the post-conviction court granted summary judgment 
and denied post-conviction relief (PCR1928-67). Taylor timely appealed (PCR1977). This 
Court affirmed. Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, 156 P.3d 739 {Taylor II). 
On September 4, 2007, Taylor filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, case 
no. 2:07-CV-00194-TC. The federal case has been stayed pending the outcome of Taylor's 
successive state petition for post-conviction relief. 
On November 5,2007, Taylor filed a second state petition for post-conviction relief. 
On August 17, 2009, the petition was dismissed (addendum A). Taylor timely appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
Taylor went on a crime spree that included burglaries; robbery; kidnapping two young 
women; a high-speed car chase with the kidnapped girls in the car; attempted murder of a 
man that Taylor twice shot in the head, doused with gasoline, and left in a burning cabin; and 
the murders of a woman and her seventy-six-year-old, partially blind mother. 
On December 14,1990 Taylor and his co-defendant, Stephen Deli, failed to return to 
the Orange Street Community Correctional Center, a half-way house to which Taylor had 
been paroled after his imprisonment for a 1989 aggravated burglary (TR317:732-42). 
Taylor and Deli fled to Taylor's parents' cabin in Beaver Springs (TR317:780). 
Taylor inappropriately includes argument and incorrect assumptions in his statement 
of facts. The State addresses and corrects those statements as necessary in argument below. 
3
 Transcripts not individually paginated are cited by volume record number and page. 
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The Taylor's cabin was near "Tiede's Tranquility," a cabin owned by the Tiede 
family (TR317:676-77, 771). Rolph and Kay Tiede and their children Linae (20), Shaun 
(17), and Trisha (16) were spending the holidays at the cabin (TR316:489-94; 317:675-77). 
On December 21 st they went to Salt Lake City for Christmas shopping and spent the night at 
the home of Beth Potts, Kay's 76-year old mother (TR316:494; 317:678). 
While the Tiedes were gone, Taylor and Deli broke into their cabin (TR 316:564,594, 
317:782-83, 786-90). Taylor opened the Tiedes' Christmas presents while Deli videotaped 
him (TR316:620-22). The next morning, Taylor called his friend Scott Manley (TR317:662, 
671-74; State's Ex.57-A, addendum B). He said "he was at one of those cabins with 
handguns and . . . he was going to shoot some people." When Manley asked about the 
owners, Taylor replied that he "was going to waste them all" (Id, addendum B, pp. 653-54). 
That same morning, Beth Potts, Rolph and Kay Tiede, and the two Tiede girls drove 
from Salt Lake back to the cabin (TR316:495). Because the roads were snowpacked, they 
parked their car at the gate to the Beaver Springs development (TR316:495-97). While 
Rolph and Trisha left on an errand, Linae, Kay, and Beth Potts headed up the two miles to 
the cabin on two snowmobiles (TR316:496-97). 
Linae entered the cabin first (TR316:498-99). When she opened the door, Taylor 
"came out holding his gun" pointed at her (TR316:499,317:795). Taylor demanded to know 
who else had arrived with Linae. Linae told him that her grandmother and mother were 
downstairs (R316:501, 317:795). Taylor told Linae to call them (TR316:501). Linae called 
to Kay that there were robbers in the cabin. Kay ran up the stairs. Deli walked out from the 
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back bedroom holding a rifle (TR316:501). Kay told Taylor and Deli that Beth was 
handicapped and would need help getting upstairs. (Beth was partially blind, had 
equilibrium problems, and needed help walking) (R316:495). Kay, accompanied by Deli, 
went back downstairs to retrieve Beth. Taylor, still pointing his gun at Linae, ordered her to 
sit down (TR316:495, 501, 504-05). Kay and Beth offered to give Taylor, who was already 
wearing Rolph Tiede's warm-up suit, money or anything else he wanted (TR316:505). 
Taylor pointed a gun at Kay and shot her (TR316:506). 
When Beth Potts said something and started to move, she was also shot and Linae saw 
"blood spray everywhere" (TR316:509-10). Linae did not see who shot Beth (R316:510).4 
Linae turned to face the fireplace and started praying out loud while the shooting continued 
(TR316:510). Taylor told her "to shut up, it wouldn't work, 'cause he was a devil 
worshipper" (TR316:511). 
Deli took Linae into a bedroom and tied her up with clear packing tape (TR316:511-
12). Taylor came into the bedroom and said he "had to shoot the bitch in the head twice" 
(TR316:513). He told Linae that her grandmother was "disgusting because she was lying in 
a pool of blood" (TR316:537). Taylor asked Linae for money, whether they had a car, and 
where the car keys were. Linae told Taylor that her father might have money in his coat 
pockets, and that her father kept a set of keys under the car's floor mat because the car had a 
combination door lock. Taylor began searching the coats in the closet (TR316:514-15). 
4
 Linae opined that Taylor shot Beth Potts (TR316:541). Taylor's statement to Dr. 
Moench confirmed this (R496A, Pet's Ex. 57, addendum C). 
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Taylor suggested that they "start the cabin on fire to get rid of our tracks" 
(TR316:515-16). Taylor left to get a gas can from the garage. Deli told Linae that she 
would have to go with them or they would have to kill her. So Linae went upstairs with 
Deli, and she saw Taylor pouring gasoline in the living room. She did not see Kay or Beth, 
and Taylor told her that they were dead (TR316:517, 519). Taylor "acted calm, just like he 
knew what he was doing, just like it was a regular day" (TR316:520). 
As Taylor and Deli were preparing the snowmobiles to leave, they heard other 
snowmobiles approaching. Taylor and Deli ran into the garage and yelled to Linae to get in 
the garage (TR316:520-21). As Rolph came up, he could see Linae standing in the doorway 
and could tell she had been crying (R317:681). Taylor "jumped out from behind the garage 
door, and pointed a gun in [Rolph's] face, and told [him] to get in the garage." (R317:682). 
As Rolph walked in, Taylor grabbed Linae "by the throat and stuck a gun to [her] back" 
(TR316:522, 317:682, 806). When Trisha arrived, Taylor and Deli ordered her into the 
garage as well (TR316:522, 317:683). Taylor told Rolph to take his clothes off, so Rolph 
took off his parka (TR317:683). Taylor also asked Rolph if he had any money (TR316:522, 
317:683-84, 806-07). Rolph had $105. Taylor told him to "toss it over here" (TR316:523; 
317:684). Taylor ordered Deli to pick up the money (TR316:524). 
After obtaining the money, Taylor ordered Deli to shoot Rolph (TR317:684; 
316:524). Deli raised his gun, cocked it, aimed at Rolph's face, but then hesitated 
(TR316:524, 317:685-86). Taylor "became impatient" and shot Rolph (R316:524-25, 
317:686). That particular bullet was loaded with bird shot (TR317:687). Pellets embedded 
7 
in Rolph's eye area, nose, and forehead; the shot knocked him down and broke his jaw (id.). 
Rolph was conscious and bleeding, but he "froze for fear of further shots," pretending he was 
unconscious (TR317:687-89). As he heard Taylor and Deli cursing the cabin for refusing to 
bum and talking with his daughters, Rolph "continued to lay there and tried to stay conscious 
and tried to stay alive and not move" (TR317:688). He was hoping to maintain his strength 
"so that somehow [he] could get [his] girls back" (TR317:689). 
Later, Taylor returned to the garage (R316:526). Linae heard more gunshots 
(R316:526-27). Rolph heard someone walk up to him and he was shot again at point blank 
range in the head (TR317:688, 690). "It was so close that the plastic wadding from the 
cartridge was stuck in [his] forehead," leaving a dent in his skull, but still not killing him 
(TR317:690). Later someone poured gasoline on the floor and over Rolph (TR317:691). 
Taylor and Deli finished loading up the snowmobiles and left on two snowmobiles 
with the girls driving (R316:526-27). Deli wanted to drive, but Taylor refused, telling Deli 
that Linae and Trisha should drive because they knew how to drive the snowmobiles 
(TR316:527). When Taylor, Deli, Linae, and Trisha got to the Tiede's car, Taylor ordered 
Linae to open the car and get the keys for him (R316:529-30). The four left in the Tiede's 
car, with Taylor driving (TR316:529-30, 317:811). 
Meanwhile, Rolph got up and went upstairs to look for his mother-in-law and his wife 
(TR317:692). He attempted to stomp out the burning carpet, but "all of a sudden [he] was a 
ball of fire, because [he] had been soaked with gas" (TR317:692-93). He removed his outer 
clothes and doused them in the shower (TR317:693). Rolph tried to use the phone, but found 
8 
that the wires had been cut (TR317:693). Eventually he abandoned the effort to put out the 
fire and rode a snowmobile back to the main road where he was rescued by his brother 
Randy (TR317:694). Rolph got in Randy's car and they started down the canyon. When 
they got to a point where the cell phone worked, they called the police (TR316:695-96). 
Soon police began a high-speed pursuit of the Tiede car (TR316:533-34). As they got 
close to Kamas, Linae saw a police vehicle with its lights flashing parked crossways in the 
road. Taylor "gunned" the car around the roadblock, driving approximately seventy miles 
per hour through a thirty-five mile per hour zone (TR316:533-35; 317:630-31). Taylor 
began to lose control of the car, eventually crashing it (TR316:535; 317:630-33, 639). He 
then pointed his gun at Deli and said, "It's time for us to die now" (TR316:535-36,317:814). 
Deli grabbed the gun, yelled, "We have hostages, we have hostages," and got out of the car. 
Deli pointed the gun at police. When an officer fired at Deli, Taylor and Deli surrendered 
(TR316:535-36; 317:637-38). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Taylor is not innocent, and his claim of innocence is not a "gateway" through the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) procedural bar rules. 
The district court correctly dismissed Taylor's successive petition because ail of his 
claims are procedurally barred. Taylor does not challenge the ruling that claims previously 
raised and addressed are procedurally barred. The only issue Taylor raises on appeal is 
whether the district court erroneously ruled that claims that could have been, but were not 
previously raised are also procedurally barred (Taylor's br. at 1, 12). Taylor has failed to 
9 
establish that the district court misinterpreted the PCRA procedural bars, or erroneously 
determined that none of the common law exceptions excused him from the procedural bars. 
He has also failed to establish that his prior post-conviction counsel was ineffective or that 
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel excuses him from the procedural bar. 
As an alternative basis for affirmance, this Court may hold that the amended 
provisions of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, which went into effect on May 5, 2008, 
apply to Taylor's petition. If the amended provisions apply, then Taylor has no right to the 
effective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel. Therefore, a claim of ineffective 
assistance cannot excuse the procedural bar and cannot entitle him to post-conviction relief. 
This Court may also affirm on the alternative basis that even if an> of Taylor's claims 
are not procedurally barred, they are time-barred. Taylor's successive petition was not filed 
within the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations, and none of Taylor's claims meet the 
"interests of justice" exception to the time bar. 
Finally, Taylor's claim that the Attorney General should be estopped from asserting 
the PCRA limits on post-conviction relief is frivolous. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TAYLOR IS NOT INNOCENT. 
Taylor asserts that he "has credibly pled that he is actually innocent." (Taylor's br. at 
11). He then argues that his claim of innocence is a "gateway through procedural bar." Id. 
Taylor's innocence claim is not a "gateway" through procedural bar because he is not 
innocent and his claims do not otherwise meet any exception to the procedural bar rules. 
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Taylor founds his claim of innocence on his premise that there is some evidence 
calling into question whether he fired any of the shots that killed Kay and Beth. Taylor's 
claim is based on a misleadingly incomplete recitation of the undisputed facts, and rests on 
erroneous legal assumptions.5 In addition, Taylor previously raised and lost these same 
allegations in his first post-conviction action, when he claimed that there was no factual basis 
for his guilty plea (R1275). 
Taylor's claim that he is innocent is legally insupportable. It rests on the faulty 
premise that he can be guilty of capital murder only if he fired a kill shot. But Taylor could 
also be guilty as an accomplice, and he admitted that he "was a participant in the events that 
led to the deaths of Ms. Tiede and Ms. Potts." (R672). Therefore, even if his claims were 
true, that he did not fire the shots that actually killed Beth Potts and Kay Tiede, Taylor is not 
"innocent" because his admitted participation makes him guilty as an accomplice and guilty 
of felony murder. 
Finally, the undisputed evidence refutes Taylor's claim that he may not have fired any 
of the fatal shots. Taylor's "innocence" claim rests on the premise that the fatal shots most 
likely came from the .44 caliber gun, and that Deli had that gun. But Taylor ignores other 
undisputed evidence demonstrating that he fired the shots that killed Beth and Kay, and may 
have fired all of the shots. 
5
 The State has never argued that Taylor would not be entitled to relief if he could 
establish that he is innocent. If Taylor did not actually engage in the conduct for which he 
was convicted, he could file a petition for determination of factual innocence under Utah 
Code § 78B-9-401 through 405 (West 2010). He has not done so and his innocence claim 
cannot meet the requirements of that statute. 
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Taylor admitted to Dr. Moench that he was the actual shooter who killed both victims 
(R496A, Pet's Ex. 57, addendum C). That statement has not been retracted or refuted. 
Taylor has never provided any affidavit or declaration asserting that he did not shoot Kay or 
Beth. At his own trial, Deli testified that Taylor did all of the shooting and that Deli shot no 
one (R974, State's Ex. 28 - affidavit of Robina Levine, addendum D). 
Taylor's argument rests on misstatements of the evidence. Taylor asserts that Linae 
"unequivocally stated that Mr. Taylor carried a .38 caliber handgun and Edward Deli carried 
a .44 caliber weapon." (Taylor's br. at 5). That is not accurate. Linae testified that when 
she first saw Mr. Taylor, he was holding the gun marked as State's exhibit 10, which was the 
.38 handgun (TR316:499). She also saw a rifle sitting next to the couch, about 5 or 6 feet 
from Taylor, and Mr. Deli was holding a rifle (State's Exhibit 11-A). Deli also had a gun in 
his belt (TR316:502-03). Numerous shots were fired (R316:510, 562). Linae never saw 
Taylor with the .44 (emphasis added) (TR316:547). But Linae did not see who fired most of 
the shots or which guns were used because she turned facing the fireplace wall and started to 
pray (TR316:510). Linae was also tied up in the bedroom during part of the crime 
(TR316:511-512). 
Taylor asserts that "with the possible exception of a bullet graze to Kay Tiede's arm, 
and the non-fatal pellet shots fired by Mr. Taylor, all of the other injuries to Kay Tiede and 
Beth Potts were in fact caused by the .44 caliber weapon carried by Mr. Deli." (Taylor's br. 
at 6). Taylor is wrong. The medical examiner, Dr. Schnittker, testified that the fatal wound 
to Kay was consistent with a .38. The other wound, which could have been fatal, was 
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consistent with a .44 (TR317:704-07, 713). She also testified that Beth had a .44 wound to 
the head and a .38 wound to the chest, both of which would have been fatal (317:712). 
The FBI crime scene investigator recovered eight bullets from the scene, including .22 
pellets, .38 and .44 caliber bullets, and numerous casings, including "22's 38's and 44 
calibers" (R316:562). He also testified that the .22 caliber weapon was the lever action rifle, 
State's Exhibit 11-A(R316:576). That rifle, State's Exhibit 11-A, is the gun Linae identified 
as the rifle carried by Deli (R316:502). In addition, Dr. Schnittker testified that the nonfatal 
pellet wounds were going back to front, therefore the shooter would have to be off to the side 
and to the back of the victim (R317:719). 
The forensic and eye-witness evidence establishes that Taylor fired a fatal shot into 
Kay. Linae saw Taylor shoot Kay in the left upper chest area (TR319:16, 316:509). Kay 
grabbed herself where she had been shot and fell over (TR316:509). Dr. Schnittker testified 
that the fatal wound to Kay entered near her left shoulder and exited from her right back. 
The bullet passed through Kay's lungs and aorta (TR317:707, 710; PCR1370, 1538, 1540, 
1554-62). She also testified that the size of the wound was "consistent with a medium 
caliber or 38." (TR704). Another wound through her back was consistent with either a .38 or 
a .44, but the diameter of the wound more closely matched a larger caliber, such as a .44 
(TR317:705-07). That wound "might have been fatal." (R317:709). 
Taylor has presented a declaration from Dr. Schnittker, which he claims "calls into 
question many of the facts relied upon by the State, and raises substantial concerns 
surrounding whether Mr. Taylor was even guilty of the two murders he pled guilty to." 
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(Taylor's br. at 44). However, Dr. Schnittker's declaration does not dispute, contradict, or 
discredit her autopsy results and testimony (TR317:699-722, R496GG, Pet.'s Ex. 117). 
Dr. Schnittker found a .38 caliber bullet in Kay's sweatshirt when she performed the 
autopsy. She testified that the .38 bullet found in Kay's sweatshirt was consistent with the 
fatal wound (TR317:707). That statement has not been disputed or refuted. Taylor argued 
below that "it appears that the coroner was incorrect when she assumed that the .38 she 
found in Kay Tiede's clothing had passed through her body." (R676). However,, in her 2007 
statement, Dr. Schnittker merely concludes that "[t]he location of this bullet is consistent 
with Gunshot Wound #2, but I cannot be certain that this bullet caused the injuries of 
Gunshot Wound #2." (R496GG, Pet.'s ex. 117, t 5). 
In addition, Taylor admits that two .38 caliber bullets were recovered (R675). FBI 
agent Bell testified that they recovered a .38 bullet at the scene, which tested positive for 
blood, indicating that it had passed through somebody's body (TR573-74). Finally, Taylor 
admitted to Dr. Moench that he emptied the .38 into Kay and Beth, then grabbed the .44 
from Deli and emptied that gun into the women as well (TR 479, addendum C). All available 
evidence establishes that Taylor fired the shot that killed Kay Tiede. 
Similarly, the forensic and eye-witness evidence establishes that Taylor fired a shot 
that did kill or would have killed Beth. Police recovered two .44 caliber bullets from the 
basement that had passed through Beth's body and the living room floor. The police report 
indicates that it appeared two additional rounds had been fired through Beth's body, but 
police never recovered those rounds (PCR1369-70.) 
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The medical examiner testified that Beth suffered a head wound and a wound near 
her feet that were more consistent with a .44 caliber bullet. She also testified that Beth 
suffered a right breast wound more consistent with a .38 caliber bullet. The breast wound 
would have been fatal if the .44 head wound had not killed Beth first. (TR317:704,710-11). 
Both the .38 shot to the chest and the .44 shot to the head would have been fatal. Therefore, 
even if Taylor only used the .38, the shot he fired would have killed Beth. 
Beth was shot in the head, and Linae testified that Taylor said he "had to shoot the 
bitch in the head twice." (TR317:513; 319:21, PCR1538). Plus, Taylor admitted to Dr. 
Moench that he was the actual shooter who killed both victims (R496A, Pet's Ex 57, 
addendum C). All available evidence demonstrates that Taylor fired at least one and 
possibly both fatal shots into Beth. As the medical examiner noted, "one shooter could use 
two different guns." (TR317:715). 
Taylor admitted to Dr. Moench that he emptied the .38 into Kay and Beth, then 
grabbed the .44 from Deli and emptied that gun into the women as well (R496A, Pet's Ex 57, 
addendum C). Taylor told Dr. Moench that Deli looked at him "as if to say 'what in hell are 
you doing?'" Taylor said, "T shot two people with no motive, out of cold blood, with my 
gun, then Ed's [Deli's].'" Id. Taylor has never submitted any affidavit or declaration 
claiming that he did not shoot Kay Tiede or Beth Potts. Deli testified at his own trial that 
Taylor did all of the shooting and that Deli shot no one (R974, addendum D). All of the 
testimony and evidence, including Taylor's own statements, establish that Taylor fired fatal 
shots into Kay and Beth. Taylor's claim of innocence is meritless. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT CLAIMS 
ALREADY RAISED ARE PROCEDURALLY BARRED. 
The district court ruled that claims already raised and addressed are procedurally 
barred. Claims 1-4, 6-8, 11, 13, 15-18, 20, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29 and 30 "were raised and 
addressed in a prior proceeding, either at trial, on direct appeal, in Petitioner's initial post-
conviction case, or in his appeal from the denial of his initial petition for posl-conviction 
relief and, therefore, they are procedurally barred under the PCRA" (R1229-80). 
Taylor has not challenged the district court's ruling on this issue (Taylor's br. at 12). 
However, he states that he "raises and preserves, but does not brief at length any of the 
claims deemed successive by the district court." Id. "Issues not briefed by an appellant are 
deemed waived and abandoned." American Towers Owners Assoc, Inc., v. CC1Mechanical, 
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1185, FN 5 (Utah 1996) (abrogated on other grounds, 2009 UT 65). By 
failing to brief the claims, Taylor has waived them on appeal. 
Taylor states that he "will not burden this Court with arguments" unless this Court 
determines that it has not had a full opportunity to review any of these claims or "if 
Respondent reverses course and contends that any or all of these claims have not previously 
been presented to this Court for consideration."6 (Taylor's br. at 13). Taylor cannot shift the 
burden to the court. A "reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with 
6
 It is not and has never been the State's position that all of the claims previously 
raised were presented to this Court. As the State pointed out below, it does not concede that 
all claims previously raised were fully exhausted for federal habeas purposes (Rl 031-32). A 
claim raised and addressed at trial or in a prior post-conviction action would be procedurally 
barred under the PCRA. If the claim was not then raised on appeal in the Utah Supreme 
Court it may not be exhausted for federal habeas purposes. Exhaustion requires presentation 
to the highest state court. O'Sullivanv. Boerckel, 526U.S. 838, 847,119 S.Ct. 1728 (1999). 
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pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988) 
(overruled in part by 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23). 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT CLAIMS 
THAT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY RAISED ARE 
PROCEDURALLY BARRED, AND NO EXCEPTION APPLIES TO 
EXCUSE TAYLOR FROM THAT BAR. 
The only issue Taylor raises on appeal is whether the district court erred in dismissing 
claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19,21, 24, 25 and 27 (Taylor's br. at 1,12). The district court ruled 
that all of these claims are procedurally barred because they could have been, but were not 
previously raised at trial, on appeal, or in his prior post-conviction petition, and Taylor has 
"not shown that any statutory or common law exceptions apply that would permit the Court 
to consider the merits of these claims." (R1306). 
Under the PCRA, a petitioner is not eligible for relief upon any ground that "could 
have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal" or that "could have been, but was not, 
raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (West 
2007); § 78B-9-106 (West 2008).7 Taylor has failed to establish that the district court 
misinterpreted or misapplied the PCRA or the common law. 
A. Taylor has failed to establish that he meets any common-law 
exception to the procedural bar. 
Taylor claims that the "good cause" common law exception to the procedural bar 
applies to him (Taylor's br. at 17). "[Ejven where a claim of error could have been raised 
The common law procedural bar rule is the same. Gardner v. Galetka, 2007 UT 3, 
Tfl7, 151 P.3d968. 
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earlier, post-conviction relief may be available in those 'rare cases' or 'unusual 
circumstances' where 'an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right has occurred' that would make it 'unconscionable' not to reexamine the 
issue." Gardner v. Galetka, 2007 UT 39 ^  17, 151 P.3d 968. The district court correctly 
concluded that Taylor failed to establish that any exception applies to excuse his claims from 
being procedurally barred.8 
1. Taylor has failed to establish that his claims are not 
frivolous or were not withheld for tactical reasons. 
Taylor claims that the "fundamental unfairness" exception applies to him because he 
is innocent (Taylor's br. at 17). But as shown in point I, Taylor is not innocent. Taylor also 
argues that the procedural bar should not apply because his claims were "overlooked in good 
faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ." (Taylor's br. at 18). However, before a post-
conviction court is required to consider whether any of the common law exceptions apply to 
excuse the procedural bar, a determination must be made that the claims "are not frivolous 
and were not withheld for tactical reasons." (R1248, 1297); see Gardner v. Galetka, 2007 
UT3,1f26, 151P.3d968. 
Taylor argues that if the district court believed that prior post-conviction counsel may 
have had a tactical basis for not bringing these claims, it should have held an evidentiary 
8
 Under the procedural bar section, Taylor also claims that his petition was timely 
(Taylor's br. at 14). However, the PCRA statute of limitations is not relevant to the 
procedural bar. If Taylor's claims could have been raised at trial, on appeal, or in his 
previous post-conviction petition, then the procedural bar applies. § 78B-9-106. If he could 
not have previously raised the claim, then the procedural bar would not apply, although the 
claim might still be untimely under § 78B-9-107. The State addresses the timeliness of 
Taylor's claims in point IV below. 
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hearing to examine the issue (Taylor's br. at 19). Taylor is mistaken. The burden is his. 
Under the PCRA, the respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion, such 
as a procedural bar, "but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to 
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." § 78B-9-105. 
As the district court correctly held, "if the substance of a successive claim was not 
raised in a prior post-conviction petition, it must be presumed that the reason for not raising 
it was tactical or strategic in nature. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003)." 
(R1249). In order to overcome this presumption, a petitioner must show that "there was no 
'conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions.'" State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, *| 6, 89 P.3d 
162 (quoting Bryant, 965 P.2d at 542) (R1298). 
The district court held that Taylor "nowhere demonstrates that [the claims] were not 
withheld for tactical reasons." (R1297). In fact, the district court held that "[n]ot only has 
Petitioner not even attempted to specifically meet this burden, it is unlikely that he could do 
so." (R1298). On appeal Taylor merely argues that "[tjhere was no conceivable tactical basis 
for counsel's withholding of claims that could potentially yield relief for Mr. Taylor." 
(Taylor's br. at 48). Taylor's conclusory statement assumes that his claims are meritorious. 
However, as addressed in point IV below, none of his claims are meritorious. In addition, 
counsel is not obligated to raise every7 colorable issue. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-
53, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (1983). 
The district court held that "[a]ll of the claims raised in Petitioner's successive 
petition that were not previously raised are claims for which a reasonable basis can be 
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articulated as to why they were not raised in a prior proceeding." (R1298). For example, the 
claims might not have been raised because they were weaker or less persuasive than other 
claims. Id. Raising weaker claims could have been futile and might have distracted the post-
conviction court from fuller consideration of the stronger claims. Id. 
2. Taylor failed to establish that his claims meet the PCRA 
requirements for newly discovered evidence. 
Taylor asserts, as an exception to the procedural bar, that two of his claims are based 
on newly discovered evidence (Taylor's br. at 16). However the district court correctly 
noted that this former common law exception has been codified in the PCRA, which 
specifically sets out the grounds for relief based on newly discovered evidence (R1283). As 
this Court stated, the PCRA "provides for relief on the basis of'newly discovered material 
evidence,' thereby incorporating the second Hurst factor.'" Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 
42, j^ 14, 94 P.3d 263. 
Taylor asserts that claim 14, alleging exclusion of non-Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints (LDS) members from the jury, and claim 24, Scott Manley's declaration, 
are based on newly discovered evidence (Taylor's br. at 16). Under the PCRA. a petitioner 
must establish that "neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the 
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial 
motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence." § 78B-9-104(l)(e)(i) (West 2009). 
Prior counsel either knew or could have discovered with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence the evidence on which Taylor bases his successive claims 14 and 24. In claim 14, 
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Taylor argues that the prosecutor excluded non-LDS venire members from the jury. Taylor 
asserts that this claim presents new facts not previously known, because it is based on 
prosecutor notes that were not provided to any of his former counsel (Taylor's br. at 16,33). 
However the issue is not whether the notes themselves were provided, but whether Taylor or 
his counsel knew of or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have discovered the 
evidence contained in the notes. 
The notes show the venire members names, with notes written under each name. 
Under some of those names is the notation "LDS." The notes also show who was stricken 
(R496A, Pet's Ex. 77, addendum E). Taylor's trial counsel certainly knew how venire 
members had answered voir dire questions, and therefore knew who stated they were LDS or 
not. He also knew which venire members were stricken by the State. Regardless of whether 
any of Taylor's prior counsel actually received or reviewed the voir dire notes, Taylor fails to 
establish that his claim that venire members were stricken because of their religion is based 
on evidence that his trial counsel did not already know. 
In claim 24, Taylor argues that the 2007 declaration obtained from Mr. Manley is 
newly discovered evidence and claims that his prior post-conviction counsel could not locate 
and interview Manley because of lack of funding (Taylor's br. at 17).9 But as the district 
9
 Manley's 2007 declaration claims that on the way to his taped interview, one of the 
parole officers told him that they knew Taylor was guilty and they expected him to make the 
story on Taylor bigger, and that if he didn't they were going to send Manley "back to the 
joint on some big heavy time." However, Manley also acknowledges in his declaration that 
since 1994 he has been on medication for mental illness, and that he hears and see things that 
are not there. (R496GG, Pet/s ex. 115). 
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court noted, Taylor "does not discuss nor demonstrate that the new evidence he now 
possesses is evidence that could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence." (R1285). Instead, he merely contends that the evidence was not discovered as a 
result of inadequate funding for prior post-conviction counsel (R1286). 
However, as the State argues in point 111(C)(2) below, Taylor has not established that 
post-conviction counsel's funding was inadequate. Taylor has essentially conceded that 
prior counsel could have obtained the declaration if they had located and interviewed 
Manley. That fact alone defeats Taylor's claim. In addition, Taylor has never asserted that 
trial or appellate counsel lacked the funding to locate and interview Manley (especially since 
Manley was present and testified at Taylor's penalty phase hearing). 
Taylor has also failed to establish that he meets the additional PCRA requirements for 
newly discovered evidence. For example, the Manley declaration is merely impeachment 
evidence. § 78B-9-104(e)(iii). And, as to both claims 14 and 24, Taylor "fails to discuss or 
demonstrate that, when viewed with all of the other evidence presented in the case, no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty of the offense to which he pleaded guilty 
or subject to the sentences of death he received." (R1288); § 78B-9-104(e)(iv). 
Taylor has failed to establish that any exception applies to his claims that would allow 
him to proceed with procedurally barred claims. 
B. The district court correctly concluded that there is no ineffective-
assistance exception to the successive petition procedural bar. 
Taylor asserts that he has a statutory right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel (Taylor's br. at 20). He then argues that his claims could not have been 
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raised in his previous post-conviction petition because his "post-conviction counsel was 
prevented from developing these claims by his lack of funding." Id. This, he claims, opens 
the door to merits review of those claims. 
In 1997, the Legislature passed 78-35a-202, which requires courts to appoint funded 
counsel who meet the competency standards established by rule to represent death-sentenced 
post-conviction petitioners.10 In Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480, this Court 
concluded that the Legislature intended to create a right to post-conviction counsel who 
would perform at the levels guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights that 
apply during criminal proceedings. Id. at l[f78-82. 
Taylor argued that he could rely on the Menzies right as an exception to the PCRA's 
proscription against raising in his successive petition any claim that he could have raised in 
his first petition (R1250-51). The district court rejected Taylor's argument, concluding that 
the PCRA included no ineffective-assistance exception to the successive petition bar 
(Rl 269-71). The district court ruled that "unlike the procedural bar rule that applies to initial 
post-conviction petitions, . . . which includes a statutory exception based upon ineffective 
assistance of trial or appellate counsel no exception based upon the ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel is expressly included in the PCRA" (R1295-96). The court 
reasoned that, because the Menzies right is statutory, the Legislature could limit its scope. 
And, because the Legislature included no ineffective-assistance successive-petition-bar 
exception, Taylor could not rely on a violation of the Menzies statutory right to excuse his 
10
 This provision, as amended in 2008, is now found in section 78B-9-202. 
23 
failure to raise his successive-petition claims in his first petition (R1269-71, 1295-96). 
The district court's analysis was correct. First, the court correctly concluded that, 
because Menzies's right was statutory, the Legislature had authority to define its reach 
(R1269). As the court recognized, Menzies itself supports that conclusion. Id. There, the 
State argued that "writing an effective assistance requirement into section [202] would make 
capital post-conviction litigation interminable and end the finality of death sentences." 
Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at ^ J 84. This Court responded that "Utah's post-conviction legislation 
and associated rules contain appropriate limitations to assist courts in streamlining post-
conviction review in death penalty cases. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-106(2002) 
(discussing various grounds under which relief may be precluded); Utah R. Civ. P. 65C 
(containing procedural provisions governing the progression of post-conviction litigation)." 
Id. This Court made it clear that, even though a death-sentenced petitioner has a statutory 
right to post-conviction counsel, the Legislature may limit the scope of that right by statute. 
Second, the district court correctly interpreted the PCRA. Courts must "look first to 
the plain language of the statutes to determine their meaning and to discern the intent of the 
legislature." Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ^ [12,223 P.3d 1128. And "[provisions within 
a statute are interpreted win harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other 
statutes under the same and related chapters.'" Id. (citation omitted). The plain language of 
section 202 merely created a right to funded, competent counsel to pursue post-conviction 
relief in death-penalty cases. § 78B-9-202. It says nothing about the successive-petition 
procedural bar, much less create an exception to it based on the right to counsel. 
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The PCRA clearly defines the procedural bars and its exceptions in section § 78B-9-
106. Section 106( 1 )(b) procedurally bars post-conviction relief for claims that were raised at 
trial or on appeal. Section 106(l)(c) bars relief for claims that could have been, but were not 
raised at trial or on appeal. And section 106(d) bars relief for claims that were or that could 
have been, but were not raised in a prior post-conviction action. Section 106(3) creates an 
ineffective-assistance exception only for section 106(l)(c): claims that could have been, but 
were not raised at trial or on appeal. By limiting the ineffective-assistance procedural-bar 
exception to claims that could have been but where not raised at trial or on direct appeal, the 
PCRA makes clear that any statutory right to the effective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel is not an exception to the successive petition procedural bar. 
Taylor has not established that the district court erred. On appeal, he argues only that 
the district court erroneously rejected his claim because counsel in his first post-conviction 
action "was prevented from developing [the claims Taylor first raised in his successive 
petition] by [the] lack of funding." (Taylor's br. at 20). But Taylor's argument only goes to 
whether any right to effective post-conviction counsel was violated. It says nothing about 
whether the violation of the right is an exception to the procedural bar. For the reasons 
argued, the district court correctly concluded that no such exception exists (R1271). 
C. The Court may affirm on the alternative bases either that Taylor 
never established that the right to effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel had been violated or that the right does not exist. 
In addition to affirming the district court ruling, this Court may affirm on the 
alternative, independent bases that 1) Taylor never proved ineffective assistance of prior 
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post-conviction counsel, or 2) he had no right to the effective-assistance of post-conviction 
counsel. As to the second, the right does not exist either because 1) the 2008 statutory 
amendment disavowing it applies to Taylor's case, or 2) this Court erred in Menzies when it 
read that right into the unamended statute.11 
1. Taylor never established that prior post-conviction counsel was 
ineffective. 
In Menzies, this Court equated the statutory right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights that apply at trial and on 
direct appeal. Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ^  87. Therefore, in order to establish that his post-
conviction counsel were ineffective, Taylor had to prove both 1) that prior post-conviction 
counsel's representation was objectively deficient; and 2) prejudice. See, e.g., Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523, 525 (2003); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88,690, 
695 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994). 
To prove the deficient-performance element, Taylor had to overcome a "strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997), 
cert denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998); Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522. 
To prove prejudice, Taylor had to prove that, but for counsel's deficient performance, 
there would be a reasonable probability of a more favorable result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
11
 The district court also rejected Taylor's argument that he had a state constitutional 
right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel and could rely on a denial of that 
right to excuse the successive petition procedural bar (Rl250-62). On appeal, Taylor relies 
only on the statutory right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. He has not 
argued that he has an independent constitutional right. 
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695. A convicted person challenging counsel's performance on direct appeal must prove that 
counsel overlooked a claim that probably would have resulted in reversal. See, e.g., Lafferty 
v. State, 2007 UT 73, 1f48,175 P.3d 530, cert, denied, 129 S. Ct. 43 (2008). Post-conviction 
review, like direct appeal, is an attempt to overturn the conviction or sentence. Therefore, 
Taylor had to prove that post-conviction counsel overlooked or mishandled a claim that 
probably would have resulted in post-conviction relief from his conviction or sentence. 
Taylor argues only that his prior counsel "was prevented from developing [the 
procedurally barred] claims by lack of funding." (Taylor's br. at 20). That bare assertion 
does not prove ineffective assistance. Taylor has not established that the funds provided 
were insufficient, or that objectively reasonable representation required counsel to develop 
the claims that prior post-conviction counsel did not develop in Taylor's first post-conviction 
action. And Taylor has not proved the requisite prejudice. As shown in point IV below, 
none of Taylor's claims are meritorious. Therefore, Taylor cannot establish that prior post-
conviction counsel omitted any claim that was reasonably likely to have succeeded. 
2. Taylor failed to prove that inadequate funding to his prior 
post-conviction counsel allows him to proceed with his 
successive post-conviction claims. 
Taylor argues that his prior post-conviction counsel was denied critical funds 
necessary to properly challenge his conviction and sentence (Taylor's br. at 21). He 
therefore argues that he should be excused from the procedural and time bars and be allowed 
to proceed with his post-conviction claims. But Taylor failed to establish that the funding 
was actually inadequate, or that even if the funding was inadequate, that he was prejudiced. 
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a. Taylor failed to establish that the funding was 
inadequate. 
Taylor has not supported the factual predicate that the funding was inadequate. 
Taylor's prior post-conviction counsel might not have received as much money as he wanted 
or even asked for, but that does not establish that he did not or could not have received 
enough to provide effective assistance of counsel. In addition, Taylor's counsel failed to 
•J *y 
follow proper procedures to request that the funding be increased (Rl 024-30). 
Taylor's prior post-conviction counsel was entitled to $20,000 for reasonable 
litigation expenses. Utah Admin. Code R25-4-5. The district court found that prior post-
conviction counsel only requested litigation expenses in the amount of $11,555.16, leaving 
unused the amount of $8,444.84 (R1287). Because there were unused litigation funds still 
available, the district court found it difficult to conclude that the new evidence Taylor now 
possesses could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence as a 
result of insufficient funding (Rl 287-88). Taylor concedes as much (Taylor's br. at 24). 
Taylor argues that the district court's calculations are not correct based on information 
that was not before the district court (Taylor's br. at 24). However, he does not argue or 
Taylor also erroneously argues that the State deliberately interfered with funding 
(Taylor's br. at 21). However, Taylor fails to ever identify how the State "interfered" with 
funding. In the district court below, Taylor complains about the fact that the State objected 
to his ex parte requests for funding. He then states that "[t]his unnecessary litigation by the 
State further depleted Mr. Mauro's already scarce resources." (R693). The State disagrees 
that its actions were unnecessary, or that its objections "interfered" with funding. The State 
believes the ex parte communications exceeded those to which the parties agreed and 
potentially prejudiced the State's position in future federal litigation (R1022-23). Like 
Taylor's counsel, State's counsel is entitled to protect his client's interests. 
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establish that the district court was incorrect based on the record in front of it. 
Taylor mentions some of the things his counsel spent money on, and some of the 
things on which he wanted to spend more money. But even assuming that counsel did not 
have enough money to spend on everything he wanted, this does not establish that his 
choices were reasonable or necessary. The fact that counsel may not have been able to do 
everything he wanted, does not establish ineffectiveness. "A reasonable investigation is not, 
however, the investigation that the best criminal defense lawyer in the world, blessed not 
only with unlimited time and resources but also with the inestimable benefit of hindsight, 
would conduct." Thomas v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 513, 515 (7th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 525 
U.S. 1123(1999). 
b. Taylor failed to establish that he was prejudiced by 
inadequate funding. 
The district court ruled that even if it were to conclude that the available funding 
hampered prior post-conviction counsel's ability to perform the investigation he believed 
was necessary, and for that reason, the new evidence he now has could not have been 
discovered, Taylor "fails to discuss or demonstrate that, when viewed with all of the other 
evidence presented in the case, no reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty of the 
offenses to which he pleaded guilty or subject to the sentences of death he received." 
R1288). Taylor has not shown that the district court ruling was incorrect. 
Taylor's addendum C is comprised of documents that are not part of the record 
because they were never provided to the district court below. The State has filed a separate 
motion asking the Court to strike Taylor's addendum C. 
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In Taylor's direct appeal, he argued that his trial counsel's "minimal compensation 
created a per se conflict of interest preventing him from giving Taylor adequate assistance of 
counsel." Taylor, 947 P.2d at 688. This Court found that Taylor had "failed to allege, let 
alone identify, anything in this particular case to support the theory that his defense 
suffered." Id. The same is true here. Taylor has failed to identify any prejudice because he 
has failed to establish a reasonable probability that his first post-conviction petition would 
have been granted if his counsel had received additional funds. 
Taylor has failed to establish that additional money spent on investigation or 
additional money spent by the mitigation expert would have provided information that would 
establish a reasonable probability that his first post-conviction petition would have been 
granted. As addressed in point IV below, all of Taylor's claims are meritless. "If an omitted 
issue is meritless, then counsel's failure to raise it does not amount to constitutionally 
ineffective assistance." Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999). 
3. Alternatively, Taylor had no right to the effective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel. 
This Court also may affirm on the alternative basis that Taylor had no right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel at all either 1) because the 2008 amendment 
to section 202 disavowing that right applies to Taylor's case, or 2) because this Court 
decided Menzies incorrectly in the first place. 
a. The 2008 amendment to § 202 applies to Taylor's case. 
A little over a year after the Court decided Menzies, the Legislature amended the 
PCRA and added section 202(4). It provides that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be 
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construed as creating the right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, and 
relief may not be granted on any claim that post-conviction counsel was ineffective." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-9-202(4) (West 2008). That amendment applies to Taylor's case, and the 
district court erroneously concluded otherwise. 
Generally, the law that exists at the time a plaintiff initiates a lawsuit will govern that 
suit. See, e.g., Marshal v. Industrial Common of Utah, 704 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985). 
There are, however, exceptions. Amendments that are procedural, as opposed to substantive, 
apply retroactively. Amendments that "neither create new rights nor destroy existing rights," 
but "operate in furtherance of a remedy already existing," "appl[y] retrospectively to 
accrued or pending actions." Id. at 582. Amendments that "control[] the mode and form of 
procedure for enforcing the underlying substantive rights apply to pending actions." Evans 
& Sutherland v. Utah State Tax Comm % 953 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1997). 
An amendment is substantive, as opposed to procedural, if it changes the factors a 
court must consider in determining whether to grant relief. See, e.g., In re: Disconnection of 
Certain Territory from Highland City, 668 P.2d 544, 548-49 (Utah 1983). Therefore, 
statutory amendments that broaden, narrow, or eliminate the availability of relief do not 
apply to pending actions. Amendments that change only how a litigant will go about 
obtaining or defending against that relief do. 
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, 40 P.3d 611, illustrates the point. Daniels was charged 
with capital murder. Id. at <|13. While Daniels' case was pending, the Legislature changed 
the sentencing statute to permit a sentence of life without the possibility of parole on the vote 
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often of twelve jurors. But when Daniels' case began, LWOP could be imposed only on the 
unanimous vote of all twelve jurors. Id. at *[  37-41. This Court held that the amendment 
was procedural; therefore, it applied to Daniels. The Court reasoned that the change from a 
unanimous verdict to a majority of ten jurors had "nothing to do with the substance of 
[Daniels'] crime or the amount of punishment specified for it; it deals with the procedure by 
which the jury arrives at a decision on the amount of punishment to impose from sentencing 
alternatives." Id. at f 41. 
This Court recently applied the same analysis to an appellate rule adopted after the 
action at issue began. In Counties v. Utah State Tax Comm % 2010 UT 50, P.3d , 
the substantive right at issue was the proper valuation method used to assess the value of 
taxable property. The new rule affected the standard for reviewing the tax commission's 
valuation. But the Court held that the rule applied because it "controlled' the mode and 
form of procedure for enforcing" the right to a proper valuation. Id. at ]f 12. 
Similarly, section 202's right to counsel - including the 2008 amendment that it does 
not include a right to the effective assistance of counsel - has "nothing to do with the 
substance" of Taylor's post-conviction action. Section 104 delineates the claims that will 
support post-conviction relief. § 78B-9-104; Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a). Even when Taylor's 
successive post-conviction action began, section 104 limited relief for ineffective 
representation to situations where that representation would violate an independent 
constitutional right. § 78-35a-104(l)(d). The United States Constitution contemplates no 
right to the effective assistance of state post-conviction counsel. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 
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U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct 2546, 2566 (1991). This Court has never recognized a state 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Menzies, 2006 UT 
811! 84. Taylor apparently has abandoned the claim that he has such a right. 
The Legislature limited ineffective-assistance as a procedural bar exception to claims 
that could have been, but were not raised at trial or on direct appeal. Even if narrowing a 
procedural bar exception affects a substantive right, §202(4) changed nothing. The addition 
of §202(4) does not narrow or eliminate a substantive basis for post-conviction relief. It 
affects only 1) whether and under what circumstances a petitioner may prosecute a post-
conviction action with a state-funded attorney, 2) funds available to pay counsel and to cover 
litigation expenses, and 3) whether the statutory right to post-conviction counsel creates the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel. It affects only "the machinery available" by 
which a petitioner may prosecute his action for post-conviction relief. Section 202(4) is not 
substantive and applies to Taylor's action. 
Nevertheless, the district court erroneously concluded otherwise. It ruled that the 
statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel was substantive because, in Menzies, 
post-conviction counsel's ineffective assistance "affected [Menzies'] substantive rights" 
(R1268). But the procedural changes that applied retroactively in both Daniels and 
Counties also "affected" substantive rights. In Daniels, the procedural change made it easier 
for the State to obtain a harsher sentence. In Counties, the procedural change affected the 
standard of appellate review of a decision on the substantive right. In those cases, as here, 
the changes did not eliminate or limit the rights themselves. 
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Another exception to the general rule against retroactivity provides that amendments 
that clarify a prior enactment apply to pending actions. See e.g., Okland v. Industrial 
Comm 'n.9 520 P.2d 208, 210-11 (Utah 1974). See also Dep 't of Social Services, v. Higgs, 
656 P.2d 998, 1001 (Utah 1982). Newly added 202(4) merely clarifies the Legislature's 
original intent when it provided for state-funded counsel in 1997. 
When Menzies was decided, §202 provided that "[i]f the court finds that the defendant 
is indigent, it shall promptly appoint counsel who is qualified to represent defendants in 
death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(a) (Supp. 2001). It further provided for reasonably funded 
counsel. Id. at 202(2)(c). But, while it provided for qualified, funded counsel, it said 
nothing about performance standards, let alone performance standards that paralleled those 
that applied during the criminal proceedings. Subsection 202(4)'s provision that "[njothing 
in [the PCRA] shall be construed as creating the right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel" is consistent with the plain language in the unamended 1997 statute. 
The 1997 legislative history to 202 further demonstrates that 202(4) merely expresses 
the Legislature's original intent.14 The Legislature passed section 202 to meet the federal 
opt-in conditions for expedited federal habeas review established in .28 U.S.C. §§ 2261 
14
 For example, in the House floor debates, Representative Martin Stephens stated, 
By passing this piece of legislation, and funding these appeals so that they are not pro 
bono, that's one of the requirements to get into the federal speed up process that Senator 
Hatch passed with the Anti-Terrorist Act. It was part of the federal prosecution. Without 
this bill and the funding of these indigent defendants, we can't get into that federal act and 
speed up process . . . . 
Floor Debate on H.B. 76, 1997 Gen. Session, Day 10, January 28, 1997. 
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through 2266 (1996). See, e.g. Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ^ 12, 223 P.3d 1128 
(recognizing that a statute's purpose provides insight into its meaning). Section 2261 
conditions the opt-in benefits in federal review on the State 1) "establishing] . . . a 
mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation 
expenses of competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings;" and 2) "providing] 
standards of competency for the appointment of such counsel." 28 U.S.C. § 2261(c).15 
Consequently, section 202 provided for both 1) reasonable funds to pay for state post-
conviction review in death-penalty cases; and 2) competency standards for the counsel 
appointed to represent death-sentenced state post-conviction petitioners. 
At the same time, the federal opt-in provisions did not condition opting in on a state 
establishing performance standards for post-conviction counsel. And the federal opt-in 
requirements nowhere intimate that they apply only where state post-conviction counsel 
performs to the level required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment during trial and direct 
appeal. Not surprisingly, then, section 202 included no such requirement. 
And, a little over one year after this Court read a right to effective-assistance of 
counsel into section 202, the Legislature amended section 202 to say that it created no such 
right. In this context, the 2008 amendment does not remove a right that the Legislature 
originally granted. It merely clarifies that the 1997 statute did not include the right that this 
Court read into it. See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 486 (Utah 1988) ("[w]hen a statute is 
amended, the amendment is persuasive evidence of the legislature's intent when it passed the 
15
 These requirements are now found in 2265(a)(1). 
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former, unamended" statute), overruled on other grounds as recognized by State v. Baker, 
884 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah App. 1994). That is, to give Utah the benefit of the expedited 
federal habeas review procedures, section 202 provided for funded counsel with certain 
qualifications and nothing more. 
The district court erroneously concluded that the amendment was not clarifying. It 
ruled that the amendment was intended as a response to Menzies, not as a clarification. The 
State agrees that section 202(4) was a response to Menzies. That is what makes it clarifying. 
This Court founded Menzies on its interpretation of the Legislature's intent. In response, the 
Legislature amended the statute to state that it shall not be "construed" the way this Court 
construed it in Menzies. If the Court had correctly discerned the Legislature's original intent, 
there would have been no reason to amend the statue. 
b. This Court should overrule Menzies. 
The Menzies court founded its holding solely on its assessment that the Legislature 
intended to create a right to the effective assistance of counsel. The sum of the Court's 
analysis was that, by creating the right to funded counsel, the Legislature must have intended 
to create a right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel because the Legislature 
could not have meant "that a petitioner in a post-conviction death penalty proceeding is only 
entitled to ineffective assistance of appointed counsel." Menzies. 2006 UT 81, f^ 82. 
Of course, the State never argued in Menzies and nothing in section 202 suggests that 
the Legislature intended to provide petitioners with ineffective assistance of counsel. That 
does not mean that the Legislature intended to create a right to post-conviction representation 
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that parallels the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights that apply during a criminal case. 
As detailed in the prior subsection, section 202's plain language, legislative history, and the 
2008 amendment refute the Menzies court's contrary surmise. That is, the Legislature 
intended to provide for funded counsel who had the requisite qualifications and no more. 
This case further demonstrates that the Court misapprehended the Legislature's intent. 
Taylor is here arguing that he is entitled to merits review of claims filed in a voluminous 
successive petition. Nothing in unamended 202's plain language or Legislative history 
suggests that the Legislature intended to generate this kind of additional litigation. Rather, 
the legislative history evinces that the Legislature intended to streamline post-conviction 
review, not to bog it down. 
In sum, the district court correctly concluded that Taylor may not rely on prior post-
conviction counsel's alleged ineffective assistance to excuse the successive-petition 
procedural bar. This Court may affirm on the alternative bases that Taylor did not prove his 
ineffective assistance claim or that Taylor has no right to the effective assistance of counsel 
in post-conviction actions. 
IV. THIS COURT MAY AFFIRM THE DISMISSAL OF THE POST-
CONVICTION PETITION ON THE ALTERNATIVE BASIS THAT 
TAYLOR'S CLAIMS ARE TIME BARRED. 
The PCRA provides that "[a] petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed 
within one year after the cause of action has accrued." § 78R-9-107(1). A cause of action for 
claims based on newly discovered evidence accrues on "the date on which petitioner knew or 
should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the 
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petition is based." § 78B-9-107(2)(d) & (e). However, as addressed above, none of 
Taylor's claims qualify as newly discovered evidence. Therefore Taylor's cause of action 
accrued on October 5, 1998, the date of "entry of the denial of the petition for writ of 
certiorari." § 78B-9-107(2)(d). Taylor's second petition was not filed until November 5, 
2007, long after expiration of the one-year time limit. The district court ruled that Taylor's 
petition was filed "over eight years too late, and therefore it is untimely." (R1271). 
When Taylor filed his successive petition, §107 included an "interests of justice" 
exception that may excuse a late filing. The district court did not analyze the interests of 
justice exception, which requires a merits analysis. In order to avoid reviewing the merits, 
the district court "opted to simply assume that Petitioner's successive petition was timely 
filed and consider first whether the successive claims are procedurally barred." (R1273). 
When Taylor filed his petition, the PCRA provided that "[I]f the court finds that the 
interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the time 
limits." § 78B-9-107(3).16 Taylor asserts that his claims would not be subject to timeliness 
restrictions because the "interests of justice" exception applies (Taylor's br. at 14). He then 
asserts that no statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied and that proper 
consideration of meritorious claims will always be in the interests of justice. Id. 
16
 Taylor filed his petition in 2007. During the 2008 legislative session the interests of 
justice exception was removed from the PCRA and replaced with an equitable tolling 
provision. The State argued below that the amended equitable tolling provision applied to 
Taylor's successive petition. The district court disagreed (R1235). In this particular case, 
the State has chosen not to challenge that portion of the district court's ruling. 
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Under the PCRA, Taylor has the burden of proving that the "interests of justice" 
exception excuses his late filing. § 78B-9-105. In order to prove the interests of justice 
exception, Taylor must 1) state why his claims were not timely filed and 2) point to 
"sufficient factual evidence or legal authority to support a conclusion of meritoriousness." 
Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62 at ^ f 20. In asserting that his claims were not time barred, Taylor 
ignored this Courf s analysis in Adams. Taylor never met his burden to establish either that 
he filed his claims timely or that the interests of justice demand excusing his late filing.17 
A, Taylor did not provide any legally sufficient excuse for filing an 
untimely petition. 
Under Adams, in order to determine whether the interests of justice excuse Taylor's 
untimely filing, a court should consider the reasons for the delay and whether the claims are 
meritorious. Adams, 2005 UT 62 at f 16. Although not entirely clear, it appears that Taylor 
claims that prior post-conviction counsel could not have timely discovered certain evidence 
due to lack of funding. Taylor asserted below that "additional evidence [was] discovered 
once adequate funding was obtained." (R734). He also claimed that "[h]ad Mr. Mauro been 
granted the appropriate funding when needed, ... Mr. Taylor could have presented the 
evidence he now presents in his original petition (R731-32). But Taylor has not proven that 
the funding was inadequate, that more funding was not available if properly requested, or 
that his prior post-conviction counsel was ineffective (see argument in point III above). 
1
 Taylor asserts that because he has "pled" actual innocence, the interests of justice 
exception applies. The State agrees that a meritorious claim of innocence would meet the 
interests of justice exception. But Taylor is not innocent. Merely claiming innocence does 
not meet the interests of justice exception when the claim lacks merit. 
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B. Taylor failed to establish that his claims are meritorious. 
Whatever the reason for filing an untimely petition, Taylor cannot meet the interests 
of justice exception unless he can also establish that his claims are meritorious. In order to 
establish that the claims are meritorious, a "petitioner bears the burden of pointing to 
sufficient factual evidence or legal authority to support a conclusion of meritoriousness." 
Adams, 2005 UT 62 at f^ 20. Taylor failed to meet that burden. 
Taylor conceded that claims 1-4, 6-8, 11, 13, 15-18, 20, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29, and 30 
were raised and addressed in prior proceedings (Rl274-79). Taylor has not challenged the 
district court ruling that these claims are procedurally barred (Taylor's br. at 12). In addition 
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to being procedurally barred, claims already raised and lost are not meritorious. Therefore, 
in making its alternative argument for affirmance, the State does not repeat its argument as to 
why these claims are not meritorious. 
Claim 5 - Change of venue motion. Taylor alleges that the trial court erred and that 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his change of venue motion 
(Taylor's br. at 27, R233-34). Taylor made a motion for a change of venue in the trial court, 
but the motion was denied. Taylor claims that trial counsel was ineffective in his 
presentation of the motion and for not renewing the motion after it was denied. Taylor also 
argues that the trial court erred by denying the request for a change of venue. Id. However, 
Taylor waived the issue of whether the court properly denied his motion for change of venue 
by entering a guilty plea. It is well settled that a voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of 
18
 Taylor does not allege that any of these claims are meritorious except 29 and 30. 
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all non-jurisdictional defects, including pre-plea constitutional violations. See State v. 
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App. 
1988). Taylor has not established that this did not also waive the issue for the penalty phase. 
Alternatively, Taylor has failed to establish that this issue is meritorious. Both the 
Utah and United States Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to trial "by an 
impartial jury." U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12. To protect that right, rule 
29(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, permits a trial court to change venue. State v. 
James, 161 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah 1989). In order to establish that the trial court deprived him 
of his constitutional right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal, Taylor must demonstrate either 
actual or presumed juror prejudice. Breechen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1350 (10l Cir. 
1994). Taylor has established neither.19 
Post-trial, the issue is whether any biased juror actually sat. Taylor has not 
established that any biased juror sat, or that his jury was not fair and impartial. In fact, 
having passed the jury for cause - which necessarily conceded that the jury he faced was 
impartial - Taylor may not now claim otherwise. See State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1350 
(Utah 1997). "When a change of venue decision is challenged on appeal following a jury 
verdict, the determinative question is whether [the] defendant was ultimately tried by a fair 
19
 In the district court below, Taylor argued presumed prejudice where the "publicity 
is so inflammatory that the defendant cannot receive a fair and impartial trial." (R234). 
However, "presumed prejudice is rarely invoked and only in extreme situations." United 
State v. Ahello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1177 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 835 
(1992). It is "a difficult standard, even in cases in which there has been extensive media 
coverage." Stafford v. Saffle. 34 F.3d 1557, 1566 (10th Cir. 1994). Taylor did not meet this 
standard. Taylor appears to have abandoned this argument by not raising it on appeal. 
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and impartial jury." Laffertyv. State, 2007 UT 73, fflj 41-43,175 P.3d 530 (internal cites and 
quotations omitted). Taylor failed to meet this standard, and therefore failed to establish that 
his counsel was ineffective or that a refusal to change venue prejudiced him. 
On appeal, Taylor claims that by interviewing the jurors he was able to establish that 
he was not tried by a fair and impartial jury (Taylor br. at 28-29). For support, Taylor claims 
that juror number five, Blaine Moore, was neither open-minded nor impartial (Taylor's br. at 
29). However, Taylor's bare statement that Mr. Moore was biased does not establish bias.20 
During voir dire, Moore stated that he was acquainted with the prosecutor because he 
worked with his mother at the temple. When asked whether that would prevent him from 
being fair and impartial to both sides, Moore answered "No Sir." (TR53-54). As support for 
his claim that Moore was biased, Taylor cites a different juror's explanation of an 
acquaintance in a small town (R274, Pet.'s Ex. 40, at f^ 5). The explanation is irrelevant, 
because it is not juror Moore's definition of an acquaintance. In addition, it does not in any 
way refute Mr. Moore's answers to the court. Mr. Moore specifically told the court that his 
acquaintance with the prosecutor would not prevent him from being fair and impartial to 
both sides. The mere fact that a juror may be acquainted with the prosecutor does not 
establish that he was not fair and impartial. State v. Cobb, 11A P.2d 1123, 1126 (UT 1989). 
~ In the district court below, Taylor asserted that Mr. Moore was neither fair nor 
impartial based on statements he made during voir dire (R274-77). A full reading of the voir 
dire establishes that juror Moore was not biased or partial (TR248-49). Taylor appears to 
have abandoned that claim, since he now argues that claim 5 could not have been brought 
earlier because it was only discovered "[ajfter conducting interviews with approximately 
three-quarters of the jurors." (Taylor's br. at 28). 
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Taylor also claimed below that Mr. Moore was inattentive (R276). In support of his 
claim Taylor provided a different juror's statement saying: "I recall that Mr. Moore was 
always tired during the trial. He sat next to me, in the back row of the jury box. He fell 
asleep in the jury box on one occasion. I had to hit him in order to wake him up. He said, 
'Thank you, Navee.'" (R271, Pet's Ex. 40 at Tf 7). The fact that a juror was tired does not 
establish inattentiveness. At the most, Taylor's proffer shows that the one time Mr. Moore 
fell asleep, the juror next to him immediately woke him, and Mr. Moore thanked her. 
Taylor also quotes statements from two jurors who claim that when Mr. Moore came 
into the jury room he immediately called for death (R276, Pet.'s Ex. 20 and 21). It is not 
appropriate to ask jurors what occurred in the jury room. Rule of Evidence 606 precludes 
jurors from "testifying] as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the 
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or 
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or 
concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith." Id. "Nor may a juror's 
affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror 
would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes." Id. See also State v. 
Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 1992); State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1993). 
Taylor's proffer merely shows Mr. Moore's opinion following the conclusion of the 
penalty hearing. It does not show that his opinion was based on anything other than an 
impartial assessment of the evidence. And it does not show that he refused to listen to any 
discussion about the appropriate penalty. 
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Taylor also asserts that the town of Coalville, Utah was too small for him to get a fair 
trial in such a high profile case (Taylor's br. at 28). However, Taylor cites no statute, rule, or 
case law in support of his claim that a defendant cannot have a fair trial in a small town. 
Claim 9 - Claim of trial court error in not striking jurors for cause. Taylor 
alleges that he was prejudiced because the trial court erroneously failed to strike venire 
members for cause (Taylor's br. at 30, R294). The only sitting juror Taylor complains about 
is Mr. Moore.21 And, as shown, Taylor has failed to establish that Mr. Moore was biased. 
Defense counsel had not used all of his peremptory challenges before he got to Mr. 
Moore (R496A, Pet.'s Ex. 77, addendum E) and could have used a peremptory challenge to 
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strike Mr. Moore if he had chosen to. Counsel chose to strike other jurors instead. Taylor 
argued below that he was entitled to relief because he had to use a peremptory challenge to 
strike a juror who should have been stricken for cause (R307-8). But Taylor would have 
been entitled to post-conviction relief only if he had proved a constitutional violation. A 
defendant does not have a constitutional right to unfettered use of his peremptory challenges. 
Taylor claimed that the trial court erred by not excusing Janet Jones, Robert Lewis, 
Jeff Rylee, Cindy Lou Schumann, Blaine Moore, and Loreene McNeil (R297-304). 
However, Janet Jones was struck by a prosecution peremptory challenge, Robert Lewis, Jeff 
Rylee, Cindy Lou Schumann, and Lorene McNeill were struck by defense peremptory 
challenges (R307). 
22
 Taylor erroneously asserts that the State's main argument was that Taylor did not 
use all of his peremptory challenges (Taylor's br. at 30). The State's main argument was that 
Taylor failed to establish that Mr. Moore was biased (Rl 119-1126). The State also clarified 
that part of its argument was that defense counsel had not used all of his peremptory 
challenges before he got to Mr. Moore. The State acknowledged that Taylor eventually used 
all of his peremptory challenges (R576, 1125, FN 41, R1338:39-40). 
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And Taylor had a duty to cure any erroneous denial of a for-cause challenge by removing the 
juror with a peremptory challenge. 
A constitutional violation occurs only when a defendant exhausts his peremptory 
challenges removing jurors who should have been dismissed for cause, and a biased juror sits 
because the defendant has no more peremptory challenges with which to remove him. State 
v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ^  24, 24 P.3d 948 (citing State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 400 (Utah 
1994)). In that circumstance, the constitutional violation is the denial of the right to trial by 
an impartial jury. That did not happen here. Taylor had peremptories left which he could 
have used to remove Moore, and he has not shown that Moore was unconstitutionally biased. 
This Court has already held that counsel did not perform deficiently during the jury 
selection process. In the appeal of his first state post-conviction petition, Taylor argued that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use a peremptory challenge to remove Mr. 
Moore. This Court stated that it "cannot conclude that trial counsel had no strategic reasons 
for keeping . . . Moore and instead exercising his peremptory strikes on other jurors." 
Taylor, 2007 UT 12 at Tf 86. The Court concluded that "trial counsel did not perform 
deficiently during the jury selection process. Id. at % 88. 
Taylor asserts that the above point is irrelevant because "this claim is against the trial 
court, not trial counsel." (Taylor's br. at 31). If the claim is against the trial court, then 
counsel's decision to leave Moore on the jury defeats the claim. Taylor did not argue on 
appeal that the trial court erred in passing Moore for cause. This Court said: "it does not 
appear that he could have challenged the trial court's decision where he did not attempt to 
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cure the court's failure to remove Moore by exercising a peremptory strike. State v. Baker, 
935 P.2d 503, 506 (Utah 1997)." Taylor, 2007 UT 12 at Tf 80, n. 3. Taylor fails to address 
this insurmountable problem with his claim. 
Claim 10 - Voir dire questions. Taylor alleged that the trial court failed to ask 
certain voir dire questions, resulting in a flawed jury selection process (R311). Although 
Taylor asserts that he is appealing claim 10 (Taylor's br. at 12), Taylor fails to ever address 
this claim in his brief, and has therefore waived it on appeal. 
In any event, Taylor has never established that this claim is meritorious. There is no 
constitutional right to a particular form of voir dire, and Taylor had no constitutional right to 
have certain specific questions asked. "The Constitution does not dictate a catechism for 
voir dire." Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222 (1992). The purpose of 
voir dire is to ensure that jurors are impartial, and to assist counsel in exercising peremptory 
challenges. MuMin v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431, 111 S.Ct. 1899 (1991). As addressed 
above, Taylor has failed to establish that any biased juror sat. 
In addition, although this exact claim was not raised on appeal, Taylor previously 
claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging trial counsel's failure 
to submit proposed voir dire questions. Taylor, 2007 UT 12 at j^68. In ruling on the issue, 
this Court found that the voir dire process was adequate to ensure a fair and impartial jury 
decided Taylor's sentence. Id. Therefore Taylor's claim of a flawed jury selection process 
cannot be meritorious because this Court has already found that the voir dire process was 
adequate to safeguard the only constitutional right at issue. 
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Claim 12 - Blood atonement. Taylor alleges that the jury venire was prejudicially 
biased by the trial court's introduction of blood atonement into the voir dire (Taylor's br. at 
32, R318). Taylor concedes that it "is not per se impermissible to inquire into a venire 
member's belief in blood atonement" (R325). However, he alleges that it was improper here 
because the jurors were asked about blood atonement in a manner that suggested the desired 
answers, and as a result, Blaine Moore and Ron Wilde were not excused for cause despite 
their belief in blood atonement (R326). 
The fact that potential jurors state a belief in blood atonement is not sufficient to 
establish that they should have been removed for cause. See State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70,79-
80 (Utah 1993) (overruled on other grounds). Below, Taylor quoted language from Wood, 
arguing that "it is prejudicial error if a defendant uses all of his peremptory challenges and 
one of them was used to remove a juror who should have been removed for cause." (R325). 
However, that portion of Wood was overruled by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 
1994). To prevail on a claim of error based on the failure to remove a juror for cause, a 
defendant must "show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent." Id. Taylor has 
failed to make that showing. 
Claim 14 - Allegation that non-LDS jurors were excluded. Taylor's exhibit 77 is a 
document which shows jurors names, with notes below, and also shows which jurors were 
stricken by the prosecution or defense (R496A, Pet's Ex. 77, addendum E). Taylor alleges 
Taylor also complains again about the State's reading of the voir dire challenges 
(Taylor's br. at 32). In response, see footnote 22 above. 
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that exhibit 77 shows that the prosecutor excluded jurors who were not LDS. He then argues 
that the exclusion of non-LDS from the jury because of their religion deprived him of the 
right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community (Taylor's 
br. at 33, R336). But religion is not a protected category like race and gender, and Taylor 
had no right to have the seated jurors form a representative cross-section of the community. 
Taylor acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court has not extended the 
Equal Protection Clause to any other categories aside from race and gender (Taylor's br. at 
35, R345). But he argues that this Court should do so under the Utah State Constitution. Id. 
Taylor has not provided, and the State has not found any Utah case holding that it is a 
violation of the Utah Constitution to use a peremptory challenge to strike a juror based on 
religion. A post-conviction petition is not an appropriate forum to argue for new law. Post-
conviction relief is generally unavailable for claims that rest on a new rule announced or 
created after direct appeal. See e.g. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989). 
Taylor also argues that a "qualified citizen may not be excluded from jury service on 
account of... religion . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-103 (West 2009), formerly §78-46-3 
(addendum F) (Taylor's br. at 35). But Taylor raised no challenge to the composition of the 
jury in the trial court below. This Court has consistently held that "a party seeking relief 
based on a 'failure to comply with this act in selecting a . . . trial jury' must move for relief 
"before the trial jury is sworn.'" State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 3 9 , \ 30, 140 P.3d 1219, citing 
State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986); see also 78B-1-113 (West 2009). 
Because Taylor did not move for relief before the jury was sworn, he is precluded from now 
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raising a claim based on this statute. ~ 
Taylor asserts that his claim evolved from federal counsel's acquisition of Exhibit 77, 
which shows peremptory strikes. He claims that despite prior post-conviction counsel's 
request for all records from the district court, he never received Exhibit 77 (Taylor's br. at 
34). Taylor claims that this "shifts the burden of proof to the State to explain the 
impermissible peremptory strikes. Id. First, as stated above, the strikes were not 
impermissible. 
Second, Taylor is wrong about shifting the burden of proof. Under the PCRA, "[t]he 
petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the 
facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief." § 78B-9-105; Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 
UT72,1f 13,61 P.3d978;5rwnerv. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153,1155 (Utah 1996). Taylor bears 
the burden of proof, and he cites no argument or case law for his claim that the burden shifts. 
Taylor also asserts that "[a]s the State withheld this document from state habeas 
counsel, there is no credible argument in favor of barring this claim." (Taylor's br. at 37). 
First, there is no evidence that "the State" wrongfully withheld this document, creating a 
Brady violation. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). According to 
Taylor's own account, he requested the documents from "the district court" not the 
In addition, the title of this statute is "Jurors selected from random cross section -
Opportunity and obligation to serve." §78B-1-103 (addendum F). It requires that "persons 
selected for jury service be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of 
the county." Id. As addressed below, Taylor's claim is that the seated jurors did not form a 
representative cross-section of the community, not that the persons selected for jury service 
did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. 
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prosecutor or the attorney general (Taylor's br. at 34). The Brady rule does not apply to the 
court. Second, the Brady rule does not require a prosecutor to automatically turn over voir 
dire notes to defense counsel. And Taylor never alleges that his prior post-conviction 
counsel ever asked the prosecutor to turn over voir dire notes. 
In addition, Exhibit 77 is merely a hand-written document with notes on the potential 
jurors, showing who was stricken by the State ("St.") and by the defense ("D") (R496A, 
Pet's Ex. 77, addendum E). It does not support Taylor's allegation that the prosecution 
systematically excluded non-LDS jurors. It merely shows that the State struck some jurors 
where the note about that juror included "LDS" and some jurors where the note about the 
juror did not include "LDS." Exhibit 77 provides no indication as to why jurors were 
stricken. Taylor concedes that the prosecution struck four people who were LDS, and the 
defense struck two people who were not LDS (R339).~ Taylor provides no evidence to 
establish that potential jurors were stricken because of their religion. Given the fact that the 
prosecution struck potential jurors who were both LDS and non-LDS, it is more likely that 
the reasons they were stricken had nothing to do with their religion. 
Next, although Taylor asserts that he was deprived of "the right to trial by a jury 
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community" (Taylor's br. at 33, R336), his 
claim is actually that the seated jurors did not form a representative cross-section of the 
community. But Taylor is not entitled to have the seated jurors form a representative cross-
In addition, Taylor never established that the persons who were stricken and did not 
have "LDS" under their name were in fact not LDS or identified themselves as not LDS. 
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section of the community. See Lockhart v. McCree, 47'6 U.S. 162,173,106S.Ct. 1758,1765 
(1986) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538, 95 S.Ct. 692, 701-02 (1975). "The 
point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the 
names are put in the box from which the panels are drawn." Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174 
(citing Pope v. U.S., 372 F.2d 710, 725 (C.A. Neb 1967) (vacated on other grounds, 392 
U.S. 651, 88 S.Ct. 2145 (1968)).26 
Taylor also asserts that "[t]he striking of Ms. Conner constitutes structural error, 
therefore no inquiry pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(e)(i)-(iv) is necessary." 
(Taylor's br. at 36). First, Taylor never raised below that a claim of structural error does not 
have to meet the PCRA newly discovered evidence requirements (R350); therefore, he is 
precluded from raising it for the first time on appeal. Tschaggeny v. Milbank Insur. Co., 
2007 UT 37, \ 20, 163 P.3d 615. Second, even if Ms. Conner was stricken based on her 
religion, that it not a Batson violation or a violation of the Utah Constitution, and therefore 
cannot constitute structural error. Finally, Taylor merely concludes without analysis or 
support that he can raise a claim of structural error at any time regardless of whether it meets 
the newly discovered evidence requirements. 
Claim 19 - Alleged juror misconduct. Taylor argues that the jury was prejudiced by 
its consideration of extrinsic evidence and by juror misconduct (Taylor's br. at 37, R390, 
394). He alleges that at the end of each day, the jurors met to compare notes and discuss the 
In addition, Taylor has failed to provide any information as to the religious makeup 
of the community. Therefore, he has never established that the venire panel or the seated 
jurors in fact did not form a representative cross-section of the community. 
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case. He also alleges that the jury foreman, Richard Andrews, "said something like, i f it 
was your mother or daughter, how would you vote?'" (Taylor's br. at 38). 
Even if Mr. Andrews did make this statement,28 Taylor has failed to establish that it 
was improper, or that he was prejudiced by it. In arguing that the statement was improper, 
Taylor cites case law holding that it was improper closing argument for counsel to ask a jury 
to put themselves in the shoes of the plaintiff (Taylor's br. at 39). Taylor cites no case law, 
and counsel could find none, stating that it is improper for a juror, during deliberation and 
within the confines of the jury room, to ask another juror how they would vote if it was their 
mother or daughter. Taylor merely argues that it should be impermissible (R394 14). 
Taylor also argues that juror Jerry Lewis said that at the end of each day, the jurors 
would meet to compare notes and discuss the case (Taylor's br. at 38, R394,). However, 
jurors comparing notes is not "extraneous" information. Taylor has not alleged that the 
In his petition below, Taylor also asserted that the jury was influenced by the 
relationship of the Tiede family to LDS church president Monson, who attended the funeral 
(R392). He also asserted that the jurors were influenced by the LDS church practice of 
sealing families in the temple (R393). Taylor does not repeat these arguments on appeal, and 
they are therefore waived. Even if not waived, they are without merit. Taylor failed to 
provide any evidence that jurors were aware of or considered the victims' visit to an LDS 
temple, or that President Monson attended the victims' funeral. Certainly, temple going LDS 
jurors would have been aware of the LDS practice of "sealing" families in the temple. But 
again, Taylor provided no evidence that it was ever discussed or considered by the jury. 
z8
 In its motion to dismiss, the State pointed out that Taylor had failed to provide an 
affidavit from Mr. Andrews. Taylor responded that Mr. Andrews is dead. Taylor then 
asserted that the fact that Mr. Andrews has died is a prime example of the prejudice suffered 
by Taylor. However, this is actually a prime example of why petitioners should not be 
allowed to file successive petitions many years after the conviction, appeal, and prior post-
conviction petition. The State is prejudiced when people have died and are therefore not 
available to admit or deny statements the petitioner claims they made. 
29
 This page is not Bates stamped, but it falls between pages stamped 394 and 395. 
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jurors discussed matters outside the evidence. In addition, Taylor has failed to establish that 
this information is admissible, or that it prejudiced him. Jurors may not testify as to how 
they or other jurors were subjectively affected by extraneous information. Under Utah Rule 
of Evidence 606, "a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence 
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror." Utah R. Evid. 606(b). However, "a juror 
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's 
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as 
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the 
juror's mental processes in connection therewith." Id. "Nor may a juror's affidavit or 
evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be 
precluded from testifying be received for these purposes." Id. "[A] juror may not testify as 
to the effect any outside information had upon the juror." United States v. Simpson, 950 F.2d 
1519, 1512 (10th Cir. 1991). 
"[EJvidence by affidavit or testimony of a juror will not be received to impeach or 
question the jury verdict or to show the grounds upon which it was rendered, or to 
show . . . their opinions, surmises and processes of reasoning in arriving at a verdict." State 
v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 1992); and see State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 
1993) (holding that trial court properly refused to consider affidavit containing information 
about the jury's deliberations). 
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Claim 21 - Admission of evidence. Taylor alleged that his constitutional rights were 
violated by the improper admission of evidence at the penalty phase of his trial (R3 86-408). 
On appeal, Taylor states that he does not oppose dismissal of parts (a), (c), (d), and (f) of 
claim 21 (Taylor's br. at 41). However, he never addresses parts (b) or (e). Id. By failing to 
address this claim on appeal, Taylor has waived all of claim 21. 
Even if Taylor had appropriately appealed claims 21(b) and (e), he failed to establish 
that those claims were meritorious. In arguing that evidence was improperly admitted at the 
penalty phase, Taylor relied on language and case law related to the admissibility of evidence 
at the guilt phase of a trial (R386-408). However, the rules that govern admissibility of 
evidence at the guilt phase, do not apply at sentencing proceedings. Utah R. Evid. 
1101(b)(3). Rather, in a capital felony sentencing proceeding, "[a]ny evidence the court 
considers to have probative force may be received regardless of its admissibility under the 
exclusionary rules of evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(b)(West2010). Taylor did 
not assert that any of the evidence was admitted in violation of the capital sentencing statute. 
In claim 21(b), Taylor asserted that the trial court improperly allowed the prosecution 
to elicit and perform irrelevant and prejudicial in-court demonstrations (R401). Taylor 
argued mat these demonstrations were '"entirely gratuitous" and rendered his trial 
fundamentally unfair (R404). Taylor continued that, by not intervening "the trial court led 
the jury to believe they could properly use the 'demonstration' rather than the evidence itself, 
in determining whether Mr. Taylor should be sentenced to death." (R777). However, Taylor 
presented no facts or evidence to support his bald assertion that the jury was led to believe 
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they could use the demonstrations rather than the evidence to determine whether Taylor 
should be sentenced to death. In addition, there was no reason for the court to intervene, 
since the demonstrations were properly used to help the jury understand the nature and 
circumstances of the crime, as specifically permitted by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2). 
In claim 21(e), Taylor complained that the trial court admitted in-life photographs of 
the victims and 14 photographs of the crime scene (R348-49). Taylor alleged that these 
photographs were redundant and were offered "solely to inflame the passions of the jury" 
(R349). But Taylor ignored the fact that in-life photographs of victims are specifically 
admissible under Utah's Rights of Crime Victims Act. §77-3 8-9(7) (West 2010). IfTaylor's 
sentences were reversed, and a new sentencing procedure took place, the life photos of the 
victims would be admissible. In addition, even though this portion of the statute was not yet 
in effect at the time of Taylor's trial, Taylor failed to establish that life photos of victims 
were not admissible at a capital felony sentencing proceeding. 
Taylor also failed to establish that the crime scene photos were improperly admitted. 
In capital sentencing proceedings, evidence may be presented on the nature and 
circumstances of the crime and any other facts in aggravation that the court considers 
relevant. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(a) permits the sentencer to consider the crime 
circumstances in determining the sentence to impose. Therefore, crime scene photographs 
are clearly admissible, and Taylor offers no reasoned basis to conclude otherwise. 
Claim 24 - Exculpatory evidence- Taylor asserts that the State failed to disclose the 
circumstances under which Mr. Manley was interrogated, and therefore failed to disclose 
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material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady (Taylor's br. at 42, R437). In a 2007 
declaration, Manley states that "one of the two parole officers told me that they knew Von 
was guilty and they expected me to make the story on Von bigger. They told me that if I did 
not do it they were going to send me back to the joint on some big heavy time." (R496GG, 
Pet's Ex 115, \ 5). But in that same declaration, Manly also acknowledged that since 1994 
he has been on medication for mental illness, and that he hears and sees things that are not 
there. Id. The State does not concede that Manley's recollection of his conversation with the 
parole officer is accurate. 
Taylor argues on appeal that "[n]either Respondent, nor the district court addressed 
the fact that impeachment evidence falls within the Brady rule." (Taylor's br. at 42). 
However, Taylor failed to establish that there was a Brady violation. In order to establish a 
Brady violation, Taylor must demonstrate that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) 
the evidence was favorable to him, and (3) he was prejudiced. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
263,282, 119 S.Ct. 1936(1999). 
Even if Manley's statement is true, Taylor has failed to establish that the prosecution 
violated the Brady rule. "Brady suppression occurs when the government fails to turn over 
even evidence that is known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor." 
Yoimghhod"v. West Virginia. 547 U.S. 867, 870, 126 S.Ct. 2188 (internal citation omitted). 
Taylor has not established that the prosecution knew what the parole officer said to Manley 
or that the prosecutor's level of responsibility for disclosure is the same for parole officers as 
it is for police investigators. In addition, even if the prosecution could be held responsible 
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for knowing what a parole officer said, Taylor has not established that failing to disclose the 
information was a Brady violation. "[S]trictly speaking, there is never a real 'Brady 
violation' unless the nondisclosure wras so serious that there is a reasonable probability that 
the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict." Strickler v. Greene, 527 
U.S. 263, 281, 119 S.Ct.1936, 1948 (1999). This Court has already held that "even if 
Manley's testimony was unreliable, any error the court made in admitting [it] was harmless." 
Taylor II, 2007 UT 12 at ^ f 111. Taylor has not established a reasonable probability that had 
information about the parole officer's statements to Manley been disclosed, that Taylor 
would not have received the death penalty. 
Claim 25 - Culpability. Taylor alleges that his death sentence is disproportionate to 
his culpability and therefore violates his constitutional rights (Taylor's br. at 44, R443). This 
claim is really just a restatement of Taylor's claim of innocence (see point I above). Taylor's 
allegation that he was less culpable than co-defendant Deli is not supported by the facts, the 
evidence, or Taylor's own admissions. 
Taylor asserts that b6[i]t is a fundamental precept that if Mr. Taylor's co-defendant, 
who only received a life sentence, was the actual killer of Kay Tiede and Beth Potts, then 
Mr. Taylor's sentence is disproportionate to his culpability and violates his constitutional 
rights." (Taylor's br. at 44). Taylor's argument is not supported by the law. A death 
sentence is constitutionally permissible even for a defendant who did not actually kill the 
victims so long as he was a major participant in the felony murder who acted with reckless 
indifference to human life. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 150, 158 (1987). The evidence 
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in this case more than amply meets that standard, even assuming a hypothetical situation in 
which Taylor fired no kill shots. 
Second, Taylor's hypothetical suggestion that he was less culpable than Deli, and that 
Deli was the actual killer, is not supported by the facts, the evidence, or Taylor's own 
admissions. Taylor, not Deli, pointed his gun at Linae; Taylor, not Deli, asked Linae who 
else had arrived with her; after Linae told Taylor that her mother and grandmother were 
downstairs, Taylor, not Deli, ordered her to call them upstairs; Linae saw Taylor, not Deli, 
shoot her mother; Linae heard Taylor, not Deli, say that he "had to shoot the bitch in the 
head twice;" Linae heard Taylor, not Deli, suggest burning the cabin to destroy their 
fingerprints; Linae saw Taylor, not Deli, pouring gasoline around the cabin. When Rolph 
and Trisha arrived, Taylor, not Deli, grabbed Linae around the throat, and held a gun to her 
back. Taylor, not Deli, ordered Rolph to strip and empty his pockets. Taylor ordered Deli to 
shoot Rolph. When Deli hesitated, Taylor shot Rolph in the face. Taylor, not Deli, decided 
the girls should drive because they knew how to drive the snowmobiles. And Taylor, not 
Deli, drove the get-away car (TR316:499-501, 506, 509,513, 516-517,522-24,527, 529-30; 
317:681-89.)30 
In addition, Deli testified at his own trial that Taylor did all of the shooting and that 
Deli shot no one (R974, State's Ex. 28 - affidavit of Robina Levine, addendum D). And 
- Taylor also told Dr. Moench that after taking the Tiedes' daughters to the 
snowmobiles, he returned to the cabin and shot Rolph one more time "'to make sure.'" 
Taylor "then poured gasoline on [Rolph] and assumed [Rolph] would be consumed in the 
house fire." (R496A, Pet's Ex. 57, addendum C). 
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Taylor himself told Dr. Moench that he emptied the .38 into Kay and Beth, then grabbed the 
.44 from Deli and emptied that gun into the women as well (TR 479, addendum C). He also 
told Moench that Deli looked at him "as if to say 'what in hell are you doing?'" Taylor said, 
"T shot two people with no motive, out of cold blood, with my gun, then [Deli's].'" 
(R496A, Pet's Ex. 57, addendum C). If Taylor was the more culpable participant, and the 
one who actually killed both women, then it is not surprising that Deli got a life sentence 
while Taylor got the death penalty. 
Claim 27 - Claim of inadequate record for appeal. Taylor alleges that there was an 
inadequate appellate record, because the transcript of his penalty hearing voir dire appears to 
be "possibly" incorrect, and the transcripts of Deli's trial are no longer available (Taylor's br. 
at 45). Taylor never showed that either claim was meritorious. The transcript shows that 
juror Chamberlain had a son who was married to prosecutor Adkins' sister (TR315:113). 
Taylor states that his federal habeas counsel have been unable to confirm that Chamberlain 
had a son who was married to Adkins' sister (R455). Taylor then jumps to the conclusion 
that the transcript is in error. 
First, Taylor has failed to establish that the transcript is in error. Second, even if the 
record is in error, that fact alone fails to establish that the claim is meritorious. To prevail on 
a claim that the record is incorrect Taylor must show that the record is not "adequate to 
review specific claims of error already raised," State v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah 
App. 1996), and "that his appeal is prejudiced b> the transcription errors." State v. Menzies, 
845 P.2d 220, 228 (Utah 1992) (Menzies I). Taylor has not made that showing. 
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Next, Taylor claims that no complete transcript exists from co-defendant Deli's trial 
(Taylor's br. at 45). Taylor asserts that his federal counsel have been unable to obtain a copy 
of Deli's transcript because the court reporter's notes have been destroyed (R455-56). This 
claim does not entitle Taylor to relief. 
First, Taylor and Deli were tried separately. Taylor has failed to establish that he has 
a constitutional right to a transcript of another person's trial. Second, Taylor likely could 
have obtained a transcript of Deli's trial if he had requested it within a reasonable time after 
the trial. Instead, he waited nearly two decades before complaining that he cannot obtain it. 
Third, Taylor failed to establish that his appellate and prior post-conviction counsel did not 
consider requesting a transcript of Deli's trial. In fact, counsel may have made a strategic 
decision not to request a transcript of Deli's trial, because it would not have been helpful. 
The only evidence before the Court is that trial counsel's paralegal attended Deli's 
trial and reported that Deli blamed Taylor for firing all of the shots suffered by both women. 
There is no evidence that they have attempted to contact Deli's counsel, the court reporter at 
Deli's trial, or any other participants or observers who could confirm or contradict this 
report. And Taylor's counsel have obviously had access to Deli (R487, Pet's Ex. 14). 
Although there is no transcript of Deli's trial, Taylor's counsel have not established that they 
have no means of reconstructing any critical portions of Deli's trial, such as Deli's 
testimony. For similar reasons, Taylor has failed to establish that he wras prejudiced by the 
31
 Trial counsel's paralegal attended most of Deli's trial. She heard Deli testify and 
blame Taylor for the murders. Therefore, counsel knew that Deli's testimony was damaging 
to Taylor (R974, Ex 28, addendum D, and see pages 121-124 of 23B hearing transcript). 
60 
fact that a transcript of Deli's trial is no longer available. A transcript of Deli's trial would 
not help Taylor, since Deli testified that Taylor did all of the shooting (R974, State's Ex. 28, 
addendum D). 
Taylor pled guilty and was sentenced to death. Deli went to trial and was sentenced to 
life in prison. Taylor argues that "[gjiven that the State seems to have introduced the same 
evidence against both defendants, a proper comparison of the different results must entail a 
comparison of the transcripts of both trials." (Taylor's br. at 46). Except, of course, that 
there were not two trials. Taylor pled guilty. The State presented evidence at the penalty 
phase in Taylor's case. However, evidence at a penalty phase is necessarily specific to each 
defendant, since evidence may be presented on "the defendant's character, background, 
history, and mental and physical condition." § 76-3-207(2)(a)(ii). 
Claim 29 - ineffective assistance of counsel. Taylor makes it clear on appeal that he 
is not pleading ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel "as a stand alone claim." 
(Taylor's br. at 47). His only reason for raising the issue is to allege that ineffective 
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel provides an excuse or exception to the procedural 
bar or time bar. That argument is addressed in point III above. 
Claim 30 - Cumulative impact. Taylor argues that with the addition of even a single 
new claim, the court must conduct a new cumulative error analysis (Taylor's br. at 47). But 
the district court ruled that all of Taylor's claims are procedurally barred. In the alternative, 
the State argues that all of Taylor's claims are also time-barred. Taylor is not entitled to a 
review of the cumulative impact of claims that are procedurally barred and time barred. 
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V. TAYLOR'S CLAIM THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SHOULD BE 
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THE PCRA LIMITS ON POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF IS FRIVOLOUS. 
Taylor asserts that the Utah Attorney General "has been able to craft the PCRA to its 
decided advantage. As the [Attorney General] was the drafter of this legislation, they should 
be estopped by this Court from arguing in favor of procedural bars now that their impartiality 
has resulted in a denial of Mr. Taylor's constitutional rights." (Taylor's br. at 27). Taylor's 
argument is legally unsupported and factually wrong. 
First, this Court amended rule 65C to state that the PCRA "sets forth the manner and 
extent to which a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and sentence 
after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal." Utah R. Civ. P. 
65C(a) (2010). The advisory committee note states that the amendments "embrace[]" the 
PCRA "as the law governing post-conviction relief." Taylor offers no explanation why the 
State should be estopped from asserting statutory defenses that this Court has endorsed. 
Second, Taylor has not established any of the elements of estoppel. To estop the State 
from asserting PCRA defenses, Taylor must establish that 1) the State made a statement or 
admission that was inconsistent with "'a claim [the State] later asserted;'" 2) Taylor relied on 
the State's initial statement or admission; 3) Taylor's reliance was reasonable; and 4) the 
State's change in position resulted in injury to Taylor. Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
2007 UT 28 Tf 14, 158 P.3d 1088 (citation omitted). The State has not taken inconsistent 
positions. It has consistently argued that the PCRA's procedural bar and time bars apply to 
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Taylor. Because the State has been consistent, Taylor cannot have relied to his detriment on 
a prior, inconsistent position. 
Finally, Taylor's argument relies on allegations and implications that are wrong. 
Taylor implies that the State lobbied the Legislature to adopt and amend the PCRA to give 
the State an unfair advantage in post-conviction litigation. What the PCRA actually does is 
strike a fair balance between a petitioner's interest in having all his challenges to his 
conviction or sentence heard against the public's and victims' interests in finality and 
closure. Fairness and justice do not belong solely to the convicted guilty. Fairness and 
justice are also owed to the people of this State and to the innocent persons that the guilty 
have victimized. And, after a criminal appeal ends, the right of a convicted guilty person to 
challenge his conviction and sentence must begin to give way to the people's right to finality 
and, more importantly, the victims' right to closure. 
As to convicted persons who do not meet the statutory definition of innocence, the 
PCRA demands only that they bring their claims timely. Its tolling and newly-discovered-
evidence provisions and its caveats that a petitioner may raise claims that he could not raise 
in a prior proceeding demand only that the petitioner proceed with reasonable diligence, 
Taylor states that the Legislature "relies on the Utah Attorney General's Office [] to 
draft legislation relating to post-conviction proceedings." (Taylor's br. at 27). Taylor implies 
that the Legislature has delegated its law making function to the Attorney General. That 
implication is false. The Attorney General does not have carte blanche to write post-
conviction law. Like any other organization, person, or entity, the State, through its 
attorneys, may propose legislation. And, like all other proposed legislation, it is subject to 
scrutiny by legislators and their counsel. It is vetted in public hearings where all interested 
parties have an opportunity to address the appropriate legislative committees and caucuses. 
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unimpeded by State violations of his rights, or by mental or physical impairment. §§ 78B-9-
104, 106, and 107. The PCRA bars merits review only when a petitioner fails to comply 
with those reasonable requirements. And, for those convicted persons who do meet the 
statutory definition of innocence, the Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence Act 
permits relief, including monetary relief, regardless of whether the petitioner has proceeded 
with reasonable diligence. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-401 through 405. 
Taylor has not argued how this balance is unfair, and it is not. In fact, Taylor asks the 
Court to adopt a rule that would give petitioners, especially death-sentenced petitioners, a 
"decided advantage." Taylor insists that "meritorious claims are always subject to review." 
(Taylor's br. at 26). But imposing no time limit or procedural limit on raising meritorious 
claims completely disregards legitimate interests in closure and finality. This case 
exemplifies that problem. Taylor's guilty pleas and death sentence have been affirmed on 
direct appeal, post-conviction review, and post-conviction appeal. Taylor nevertheless filed 
a 487-page successive petition and supporting memorandum. He insists that he is entitled to 
merits review on his claims. And the briefing to address those claims spans 493 pages. 
Under Taylor's proposed rule, he could file endless petitions of unlimited length 
requiring the State and the courts to address whether the claims were meritorious. Even if 
they were found not to be so, he could forever forestall the execution of his sentence without 
ever demonstrating that the sentence or the conviction on which it was based was 
constitutionally infirm. Taylor is not entitled to endless review. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted October .2010. 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
THOMAS B. BRUNKER 
ERIN RILEY 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addendum A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VON LESTER TAYLOR, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 070500645 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: August 17, 2009 
The above matter came before the court on July 14, 2009 for 
oral argument on respondent's motion to dismiss. 
Petitioner was present through Brian M. Pomerantz and Megan 
B. Moriarty and respondent was present through Thomas B. Brunker 
and Erin Riley. Counsel for petitioner waived the appearance of 
petitioner. 
In this capital homicide case petitioner filed a successive 
petition (petitioner calls it a complete petition) for relief 
under the Utah Post Conviction Remedies Act and URCP, Rule 65C, 
on November 5, 2007. 
To explain the delays involved in this case, the court notes 
that petition contained 426 pages of argument. It contained just 
over 5 volumes of attachments, perhaps 1000 pages of material. 
The parties have often either informally or by motion and order 
obtained extensions of filing deadlines under the rules given the 
complexity, length and importance of the issues. 
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, consisting of 89 
pages, on February 15, 2008. Petitioner filed an opposition 
response on May 13, 2008, and it was 129 pages in length. On 
June 13, 2008, respondent moved for permission to file a 
supplemental memorandum in support if its motion to dismiss. 
Petitioner opposed that on June 23, 2008. Respondent filed a 
reply on that request June 2 6, 2008, and the court on that same 
date, June 2 6, 2008, allowed the supplemental memorandum by the 
State. On July 3, 2008, the parties stipulated to substitute the 
State of Utah as the correct respondent rather than the warden 
named in the petition. On July 25, 2008, the State filed a 
supplemental memo of rather standard length, 23 pages. Petitioner 
filed an opposition on August 27, 2008. On March 4, 2009, 
respondent filed a 179 page reply. On March 13, 2009, respondent 
filed a request to submit. Based thereon oral argument was 
scheduled originally for April 22, 2009, Respondent filed on 
March 17, 2009, a notice that permission to file a sur reply may 
be filed. Respondent also moved to continue the oral argument due 
to the press of other business and unavailability of counsel. 
This date was then scheduled for oral argument. 
•ii-
Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under 
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the 
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. The 
court has read all of the pleadings and all of the transcripts 
that are part of this record, including the preliminary hearing 
and penalty phase hearing, that are on file in the office of the 
clerk of this court. The court has examined the exhibits which 
are attached to the pleadings and has examined the trial exhibits 
which still remain in the office of the clerk of this court in 
Summit County. Since taking the issues under advisement, the 
court has further considered the law and facts relating to the 
issues and the memoranda of the parties. Now being fully 
advised, the court renders the following Ruling and Order, 
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Table of Contents 
I. Background 1 
II. Summary of the Arguments 7 
A. Claims Raised in the Successive Petition 7 
B. State's Motion to Dismiss 9 
C. Petitioner's Response to the State's Motion . . . . 11 
D. Supplemental Memoranda 13 
E. State's Reply 14 
III. Discussion 15 
A. Legal Analysis 15 
1. The Interests of Justice Exception 15 
a. Introduction 15 
b. Retroactive Application of Statutory 
Amendments 17 
c. Whether the 2008 Amendments to the 
PCRA Apply Retroactively 19 
2. Procedural Bar Rule 27 
a. Introduction . 27 
b. Common Law Exceptions to the Procedural 
Bar Rule 30 
c. Whether an Exception Exists to the Procedural 
Bar Rule Based Upon a State Constitutional 
Right to the Effective Assistance of 
Post-Conviction Counsel . . . . . 35 
-iv-
U0i21i 
d. Whether an Exception Exists to the Procedural 
Bar Rule Based Upon a Statutory Right to 
the Effective Assistance of Post-Conviction 
Counsel . 48 
B. Petitioner's Post-Conviction Claims 56 
1. Timeliness 56 
2. Claims that Were Raised and Addressed in a 
Prior Proceeding 59 
3. Claims that Could Have Been, But Were Not, 
Raised in Petitioner's Prior Post-Conviction 
Petition 78 
4. Claim Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Prior 
Post-Conviction Counsel 92 
IV. Conclusion 95 
-v-
I. Background 
Gleaned from the record of court proceedings as found by the 
court and jury at the time, almost nineteen years ago, on 
December 14, 1990, Petitioner left the Orange Street Community 
Correctional Center in Salt Lake City and failed to return. On 
December 21, 1990, Petitioner, along with an accomplice, Edward 
Deli, broke into the family cabin of Rolf and Kaye Tiede in 
Summit County while the Tiedes were in Salt Lake City shopping. 
The following day, the Tiedes returned to the cabin. Part of the 
family parked at the gate to the Beaver Springs development and 
Ms. Kaye Tiede, together with her mother, Beth Potts, a woman in 
her mid-70s, and daughter Linae Tiede, age 20, drove two 
snowmobiles to the cabin, which was located approximately two 
miles from the gate which was on the Weber Canyon road. Mr. 
Rolfe Tiede and his 16 year-old daughter Ticia Tiede drove to a 
repair shop to pick up additional snowmobiles which were being 
repaired. 
Linae was the first to arrive at the cabin and when she 
opened the door at the top of the stairs Petitioner confronted 
her with his gun drawn. He ordered Kaye Tiede and Ms. Potts 
upstairs. Ms. Potts needed assistance because she was partially 
blind and needed help walking. Once all three were upstairs, 
Kaye Tiede offered Petitioner money and whatever else he wanted. 
Petitioner shot Kaye Tiede near her left shoulder. The bullet 
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passed through her lungs and aorta, causing her death. Ms. Potts 
was then shot several times, including at least once in the chest 
and in the head, either of which could have been the cause of her 
death. During the shooting, Linae began to pray, but Petitioner 
told her that praying would not help because he worshiped the 
devil. 
Once the shooting ended, Petitioner determined that he, 
Deli, and Linae would leave and that the cabin should be burned 
in order to prevent the discovery of any fingerprints. As they 
were preparing to leave, Mr. Tiede and his daughter Ticia 
arrived. Petitioner grabbed Linae by the throat and held his gun 
to her back. Mr. Tiede and Ticia were both ordered into the 
garage and Petitioner asked Mr. Tiede for money. Mr, Tiede 
complied and then Petitioner ordered Deli to shoot Mr. Tiede. 
When Deli hesitated, Petitioner shot Mr. Tiede in the face. 
Petitioner said nothing. Prior to leaving the cabin with Linae 
and Ticia, Petitioner returned to the garage, shot Mr. Tiede 
again in the head while Mr. Tiede was lying face down on the 
ground "pretending" to be dead, and poured gasoline over him. 
Gasoline was scattered through the cabin and it was set on fire 
before Petitioner and the others left. When Petitioner, Deli, 
Linae, and Ticia arrived at the gate to the Beaver Springs 
development at the Weber Canyon Road, Petitioner ordered everyone 
into the Tiede's car and they drove away. Mr. Tiede, who was not 
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killed by the attack, was ultimately able to arouse himself, and 
take a snowmobile to the Weber Canyon Road where he found a 
family member and they called police. Following a high-speed 
chase, Petitioner and Deli were apprehended and the two girls 
were safely taken from Petitioner and Deli. 
On December 24, 1990, Petitioner was charged with two counts 
of capital homicide in the deaths of Kaye Tiede and Ms, Potts, in 
addition to several other felony counts of attempted aggravated 
murder, aggravated arson, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated 
robbery, theft, and failure to respond to an officer's signal to 
stop. 
On May 1, 1991, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the two counts 
of capital homicide and the State agreed to dismiss all of the 
other charges. On May 16, 17, 21, and 22, 1991, a sentencing 
proceeding was convened for the purpose of receiving evidence 
concerning the appropriate sentence that should be imposed upon 
Petitioner by the jury. Following their deliberations, on May 
24, 1991, the jurors returned a unanimous sentencing decision in 
favor of death for Petitioner on each count of capital homicide. 
Petitioner then sought to withdraw his guilty plea, which 
was denied by the trial court. 
Through his trial counsel, Elliott Levine ("Levine"), 
Petitioner appealed to the Utah Supreme Court on July 8, 1992. 
However, after Petitioner's opening brief was filed, on July 20, 
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1992, the State requested that the brief be stricken and that 
Levine be removed from his representation of Petitioner. 
Although Levine was ordered to withdraw and was replaced by J. 
Bruce Savage ("Savage") in September 1993, the opening brief was 
not stricken. During the direct appeal, the Supreme Court 
remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing 
under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 23B, on the claim 
that trial counsel had been ineffective. Evidence was presented 
to the trial court at that hearing on May 15, 16, 18, 22, 23, and 
24, 1995, The trial court concluded that Petitioner had not been 
deprived of his right to effective representation under the Sixth 
Amendment, 
Savage then pursued the direct appeal by filing Petitioner's 
brief on June 3, 1996. On October 24, 1997, the Utah Supreme 
Court issued its opinion rejecting all of Petitioner's appellate 
claims. State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681 (Utah 1997) (Taylor I). 
The United States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of 
certiorari on October 5, 1998. 
On February 23, 1998, Richard P. Mauro ("Mauro") was 
appointed as post-conviction counsel pursuant to the PCRA to 
represent Petitioner in his post-conviction action. Approximately 
one year later Petitioner filed his Petition for Relief Under the 
Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act, On May 30, 2002, Petitioner 
filed his First Amended Petition for Relief Under the Utah Post-
-4-
Conviction Remedies Act. Respondent, Hank Galetka, who was the 
warden/respondent at the time, filed a motion for summary 
judgment on September 13, 2002. Oral argument on the motion for 
summary judgment was heard on April 18, 2003. On March 1, 2004, 
the post-conviction trial court, granted Respondent's motion for 
summary judgment and denied post-conviction relief on all of 
Petitioner's claims. The signed order and judgment was entered 
on September 22, 2004. 
Petitioner timely appealed that decision and the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the .post-conviction court, the Honorable 
Frank. G. Noel, on January 26, 2007. Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 
12, 156 P.3d 739 (Taylor II). The request for a rehearing was 
denied on March 27, 2007. The Office of the Federal Public 
Defender for the District of Utah was appointed to represent 
Petitioner in federal court on March 6, 2007. On September 4, 
2007, Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas 
corpus and, on November 2, 2007, a first amended petition was 
filed in federal court. Although Petitioner's federal case was, 
and is, still pending, on November 5, 2007, Petitioner filed this 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
To explain the delays involved in this case, the Court notes 
that the successive petition contained 426 pages of argument and 
over five volumes of attachments. Moreover, the parties have, 
either informally or by motion and order, obtained extensions of 
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the filing deadlines given the complexity, length, and importance 
of the issues raised. On February 15, 2008, Respondent filed a 
motion to dismiss, consisting of 89 pages. Petitioner filed a 
129 page response in opposition on May 13, 2008. On June 13, 
2008, Respondent requested permission to file a supplemental 
memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss, which Petitioner 
opposed on June 23, 2008. Respondent filed a reply on that 
request on June 26, 2008 and the Court, on that same date, 
allowed the supplemental memorandum by Respondent. On July 3, 
2008, the parties stipulated to substitute the State of Utah as 
the correct respondent rather than the warden of the Utah State 
Prison. On July 25, 2008, Respondent filed its supplemental 
memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss and Petitioner 
filed his response in opposition to the supplemental memorandum 
on August 27, 2008. On March 4, 2009, Respondent filed a 179 
page reply to Petitioner's opposition to the motion to dismiss. 
On March 13, 2009, Respondent filed a request to submit and, 
based upon this request, oral argument was scheduled for April 
22, 2009. Petitioner moved to continue that date due to 
conflicts with counsel's schedule. On March 17, 2009, Respondent 
filed a request for permission to file a sur reply. Oral 
argument on the motion to dismiss was held on July 14, 2009 and 
the Court took the issues raised under advisement. 
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II. Summary of the Arguments 
A, Claims Raised in the Successive Petition 
Petitioner raised thirty (30) separate grounds for relief in 
his successive (complete) petition. These include claims that 
trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to properly 
investigate the case, failed to conduct an adequate mitigation 
investigation, failed to adequately counsel and advise Petitioner 
in connection with his pleas of guilty to two counts of capital 
homicide, failed to properly litigate and renew the motion for 
change of venue, was laboring under an actual conflict of 
interest, performed deficiently during the jury selection process 
including failing to properly challenge jurors, failed to make 
appropriate challenges for cause, failed to uncover potential 
juror bias, and failed to submit voir dire questions, failed to 
present an adequate mitigation case, and failed to challenge the 
State's case in aggravation. Petitioner has now abandoned one of 
those thirty claims. 
Petitioner alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective 
because he failed to properly argue the correct legal standard 
for ineffective assistance of trial counsel and failed to raise 
issues that could, and should, have been raised. 
Petitioner asserts a claim that because the funding 
available for his initial post-conviction petition and counsel 
was inadequate, his prior post-conviction counsel was unable to 
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provide effective representation. 
Petitioner also raises claims asserting that the trial court 
committed error including that the court improperly denied 
Petitioner's motion for change of venue, improperly conducted 
individual voir dire of prospective jurors in chambers, failed to 
properly grant Petitioner's challenges for cause, asked 
impermissible questions and ignored responses during jury 
selection, improperly excluded prospective jurors who were not 
members of the LDS Church, provided jurors with confusing and 
erroneous jury instructions and a special verdict form, and 
improperly admitted evidence. 
In addition to the foregoing claims related to alleged trial 
court error and ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and 
post-conviction counsel, Petitioner also asserts that his 
conviction and death sentences should be vacated because he did 
not receive the competent assistance of mental health experts, he 
is actually innocent of causing the deaths of Kaye Tiede and Beth 
Potts, there is no factual basis for his guilty pleas, a 
disproportionate number of the jurors who served were members of 
the LDS Church, jurors were improperly influenced by LDS Church 
practices and the relationship between Church leaders and the 
victims' families, there was juror misconduct, there was 
prosecutorial misconduct, the State failed to disclose 
exculpatory evidence, the sentences of death are disproportionate 
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to P e t i t i o n e r ' s cu lpab i l i t y , the Utah death penalty scheme i s 
unconst i tut ional because i t f a i l s to narrow the c lass of 
murderers e l i g ib l e for the death penalty, there i s an inadequate 
appel la te record, l e t h a l intravenous in ject ion cons t i tu t e s cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, ( that claim i s 
now abandoned) and the cumulative impact of a l l the e r ro rs 
committed in his case v io la ted his cons t i tu t iona l r i g h t s . 
B. State's Motion to Dismiss 
The State responded to P e t i t i o n e r ' s successive pe t i t i on with 
a motion to dismiss. 
F i r s t , the Sta te argues tha t most of P e t i t i o n e r ' s claims 
were ra ised and adjudicated in a pr ior proceeding and, therefore , 
under both the PCRA and the common law they are absolutely 
procedurally barred. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a~106(b) and (d) 
(2007)-1 
Second, a l l of P e t i t i o n e r ' s claims are ones tha t could have 
been, but were not, ra ised in a pr ior proceeding. Therefore, 
under the PCRA, they are a l l procedurally barred. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-35a-106( c) and (d). 
Third, the State i n i t i a l l y argued tha t a l l of P e t i t i o n e r ' s 
claims were time-barred because they were not ra i sed within one 
xIn 1996, the PCRA was found i n T i t l e 78, Chapter 35a. In 2008, the PCRA 
was r e - c o d i f i e d as T i t l e 78B, Chapter 9. Al l r e fe rences in t h i s r u l i n g t o T i t l e 
78, Chapter 35a a re t o the ve r s ion of the PCRA t h a t e x i s t e d a t the time 
P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d h i s success ive pos t - conv ic t i on p e t i t i o n in 2007. 
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year of the petition's accrual date and he had not shown that any 
of the claims satisfied the interests of justice exception; i.e., 
he had not established that he had a legitimate reason for not 
raising the claim in a prior proceeding nor that any of his 
claims were meritorious. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(3). 
According to the State, the time frame for "accrual" of the post-
conviction action under the PCRA, even under the 1996 version, 
was the date on which the petition for a writ of certiorari was 
denied, which was October 5, 1998. Thus, Petitioner's successive 
post-conviction petition is eight years late. 
However, in a supplemental memorandum, the State argues that 
the 2008 amendments to the PCRA, which removed the interests of 
justice exception to the statute of limitations and replaced it 
with an equitable tolling provisions, apply to Petitioner's 
successive petition. Thus, according to the State, the interests 
of justice exception cannot be relied upon by Petitioner to 
excuse an untimely claim. Furthermore, because Petitioner has 
not shown that the tolling provision applies to any of his 
claims, all of his claims are time-barred under 2008 amendments 
to the PCRA. 
Finally, the State argues that Petitioner's claim of 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel must be 
dismissed because it is not a proper claim under the PCRA. At 
the time Petitioner filed his successive petition, the PCRA 
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"established] a substantive legal remedy for any person who 
challenges a conviction or sentence," Utah Code Ann. § 78~35a-
102. Because a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel is not a challenge to Petitioner's conviction or 
sentence, it is not a claim for which relief can be granted under 
the PCRA. Moreover, in its supplemental memorandum addressing 
the applicability of the 2008 amendments to the PCRA, the PCRA 
now states that XN[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as 
creating the right to the effective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel, and relief may not be granted on any claim that post-
conviction counsel was ineffective>" Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
202(4). In light of this new language, the State also argues 
that the current version of the PCRA precludes Petitioner from 
obtaining relief on his ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel claim. 
C. Petitioner's Response to the State's Motion to Dismiss 
In response to the State's motion to dismiss, Petitioner 
begins by asserting that he was falsely led to believe that he, 
rather than his co-defendant Edward Deli, caused the deaths of 
Kaye Tiede and Ms. Potts and therefore he is factually innocent 
of the murders to which he pleaded guilty. According to 
Petitioner, his factual innocence necessarily "trumps the 
procedural and timeliness bars relied on by the State." (Pet'r 
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Mem. in Opp. at 15,) The failure to discover this new evidence 
concerning his factual innocence and to raise the claims in his 
first petition was the result of ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel, which in turn was the result of the 
inadequate amount of funding that was made available to prior 
post-conviction counsel. Petitioner argues that his claims are 
not time-barred because the mere passage of time can never 
justify the continued imprisonment of one who has been denied 
fundamental rights. Moreover, the interests of justice exception 
under the PCRA has been satisfied. 
In addition, he also argues that he has shown "good cause" 
or "unusual circumstances" to overcome the procedural bar raised 
by the State. Specifically, he contends that as a result of the 
lack of adequate funding and ineffective assistance of prior 
post-conviction counsel his claims could not have been raised in 
an earlier petition and new facts not previously known 
demonstrate either the denial of a constitutional right, that the 
outcome of his trial might have been different, or the existence 
of fundamental unfairness in his conviction. Because his claims 
were overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay the post-
conviction process, Petitioner contends that good cause exists 
that permits him to raise these claims in his successive 
petition, despite the procedural bar. 
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D. Supplemental Memoranda 
Prior to filing a reply to Petitioner's opposition, the 
State filed a supplemental memorandum in which it argues that the 
2008 amendments to the PCRA that removed the interests of justice 
exception to the time-bar and ostensibly clarified that post-
conviction petitioners do not have a right to the effective 
assistance of counsel, apply retroactively to Petitioner's 
successive post-conviction petition. Therefore, the State 
asserts, Petitioner cannot rely upon the interests of justice 
exception to excuse the untimely filing of any successive claim 
and cannot assert as a ground for relief that his post-conviction 
counsel provided ineffective representation. 
In Petitioner's memorandum in opposition to the State's 
supplemental memorandum, he argues that the Utah Supreme Court 
has exclusive authority to define post-conviction remedies and 
procedures. Because the Supreme Court has already held that the 
mere passage of time can never justify rejecting a meritorious 
claim, removing the interests of justice exception from the PCRA 
is necessarily ineffectual. Moreover, Petitioner also argues 
that the 2008 amendments cannot apply retroactively because (1) 
the interests of justice exception constitutes a vested right 
that cannot be removed retrospectively, and (2) he has a right 
under the Utah Constitution to the effective assistance of post-
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conviction counsel that the legislature cannot extinguish. 
E. State's Reply 
In reply, the State repeats the arguments that were set 
forth in its supplemental memorandum concerning the retroactive 
application of the 2008 amendments to the PCRA. In addition, 
the State argues that even if the 2008 amendments do not apply, 
claims alleging ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 
are not cognizable under the PCRA, Petitioner has no state or 
federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel, the statutory right to post-conviction 
counsel does not give Petitioner the right to a claim of 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in a successive 
petition, and in any event, Petitioner has failed to establish 
that his post-conviction counsel was, in fact, ineffective. 
Further, the State also contends that Petitioner's claims 
are procedurally barred because they are claims that were either 
raised and addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in 
a prior proceeding and Petitioner has failed to show that any 
exception applies or that unusual circumstances exist. Finally, 
although Petitioner frequently asserts that, with appropriate 
funding finally provided, his current counsel have discovered new 
evidence in the case, Petitioner has not shown that any of the 
recently discovered evidence satisfies the requirements of the 
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"newly discovered evidence" standard set forth in the PCRA. At 
best he is essentially making a claim of ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel, a claim for which no relief may be 
granted under the PCRA. 
III. Discussion 
A. Legal Analysis 
1• The Interests of Justice Exception 
a. Introduction 
Under the provisions of the PCRA as they existed when 
Petitioner filed his successive post-conviction petition, a 
petitioner was "not eligible for relief . , . upon any ground 
that . . • [was] barred by the limitation period established in 
Section 78-35a-107." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1) (e). As with 
the current version of the PCRA, the statute of limitations 
entitled a petitioner to "relief only if the petition [was] filed 
within one year after the cause of action [had] accrued." Utah 
Code Ann, § 78-35a-107 (1). Nevertheless, at the time Petitioner 
filed his successive petition, the PCRA included an exception 
that, if satisfied, would excuse an untimely filing. Under this 
exception, nif the court finds that the interests of justice 
require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within 
the time limitations." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(3). 
In considering this exception, the Utah Supreme Court has 
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specifically held that a trial court "presented with an untimely 
post-conviction petition must consider the interests of justice 
exception before disposing of the petition • , . [and] has no 
discretion to grant relief on an untimely . . . petition if the 
^interests of justice' do not so require," Johnson v. Statef 
2006 UT 21, 116, 134 P.3d 1133. On the other hand, if the trial 
court makes specific findings in support of the interests of 
justice exception, then the untimeliness of the successive 
petition must be excused. See id. at 117. "An analysis of what 
constitutes an exception in the ^interests of justice' should 
involve examination of both the meritoriousness of the 
petitioner's claim and the reason for an untimely filing.'7 Adams 
v. State, 2005 UT 62, 116, 123 P. 3d 400. However, it is not 
necessarily required that both prongs of this test be satisfied. 
As noted by the Supreme Court, depending upon the facts of the 
particular case under consideration, some claims may require no 
justification for an untimely filing—such as a claim of actual 
innocence supported by DNA evidence—while uan entirely frivolous 
claim would not meet the ^interests of justice' exception even 
with the best possible excuse for the late filing." Id. In 
other cases, a clear assessment of both prongs will be necessary 
to determine whether the interests of justice exception is 
satisfied. "[W]e expect that the district court will give 
appropriate weight to each of [these] factors according to the 
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circumstances of a particular case." Id. 
b. Retroactive Application of Statutory Amendments 
During the 2008 legislative session the interests of justice 
exception was removed from the PCRA and replaced with equitable 
tolling provisions which toll the limitations period "for any-
period during which the petitioner was prevented from filing a 
petition due to state action in violation of the United States 
Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity," Utah 
Code Ann, § 78B-9-107(3). This change went into effect on May 5, 
2008 and therefore, no interests of justice exception currently 
exists in the PCRA to excuse the failure of a petitioner to 
timely file a petition for post-conviction relief. "Ordinarily 
the facts and the law in a given lawsuit are to be applied as of 
the date of the filing of the original complaint.'' Archer v. 
Utah State Land Bd., 392 P.2d 622, 624 ( UT 1964). It is 
generally true that "legislation is not given retroactive 
effect." B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2006 UT 2f 
120, 128 P.3d 1161. See also Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. 
Co., 2004 UT 80, %39, 104 P.3d 1185 ("A statute is not to be 
applied retroactively unless the statute expressly declares that 
it operates retroactively."); Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 ("No part 
of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared."). 
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However, "[a]n exception to the general rule against 
retroactivity applies to changes which are procedural only," 
Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1998). 
Unlike substantive law, which "creates, defines[,] and regulates 
the rights and duties of the parties which may give rise to a 
cause of action," procedural law "prescribes the practice and 
procedure or the legal machinery by which the substantive law is 
determined or made effective/' Petty v. Clark, 192 P.2d 589, 
593-594 (Utah 1948). Thus, "statutes which operate in 
furtherance of a remedy already existing and which neither create 
new rights nor destroy existing rights . • . appl[y] 
retrospectively to accrued or pending actions to further the 
legislature's remedial purpose." Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n, 
704 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985). Furthermore, "statutory amendments 
that merely clarify an ambiguity in an original statute will be 
given retroactive effect." Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435, 440 (Utah 1997) (emphasis 
added). See also Oakland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Common, 520 
P.2d 208, 210-211 (Utah 1974) (general principle against 
retroactive application "has no application where the later 
statute or amendment deals only with clarification or 
amplification as to how the law should have been understood prior 
to its enactment." (emphasis added)). That is, "an exception 
exists for amendments clarifying statutes, which are applied 
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retroactively, so long as they Mo not enlarge, eliminate, or 
destroy vested or contractual rights.'" Keegan v. State, 896 
P. 2d 618, 620 (Utah 1995) (quoting Board of Equalization v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n ex rel. Benchmark, Inc., 864 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 
1993)). Nevertheless, as the Utah Court of Appeals has expressly 
held, >N[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute, we presume it 
intended to make a substantive, rather than procedural or 
remedial change." Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, 113, 35 P.3d 
341. 
c. Whether the 2008 Amendments to the PCRA Apply 
Retroactively 
Nowhere in the 2008 amendments is there language declaring 
that the removal of the interests of justice exception should 
apply retroactively* In addition, because the amendments also do 
not expressly state that they are clarifying in nature, there is 
a rebuttable presumption that the amendments are substantive and, 
therefore, should not be applied retroactively. See State v. 
Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Every 
amendment not expressly characterized as a clarification carries 
the rebuttable presumption that it is intended to change existing 
legal rights and liabilities."). See also Thomas v. Color 
Country Mgmt., 2004 UT 12, 136, 84 P.3d 1201 (Durham, C.J., 
concurring) (same). Even without the presumption, however, a 
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persuasive argument exists that removing the interests of justice 
exception from the PCRA constitutes a substantive change. 
Whether an amendment affects substantive rights "should be 
informed and guided by xfamiliar considerations of fair notice, 
reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.'" Martin v. 
Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 357-58 (1999) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994)). See also Goebel, 2004 UT 80 
at 139 ("Convenience, reasonableness, and justice are factors we 
consider in deciding whether a statute has a merely remedial or 
procedural purpose."). 
When Petitioner filed his successive post-conviction 
petition in November 2007 he had a reasonable expectation that if 
the State raised the time-bar as a ground for dismissing the 
claims, he would have the opportunity to argue that the interests 
of justice exception applies and that his untimely filing should 
be excused. Having reasonably relied on the existence of the 
interests of justice exception to excuse his untiraeliness, to now 
preclude him from asserting it would constitute an unfair 
windfall for the State and would be unfair to some one in 
Petitioner's position. Moreover, in the same way that a 
legislative amendment removing the defense of an expired statute 
of limitations is a change that affects the vested rights of a 
defendant, see Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P,2d 1058, 1062 (Utah 1995) 
("Since 1900, this court has consistently maintained that the 
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defense of an expired statute of limitations is a vested 
right."), it follows by force of logic that a legislative 
amendment removing a statutory exception to the defense of an 
expired statute of limitations is also a change that affects the 
vested rights of a plaintiff. Thus, the 2008 amendments are 
substantive in nature because they eliminate a vested right held 
by Petitioner at the time he filed his successive post-conviction 
petition. See Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 192 (Utah 1990) (a 
statute is considered substantive if it "eliminate[s] or 
destroy[s] vested rights,"). 
Notwithstanding language in Keegan suggesting that 
clarifying statutes cannot be applied retroactively if they 
eliminate vested rights, Keegan, 896 P.2d at 620, the State 
argues that Keegan does not state the governing law. The State 
contends that the purpose of the 2008 amendments was to clarify 
the unamended PCRA, and therefore the amendments should be 
applied retroactively to Petitioner's case. The court does not 
find this argument to be persuasive. 
First, despite the State's contention otherwise, more recent 
cases appear to provide support for Keegan. The case of Evans & 
Sutherland, which was decided after Keegan, specifically states 
that "under a long-standing exception to the general rule against 
applying statutes retroactively, statutory amendments that merely 
clarify an ambiguity in an original statute will be given 
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retroactive effect." Use of the word "merely" certainly 
suggests that amendments that do more than simply clarify should 
not be applied retroactively. Clearly, as the Keegan case holds, 
changes that enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual 
rights do more than merely clarify and, therefore, are not 
applied retroactively. Furthermore, the case of Kilpatrick v. 
Wiley, 2001 UT 107, 37 P. 3d 1130, which the State cites as an 
example of a recent case that ostensibly treats the clarifying 
exception as independent from the general rule against 
retroactivity, also can be read as supporting Keegan. After 
stating that legislative amendments may be applied retroactively 
when the purpose of the change is to clarify the meaning of an 
earlier statute, the Supreme Court went on to state that 
"[f]urther, in light of the fact that we have now reversed the 
jury's verdict, the plaintiffs have no vested or contractual 
right that would prohibit application of the amended statute," 
Id, at 159. In other words, because the clarifying amendments do 
not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights, 
i.e. they are procedural, they may be retroactively applied to 
the case. 
Second, the Utah Court of Appeals has directly held that 
clarifying amendments are procedural in nature. See Wilde, 2001 
UT App 318 at 114 ("A procedural or remedial law ^provides a 
different mode or form of procedure for enforcing substantive 
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rights,' or clarifies the meaning of an earlier enactment." 
(quoting Pilcher v. Department of Soc. Servs., 663 P.2d 450, 455 
(Utah 1983) (emphasis added)). Based upon the foregoing 
analysis, the principle enunciated in Keegan that clarifying 
amendments may be applied retroactively as long as they do not 
enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights, 
appears to be controlling law. 
However, even if the principle set forth in Keegan is 
incorrect, the State has nevertheless failed to persuasively 
demonstrate that the 2008 amendments are clarifying in nature. 
Relying on State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), overruled 
on other grounds as recognized by State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280, 
1283 (Utah 1994), the State contends that legislative acts 
amending a statute constitute "persuasive evidence of the 
legislature's intent when it passed the former, unamended 
statute,'' Id. at 486, i.e., that the amending statute was meant 
to clarify. Because, according to the State, the Utah Supreme 
Court incorrectly interpreted the interests of justice exception 
in the Adams case to allow a petitioner to escape the time-bar 
any time the petitioner could explain the delay and show that the 
claim was potentially meritorious, the fact alone that the 
legislature amended the PCRA to remove the interest of justice 
exception and replace it with an equitable tolling provision is 
persuasive evidence that the legislature intended to clarify what 
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it meant when the i nterests of justice exception was originally •. 
However, ..rule the State correctly quotes Bishop? the 
entitled "Clarifying Child Kidnaping and Sexual Abuse Ad."' " it 
quoteo by the State cr^w? i s meaning from this context and 
language of tna amenaing statute itself i-tciirg that it is 
clarifying the prior enactment, Tims, 6lm v because tne 
legislature amended the PCRA 'after the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the i nterests of justice exception in Adams, 
this does not necessarily mean that the legislature intended the 
2008 amendments to be clarifying in nature.,, parti cularly in ligau 
of the fact that, unlike Bishop, no legislati ve 1 ai iguage was . . 
i ncluded in the amendments suggesting that the amendments were 
ii i Lei ided or ily It : » be clarifyii lg. •. . . 
In addition, citing to the case of Horton \ n Go 1dm ine.rfs 
Da u g h t er, 7 85 P, 2d 1Q 6 ; ( £ 't ' 3 h 19 89) , t) Ie S t a t e a 1 s o a r g'u e s 11 i at 
because a "purpose of a statute of limitations is to cut off 
un t line J y c ] a in is r e qa r d 1 e s s o f t he c 1 a. iui.' s p of en t i a. I. me.: ^  t , ,f 
(State's Supplemental Mem. :i i I Supp. at 9) (emphasis added)
 f the 
Supreme Court's broad i nterp -?' •- --
exception is illogical insofar as :i t defeats the purpose . : 
having a limitations statute in the first place. The Horton case 
states that "[i]n general, statutes of limitation are intended to 
compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time 
and to suppress stale and fraudulent claims so that claims are 
advanced while evidence to rebut them is still fresh." Id. at 
1091. Nothing in this language suggests that statutes of 
limitations are intended to cut off claims regardless of their 
potential merit* Indeed, following the above-quoted language, 
Horton case cites to Burnett v\ New York Central R,R>, 380 U.S. 
424 (1965) which held that 
[sjtatutes of limitations are primarily designed to 
assure fairness to defendants. Such statutes "promote 
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of 
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence 
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just 
claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice 
to defend within the period of limitation and that the 
right to be free of stale claims in time comes to 
prevail over the right to prosecute them." . . • The 
policy of repose, designed to protect defendants, is 
frequently outweighed, however, where the interests of 
justice require vindication of the plaintiffrs rights. 
Id. at 428 (quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway 
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" >::: z -: : z;: >~- r. 3 2 1 I " = ' 8 - !' 2 : ' 4 8 4 9 ( 1 < ' !' !'" ) (eiiipl Ia s I s • 
added1 •, T m s language suggests that it is not true that a 
ciair..'' s potential meri* Anile :.ne State argues that the Utah 
i;^:: • t defeated t::e purpose or :ne statute •:•: _in.itat.icns, '' 
S"^~';/ Suoplemental Mem, in f ^ : . .u:. . anu Lr-f:'--r-^ -» -1 . -
the _-^o amendments removing the interests of justice - j x ^ i - o n 
shouiu be viewed as ciarif'^rT in nature, * M s i'^oument is not 
particularly persuasive given the fact that the >Nrule" relied 
upon by the State may not stand for the precise proposition the 
State suggest! .LL ... :>es», 11: ie Sta te's arguments simply do not show 
that the 2008 amendments mere] y cl arify the prior unamended PCRA, 
E • i :i r t h e i n t c • i e , a s P e t i t i o i i e r p o i n t s c i 11, p r i o r t o 1: i I e A d a m s 
case being decided, the Utah Supreme Court held in Julian v. 
t -.; - , s r c J-.. . roper consideration of 
meritorious claims raise:3 \r r, habeas corpus petition will always 
be i i i LI: ie interests :::)f ji i s t i c e . . •- - - . •. - o 
statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a 
habeas petitioi ) Z :  i at 25 1 E ased i i]: :>i I thi s J anguag e, ti ie 
legislature should have been on notice of the broadness of the 
Supreme Court's interpretatl" r *-•--'•-,- - • * 3 
exception, Yetf 2 f the 200° arend-uer.to wei-j yjhair.eb '^tended 
to clarify the legislature's original intent with respect to the 
interests of justice exception, the State has failed to 
adequately explain why the legislature waited nearly ten years to 
ultimately remove the interests of justice exception from the 
PCRA. 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is the court's 
conclusion that the 2008 amendments removing the interests of 
justice exception from the PCRA are not necessarily clarifying in 
nature. Moreover, even if their purpose is to clarify, the 
amendments do more than clarify insofar as they eliminate a 
vested right held by Petitioner at the time he filed his 
successive post-conviction petition, namely his right to raise 
the interests of justice exception as a reason to excuse the 
untimely filing of his successive petition. The 2008 amendments 
are substantive in nature and, consistent with the general rule 
against retroactive application of substantive changes, they 
cannot be applied retroactively. Petitioner is entitled, 
therefore, to assert the interests of justice exception to excuse 
the untimeliness of his successive post-conviction petition, 
2. Procedural Bar Rule 
a. Introduction 
The PCRA ''establishes a substantive legal remedy for any 
person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal 
offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies." Utah 
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defenaa: "" i n - -j>opoi~cun: t y t o ruv a n i s cor:\ . . o t i c , and s e n t e n i e 
v a c a t e d - r. 
State, 2007 i . >s. 5'--><i* i ~ :> ? , 3 o ^ i J , b e c a m e :i p e t i t i o n t o r 
r - ~ - - —•** -^- - "* 1 -* 
sentence [mu - uriv:r.te i -r -ppei^ate review,'' 
Tayiojs 1 ±/ 2u07 UT lz dt n * -. - ^  
relief on claims that were "^raised or addressed' on direct -
appeal.'7 Kell v. State, 20G8 UT 62, 11 \- '94 P. 3d 5 Z 3 (oi t. i rig -
I ^ ii Code Ann 5 ^9-35a-!06 '1 w b ^ T:UJ^: ~e a.30 l-affer-.y, 
2CC~ UT 13 at $44 (^Claims m a t were bro-jc" ' —~ -,---^ -- --- . 
inelicihls f ^ r consideration z n t^ o ^  t — con v i r i .L o n c* Jt1o11s 3 „<cn 
issues are ^i^missed as ar iruse of the ^-~ot-conviction process 
v. i * n ol J t ^ " * n cf on i~ h e rp & 2" 11 j. No exceptions exist fcr this 
p^ooe~rir-~l r - jn^::1: ~ ::e PCRA* :ncludina a c rertions th-T-
a._:L . ;-. ~ .:.:.:*. a-^oq^ate^y ra^.rd or aroue;: one 
issues en appeal, "ee KeJ J * / n*? *T ~:~ "- !;T " , .after opportunely 
t - - ~n ,j^-. _ • ..•_, -j ; ;., i ' ,s court crave "f\. _.-
consideration to the claims, reQardless of whether [oetitionerfs] 
counsel raised ^h-^n1 'in f V-> \n\jpA effective niannc r M , 
In addition t ;) pormi 1 ti rui t lv- ii sun r s'\ I ri r ^nrce.s 3 ive post-
conviction claims previously raised and addressed at trial or on 
direct appeal f the PCRA also precludes a petitioner from 
2 .8 • ' " 
obtaining "relief . . . upon any ground that was raised or 
addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or 
could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for 
post-conviction relief." Utah Code Ann, § 78-35a-106 (1) (d), The 
same is true under the common law. See Gardner v. Holden, 888 
P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994) (Gardner I) ("Issues that could and 
should have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, may not 
properly be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding absent unusual 
circumstances."). Unlike the procedural bar rule that applies to 
initial post-conviction petitions, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
106(1) ( c ) , which includes a statutory exception based upon 
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2), no exception based upon ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel is expressly included in 
the PCRA that would apply to claims raised in a successive 
petition for post-conviction relief that could have been, but 
were not, raised in a prior proceeding. Thus, any successive 
claim that was raised or that could have been raised, but was 
not, in a prior post-conviction petition is procedurally barred 
and no exceotion exists under the PCRA to excuse this failure. 
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b. -Common Law Exceptions to the Procedural Bar Rule 2 
Notwithstanding th^ linquaqe of the PCRA, under the common 
law as set toitti by the Utjh Supreme Court, the merits of a claim 
that ^-- rrevi-^sly ra4 ceri ana addressed in a prior proceeding 
ma y 1.»_ c ^:. s -. u - ^.- a , \ - c i .a1 c on T* t : h e p e 1111 c:~ •=: .. /I +• o 
demonstrate ^unusual circumstances/7 See Hurst v. Ccck, i-\2d 
1029, 2036"" ( Utah 1989) (a 'ground for re] i ef from a c^iv^i- .->n or 
sentence that has once been fully and fa: rl y adjudicated on 
a p p e a 1 :> r :i i I a p r i o i: 1 I a fc • e a s p r o c e e i i i i g s h o u 1 d n o t b e 
readjudicated unless it: can be shown that there are ^unusual 
c . \ . - ri ) See d,Lso Allow /'i .- • , ii' I .' i , / 1 94 
F.Sd 903 ("When the ground for preclusion is that the petitioner 
a.r--- ' .:::essed . . . Uie it.-Mii', u u | "I M i JIK I ' 1 nun i, i i 
not: he allowed in a post-conviction relief proceeding absent 
v " • .mustarK'er. """") ; Lei I I n i n \: { ' / ' 8 
(Utah 1990) ( s a m e ) . "For example , a p r i o r a d j u d i c a t i o n i s not a 
b •=• ' . - . ' - , -T - - t . - a 
r e i r o a c t - v e chance _n \ e ii* . s u b s e q u e n t d i s c o v e r y of 
s u p p r e s s e d e v i d e n c e , o r newly d i s c o v e r e d ev i den.ee ,, " Hi rrst 777 
/!
'When P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d h i s success ive p e t i t i o n for pos t - conv ic t i on r e l i e f , 
the PCRA " e s t a b l i s h e [ d ] a subs t an t ive l e g a l remedy for any person who 
cha l lenge[d] a convic t ion or sentence for a c r imina l offense and who ha[d] 
exhausted a l l o ther l e g a l remedies . " Utah Code Ann, § 78-35a-102(1) , However, 
in 2008, the phrase "a subs t an t i ve l e g a l remedy" was removed and rep laced with 
" the so l e remedy." Never the less , al though the "amendment appears to have 
ex t inguished [ the] common law wri t a u t h o r i t y for fu ture c a s e s [ , b]ecause 
[ P e t i t i o n e r ] sought p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f p r i o r t o the implementation of t he 
2008 amendment, r e l i e f through [the] common law wri t a u t h o r i t y i s s t i l l a v a i l a b l e 
t o h i m . " P e t e r s o n v. Kennard, 2008 UT 90, 116, 201 P.3d 956. 
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P.2d at 1036. 
With respect to claims not previously raised, the Utah 
Supreme Court has "consistently recognized exceptions to [the 
procedural bar] rule in ^unusual circumstances' where xgood 
cause' excuses a petitioner's failure to raise the claim 
earlier." Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56r 120, 128 P.3d 1123 
(citing Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1036). See also Utah R. Civ. P. 
65C( c) ("Additional claims relating to the legality of the 
conviction or sentence may not be raised in subsequent [post-
conviction] proceedings except for good cause shown."). 
According to the Supreme Court, it has 
long been our law[] that a procedural default is not 
always determinative of a collateral attack on a 
conviction where it is alleged that the trial was not 
conducted within the bounds of basic fairness or in 
harmony with constitutional standards. Therefore, even 
where a claim of error could have been raised earlier, 
post-conviction relief may be available in those "rare 
cases" or "unusual circumstances" where "an obvious 
injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right has occurred" that would make it 
"unconscionable" not to reexamine the issue. 
Gardner v. Galetka, 2007 UT 3, 117, 151 P.3d 968 (Gardner III). 
See also Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, 120, 184 P.3d 1226 
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{ss [P]rocedura 1 defau 11s {such as the ban oi 1 successive petitions) 
[raised] ") . , • • 
The Supreme Court has identified five Mgoo;i cause" ccmcn 
law exceptions3 to the procedural bar rule,, thr- : r *' **• ' *•* 
been codiiied either by statute or procedural ru_e. "hese ::nunon 
law exceptions are; 
(1) the denial . i a const: t.ct\ zi.a i z':ji z pnrsuar4" ^ c 
new law that is, ^ Tjght L>C r-troa^1* •- ' > v 
facts IIMI. previa«_ j .nown w . v _„„
 t ..... *w:.w .: i.l 
of a constitutions~ jicKt :\ :. :ah^ -harae "-a outcome 
c >f tl I 5 trii a] , (
 fc- - - . - ^ .-I 
unfairness in a conviction, . •. 1 irn i-leoal-L/ :i a 
s _. r - .. . ? , 
wiui": no ;n:en: re delay or abuse tie writ. 
#--.--* ""' 3\ " • '! Mm l mi.' r- f 11 noner f i U M I his 
successive peti;icn, exception ti) was implicitly included in the 
PCRA via Sect i on 7 8-35a-106(d), except i on (2) was express 1 y 
provided" for in Section 78-35a-104 (1) (e), and exception (4) was 
covered by Rul e 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
I 'rap o r t a i 111y, b ecause t h e c ommon law exceptions "retain the ir 
3The Utah Supreme Court has also made clear that the list of common law 
exceptions set forth in Hurst v. Cook, 111 P,2d 1029 (Utah 1989) is not an 
exhaustive list. See Gardner v. Galetka, 2001 UT 3, 118, 151 P. 3d 968 pWe later 
clarified that this list of Agood cause' exceptions is not exhaustive."). 
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independent constitutional significance," Gardner v. Galetka, 
2004 UT 42, 115, 94 P. 3d 263 (Gardner II), they can be asserted 
by petitioners raising successive post-conviction claims 
regardless of whether the exception has been included in the 
PCRA. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has also held that because 
frivolous claims and claims previously withheld for tactical 
reasons must be summarily denied, see Hurst/ 777 P.2d at 1037, 
post conviction petitioners must first demonstrate that a claim 
is neither frivolous nor was it withheld for tactical reasons 
before the post-conviction court is required to consider whether 
any common law exceptions apply that would excuse a petitioner's 
failure to raise the successive claim in a prior proceeding. See 
Gardner III, 2007 UT 3 at 126 (because "[frivolous claims, . . . 
and claims that are withheld for tactical reasons should be 
summarily denied[,] • • . a separate and distinct procedural 
determination for successive post-conviction claims [must be] 
made before [the trial court] reach[es] an analysis under the 
^good cause' common law exceptions/'). In other words, the trial 
court is required to summarily dismiss all successive post-
conviction claims that are frivolous or that were withheld for 
tactical reasons before considering the applicability of the 
common law exceptions. 
A claim is frivolous if it is facially implausible. See id. 
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at 121. Thus, a petitioner raising a successive post-conviction 
'~" aim must Z±LZ. ' "' " ~ 
_mo—ausibis bsfoi1;" rs^ufeiLii/1 ^r,^ the cn<jr re j^ r consider the 
coiiim^ n law except j_ono. rib iux tidii:\ ' 
reasons "* n nearly a] 1 cases, if ^ v,c- substance : a successive 
claim '*?? rr** * ^ iced in a - 'i pose-conviction pet:* 
i
 z„-j\.?.~z ~n~t * :.e reaso.. :,-. not raising "I4" T*-^  -cvtixd. : 
ftratecric in nature. LV-e lazbcrough v. Gentr\r. 540 U.S. ±f u 
. ^ — :wCuses on some issues to the exclusion of 
others t'ere -- -. --r— Y resumption tha~ ve did so for tactical 
i.^z-: _ .
 r*. jjeer neglect Strickland "T 
Washington, 46c *\ :~. c - 9. fw f :;^-^ " •;
 : ne defendant must 
c -r. t-\ _. -t . ;.-. *r- circumstances, the 
chal lerged acti-~ n " > : or " re considered FOW d tr" al strategy. ' " 
Thus, wi:;: respect to any successive : Iain;, „u * i-i .* - r the 
t ' • ' :• .- : " : - i - - . .-. - . 
petitioner mur~" overcome the strong presumption that no tactical 
reasons existed for counsel not l > IM P tai ^ 1 tit- claim vMi"li •-
now raised in the successive proceeding. That i3f the petitioner 
must demonstrate that nthere was no ^conceivable tactical basi s 
for counsel's actions ' State v. Clark , 2004 UT 25, 16, 89 P.3d 
162 (quoting State v." Bryant, 965 P,2d 539, .542 (Utah Ct App, 
1998)), See also State \ t, Crosby, 927 P,2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) 
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("[W]e give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical 
decisions and will not question such decisions unless there is no 
reasonable basis supporting them/'); State v. Farnsworth, 368 
P.2d 914, 915 (Utah 1962) (defendant charged with burglary did 
not have incompetent counsel where the "record indicate[d] no 
action or inaction by the trial attorney which could not 
rationally find explanation in a legitimate exercise of 
strategy,"). 
c. Whether an Exception Exists to the Procedural Bar 
Rule Based Upon a State Constitutional Right to 
the Effective Assistance of Post-Conviction 
Counsel 
In addition to raising an independent claim of ineffective 
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, Petitioner also 
argues that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 
constitutes a common law exception to the procedural bar rule 
and, therefore, many of his other claims are not procedurally 
barred because the failure to raise these claims in his prior 
post-conviction petition was the result of ineffective 
representation. In his memorandum opposing the State's 
supplemental motion to dismiss, he provides support for this 
argument by arguing that he has both a state constitutional right 
and a statutory right to the effective assistance of post-
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conviction counsel, 
"here ~- — -ruestion that. Petitions: *" - ' 
constiwwLii;:*!* ^t;4,t to the effective assistance ,_ _ i.i.al and 
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L ; •' ' . . . . j.-ei.u^*.. ~r a criminal 
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/raxr.!^  tan, 7 J 2 r.lc 5 "5, ' C^-5C7 ({'^ah i ° 5 r ; citing Utah C*vst. 
.-re^ ^71^ f i t is in accordance /.:h - assurance ci t;:~ Utah 
State HI c i 11 11 i <" n U i ;i I in j.cu^'J L«*. pi *i J«*J « l "i i.he 
assistance of counsel =t every important stage of the proceedings 
against him, ' i i n . f inrlur>- * n f iiil / 1 IM i L HIIJIH P r i id i , n in 
the appeal as well. See Utah Const, art. :, ^ .. •: ("In all 
criminal prosecutions the =•:;•-•:! ' M • * • • .-. , , to 
have a speedy public tr:?" -...u • ne ricnr :o appeal."), See 
also State v. Tuttle, 713 P. 2d 703, "04 (Utah 19P5) ("Tho Ht iti 
Constitution provides thai a defendant in a crintinal prosecution 
shall have a Aright to appeal i n a.l ] cases,'' The s shows that the 
draf ters : • f c >i ;ir : oi is ti t:i i tioi i coi isidered the right of appeal • ' 
essential :;• a r a n criminal proceediro. ..joti-ig Utah Conif'". 
art i, ' .-.„.-, _ ..-.^use z : a i-cnt 
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to counsel includes effective assistance of counsel," State v. 
Bums, 2000 UT 56, 123, 4 P. 3d 795, it follows that Petitioner 
had a state constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel both at trial and on appeal. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the Utah Constitution guarantees 
a criminal defendant the right to effective representation at 
trial and on appeal does not, in and of itself, warrant the 
conclusion that a state constitutional right .to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel exists. The Utah Supreme 
Court has never held that post-conviction petitioners in a death 
penalty case4 have a state constitutional right to post-conviction 
counsel. In Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480, the 
Supreme Court expressly avoided the issue when it declared that, 
[w]hile we have not yet considered whether such a right 
exists under the Utah Constitution, there is no need to 
do so in this case . . . . We do not foreclose the 
possibility that an indigent death row inmate may have 
a right to the effective assistance of counsel under 
the Utah Constitution, but that question must wait for 
4In the case of Hutchings v, State, 2003 UT 52, 84 P.3d 1150, the Utah 
Supreme Court considered a decision by the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the 
trial court's dismissal of a successive, non-capital petition for post-conviction 
relief. One of the claims raised by the petitioner was that he was ,,vwrongfully 
denied counsel for purposes of . , . his first petition for post-conviction 
relief. Id. at 119, The Supreme Court held that while the petitioner "may have 
benefitted from professional assistance in the drafting and presentation of his 
[first] petition, there is no statutory or constitutional right to counsel in a 
civil petition for post-conviction relief.'" Id. at 520 {emphasis added). 
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. . 'i • '- < - d i r e c t i v e * • o ^' 
another day. . 
jc[§ a£ $84, Because trie F>:r-'r 
recognized 5 ~~nstituticna. 
counsel, Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating Hnf * 
proper interpretation of the Utah Constitution yields such a 
right. 
.•L_,.. . upreme Court has ii-^j, u ' "scope of 
Utah**-r constitutional uro^ecM-r- \may be *- reader or narrower 
.. ..-- - _• . , .---*• 1 consti .-t_ „: depending on 
't~rj state censtirut ior-' s languaae, iv:s~o;v„ a* i 
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c o n s i d e r a t i o n *r P e t i t i o n e r ' s a rqument s , i*. i .: ! ne C o u r t ' s 
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Constitution -.nciudos the rign; *. .* n e effective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel. 
First, Petitioner argues that he has a state constitutional 
right to post-conviction counsel under Article I ,„ ^rfiori i;1. 
However, any reliance on Artn.e I, Section 12 !s guarantee of the 
right to counsel i s misplaced. While if may be true that the 
under 1 yii Ig fac !::s assoc iated vi th a post-convicti on petition 
concern a criminal conviction and sentence, post-conviction 
proceedings thRinsel ^  'es a re I upreme 
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Court has specifically held that "a petition for post-conviction 
relief is a civil action, specifically governed by rule 65C of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 
12, $10, 61 P. 3d 978. See also Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, 
120, 84 P.3d 1150 P[T]here is no statutory or constitutional 
right to counsel in a civil petition for post-conviction 
relief."). Moreover, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that, to 
"avoid any misconceptions . . ., it is reiterated that the Utah 
Const. Art. I, § 12 declares the right to be defended by counsel 
applies only in criminal prosecutions, not civil actions." 
Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372, 1373-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(emphasis added). Thus, because post-conviction proceedings are 
civil in nature, Petitioner cannot justifiably rely upon Article 
I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution to argue that he had a 
state constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel while prosecuting his first post-conviction 
petition. 
Second, although Petitioner claims that there has been a 
steady movement toward the recognition of a state constitutional 
right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, his 
argument relies primarily on language from cases emphasizing the 
need for state-funded post-conviction counsel and he does not 
cite to any language suggesting that a state constitutional right 
to effective post-conviction counsel is or may be necessary. 
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See, e.g., Julianf 960 P.~d 5- 0 ? Limmerman, J., concurring). 
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automatic post-conviction proceeding." {emphasis added)); Parsons 
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funding scheme, with i t s absolute caps on the payment of 
a t torneys fees and l i t i g a t i o n cos ts , could impose a cr ippl ing 
burden on cap i ta l p e t i t i o n e r s . While i t may be argued tha t the 
Supreme Court was suggesting that without suff ic ient funds, pos t -
conviction counsel may be unable to properly represent his 
c l i e n t , i . e . provide effect ive representa t ion , nowhere in the 
decision, e i the r impliedly or expressly, did the Supreme Court 
l ink inadequate s t a t e funding with the existence of a s t a t e 
cons t i tu t iona l r igh t to the effect ive ass is tance of counsel. 
Thus, Pe t i t ioner has fa i led to show tha t there has been a "steady 
movement" toward recognizing a s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l r igh t to 
ef fec t ive post-convict ion counsel or tha t such a cons t i t u t i ona l 
r ight i s required where inadequate funding is provided. 
Fourth, Pe t i t ione r argues tha t because the due process 
clause in Ar t i c l e I , Section 7 of the Utah Consti tution has been 
in te rpre ted by the Utah Supreme Court to provide broader 
protec t ions than i t s federal counterpart , the Utah Cons t i tu t ion ' s 
due process clause should be in te rpre ted to guarantee the 
ef fec t ive ass is tance of post-conviction counsel,5 This i s 
Presumably , P e t i t i o n e r makes the argument t h a t t he due process c l a u s e 
under t he s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n i s broader than i t s f edera l coun te rpa r t because he 
recognizes t h a t he had no federa l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o the e f f e c t i v e 
a s s i s t a n c e of p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n counsel dur ing h i s i n i t i a l s t a t e p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n 
proceeding . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court has express ly held that,, under the 
f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n , x v [ t ]here i s no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o an a t t o rney in s t a t e 
p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n p roceed ings . Consequently, a p e t i t i o n e r cannot claim 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel in such p r o c e e d i n g s . " Coleman 
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 152 (1991). See a l s o Menzles v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 
184, 150 P. 3d 480 ("We do, however, note t h a t the United S t a t e s Supreme Court has 
p r ev ious ly dec l ined t o recognize a federa l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o the e f f e c t i v e 
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consistent he argues, with other jurisdictions that have 
recognized a state constitutional right to effective post-
conviction counsel under the due process clause of their state 
constitutions. However, the case law from Alaska, Florida, and 
Mississippi upon which Petitioner relies and the arguments he 
makes are unpersuasive. It is true that in Grinols v. State, 74 
P. 3d 889 (Alaska 2003) the Alaska Supreme Court held that "the 
right to counsel in a first application for post-conviction 
relief is of a constitutional nature, required under the due 
process clause of the Alaska Constitution,'7 id. at 894, and, not 
surprisingly, that this includes the right to effective 
representation which may be challenged in a second petition for 
post-conviction relief. See id. at 895. However, whether the 
Florida Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to 
the effective assistance of counsel under the Florida 
Constitution is, at best, unclear. As noted in the concurring 
opinion in Arbelaez v. Butterworth, 738 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1999), 
the Florida Supreme Court has "sent out an ambiguous, if not 
implicitly contradictory signal, when [it] declined to recognize 
a specific constitutional obligation of the State for provision 
of post-conviction counsel in capital cases, while at the same 
time recognizing a limited constitutional due process right to 
counsel in all post-conviction proceedings." Id. at 329 
assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings."'). 
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(Anstead, J,, concurring). 
The same is true of the Mississippi case, Jackson v. State, 
132 So.2d 187 (Miss. 1999), cited by Petitioner, Although the 
concurring opinion in that case stated that the majority erred in 
suggesting that a right to post-conviction counsel is found in 
the Mississippi Constitution, see id. at 191-92, the majority 
opinion itself makes no such express conclusion. Rather, in the 
context of encouraging the Mississippi legislature to establish a 
statewide public defender system, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
stated, "[w]e therefore find that [the petitioner], as a death 
row inmate, is entitled to appointed and compensated counsel to 
represent him in his state post-conviction efforts." Id. at 191. 
No mention was made whether this entitlement was constitutional 
or statutory in nature. 
Moreover, it is at least noteworthy that the supreme courts 
of other states have specifically held that their state 
constitutions do not include a right to post-conviction counsel. 
See In re Beasley, 107 S.W.3d 696r 697 (Tex. App. 2003) 
("Similarly, the Texas Constitution provides no right to counsel 
in a post-conviction collateral attack."); McKague v. Warden, 
Nevada State Prison, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (Nev. 1996) ("The Nevada 
Constitution also does not guarantee a right to counsel in post-
conviction proceedings. . . . " ) ; State v. Crowder, 573 N.E.2d 
652, 653-654 (Ohio 1991) (>xWe agree with the court of appeals 
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that an indigent petitioner has neither a state nor a federal 
constitutional right to be represented by an attorney in a post-
conviction proceeding,"). 
Finally, in its reply to Petitioner's memorandum in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss, the State raises a 
noteworthy policy argument against the position that the Utah 
Constitution should be interpreted to guarantee a right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. According to the 
State, if the Utah Constitution guarantees a right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, it will allow 
petitioners "to file endless successive petitions re-litigating 
claims that they previously lost and raising new claims that they 
should have raised in a prior proceeding, and arguing that the 
court must reach their merits because any one of a seemingly 
endless string of post-conviction counsel had been ineffective." 
(State's Mem. in Reply at 31.) Under this "infinite continuum of 
litigation" argument, a state constitutional right to post-
conviction counsel would result in "an infinite continuum of 
litigation in many criminal cases." Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 
425, 429 (9th Cir. 1993). As the Bonin court noted, if a 
petitioner 
has a [constitutional] right to competent counsel in 
his or her first state post-conviction proceeding 
because that is the first forum in which the 
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ineffectiveness of trial counsel can be alleged, it 
follows that the petitioner has a [constitutional] 
right to counsel in the second state post-conviction 
proceeding, for that is the first forum in which he or 
she can raise a challenge based on counsel's 
performance in the first state post-conviction 
proceeding. . . . And so it would go. 
Id. at 429-30. The same conclusion was reached by the Arizona 
Supreme Court when it considered this same issue. In State v. 
Mata, 916 P.2d 1035 (Ariz. 1996), the Arizona Supreme Court held 
that 
if defendant deserved effective representation on his 
first [post-conviction petition] to litigate effective-
ness on appeal, then it must follow that he be 
effectively represented on the second in order to 
litigate the first. This is because defendant's 
argument is based on the ill-begotten notion that the 
right to effective counsel on appeal is empty without 
effective counsel to challenge appellate counsel's 
performance. According to defendant's own logic, the 
right to effective assistance on the first [post-
conviction petition] would also be meaningless without 
another proceeding in which defendant could argue that 
counsel on that petition was inadequate. We reject 
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this infinitely regressive notion. 
Id. at 1052-53. 
In light of the foregoing policy argument, if the Utah 
Constitution is interpreted to include a right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel, then any capital 
petitioner would be in a position to effectively delay and even 
halt the full effects of his sentence. In order to avoid this 
arguably unjust and one-sided result, the Utah Constitution 
should not be interpreted to include a right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel. Support for this 
conclusion is found in Menzies itself. There the State argued 
that a state constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel "would make capital post-conviction 
litigation interminable and end the finality of death sentences." 
Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at §84. The Utah Supreme Court side-stepped 
making a direct ruling on this argument by stating that "Ma]s 
important as finality is, it does not have a higher value than 
constitutional guarantees of liberty.'" Id. (quoting Hurst, 111 
P.2d at 1035). Nevertheless, in the context of the State's 
infinite continuum of litigation argument, the Supreme Court 
specifically noted that the PCRA prevents this from occurring 
because "Utah's post-conviction legislation and associated rules 
contain appropriate limitations to assist courts in streamlining 
post-conviction review in death penalty cases." Id. Since a 
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constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel would not be subject to the statutory and rule 
constraints the Supreme Court has held exists to prevent the 
possibility of endless post-conviction litigation, the Supreme 
Court's statement is at least an implied rejection of the notion 
that the Utah Constitution includes a right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel. 
Based upon a careful assessment of the arguments provided by 
Petitioner in support of his contention that capital petitioners 
enjoy a state constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel, it is the Court's conclusion that 
Petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated that a proper 
interpretation of the Utah Constitution includes a right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Therefore, 
Petitioner cannot assert an exception, common law or otherwise, 
to the PCRA's procedural bar for claims that were raised and 
addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in a prior 
post-conviction petition based upon a state constitutional right 
to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel because he 
has failed to demonstrate that a proper interpretation of the 
Utah Constitution guarantees him such a right. 
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d. Whether an Exception Exists to the Procedural Bar 
Rule Based Upon a Statutory Right to the Effective 
Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel 
Although Petitioner has not shown that he had a state 
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel during his 
initial post-conviction proceedings, nor that a coininon law 
exception to the procedural bar rule exists based upon 
constitutional and common law considerations, under the PCRA he 
had a statutory right to post-conviction counsel. During the 
pendency of his initial petition for post-conviction relief, the 
PCRA required the trial court to determine whether the petitioner 
was indigent and, if so, "promptly appoint counsel who is 
qualified to represent [petitioners] in death penalty cases as 
required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(1)(2)(a). In the Menzies case, the 
Utah Supreme Court considered whether the statutory right to 
post-conviction counsel entitled capital petitioners to the 
effective assistance of counsel* The Supreme Court noted that 
"[g]iven the high stakes inherent in such [capital post-
conviction] proceedings—life and liberty—providing a petitioner 
the procedural safeguard of appointed counsel is an important 
step in assuring that the underlying criminal conviction was 
accurate." Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at 182. In order to take 
seriously this legislatively created protection, the Supreme 
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Court concluded that the statutory right to post-conviction 
counsel necessarily includes "a statutory right to effective 
assistance of counsel." Id, 
When the State filed its memorandum in support of the motion 
to dismiss on February 15, 2008, the State did not contest that 
Petitioner had a statutory right to the effective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel. However, new amendments to the PCRA 
that went into effect on May 5, 2008 added language specifically 
stating that >N[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as 
creating the right to the effective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel, and relief may not be granted on any claim that post-
conviction counsel was ineffective." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
202(4). In light of this change, in both a supplemental pleading 
filed on July 25, 2008 and its memorandum in reply filed on 
February 26, 2009, the State argues that the "no effective 
assistance of counsel" provision in the PCRA retroactively 
applies to Petitioner's case and, as a result, while he may have 
had a statutory right to post-conviction counsel, he did not have 
a statutory right to the effective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel. Therefore, the State argues, Petitioner cannot overcome 
the PCRA's procedural bar for claims that were raised and 
addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in a prior 
post-conviction petition by relying on a statutory right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel because the PCRA 
-49-
now expressly denies Petitioner this statutory right. 
The State provides three reasons in support of its 
contention that the new "no effective assistance of counsel" 
amendment applies retroactively: First, the new amendment is 
merely procedural in nature because it neither narrows nor 
eliminates Petitioner's cause of action and only affects how 
Petitioner will proceed with his litigation. Second, the new 
amendment merely clarifies the Legislature's original intent with 
respect to the right to effective representation in post-
conviction proceedings that may have been put into question by 
the Utah Supreme Court's erroneous conclusion in Menzies that the 
prior Section 202 of the PCRA included the right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel. Third, the Legislature 
intended that the new amendment apply to Petitioner's case. 
During the 2008 legislative session, Petitioner's case was 
pending and counsel for the State testified before the Senate 
Judiciary, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Justice Committee and 
enumerated the problems the new amendment was intended to remedy 
and that the amendments were needed immediately. 
Petitioner argues in response that the Menzies decision 
effectively vested him with a statutory right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel and that this Court does 
not have the authority to overrule the Utah Supreme Court. In 
-50-
addition, he also contends that his right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel is substantive in nature 
and that the amendment does more than simply clarify the PCRA, it 
eliminates this substantive right. Therefore, according to 
Petitioner, the "no effective assistance of counsel" amendment 
should not be applied retroactively. 
After carefully considering the arguments, it is the Court's 
conclusion that the "no effective assistance of counsel" 
amendment to the PCRA does not retroactively apply to 
Petitioner's case and, therefore, that Petitioner was entitled to 
the effective representation of post-conviction counsel during 
his initial post-conviction proceeding. 
First, the Court finds unpersuasive the State's argument 
that the Legislature intended the new amendment to apply 
retroactively. Nowhere in the 2008 amendments to the PCRA is 
there language that either impliedly or expressly declares that 
the new legislation should apply retroactively. Moreover, the 
fact that counsel for the State argued before a Senate committee 
that >%[w]e need these amendments now for the reasons that I've, 
I've already said," (State's Supplemental Mem. in Supp. at 18,) 
does little, in the Court's view, to suggest that the Legislature 
itself intended the 2008 amendments to apply retroactively. 
Second, because Petitioner was appointed counsel under the 
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PCRA and the Utah Supreme Court has held that capital post-
conviction petitioners are statutorily entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel under the PCRA, the mandate rule requires 
this Court to abide by the Supreme Court's ruling* Under the 
mandate rule, 
pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in 
a case become the law of the case and must be followed 
in subsequent proceedings of that case. The lower 
court must not depart from the mandate, and any change 
with respect to the legal issues governed by the 
mandate must be made by the appellate court that 
established it or by a court to which it, in turn, owes 
obedience. 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P. 2d 1034, 1037-1038 (Utah 
1995). The fact that the Supreme Court held in a separate case 
that capital petitioners have a statutory right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel does not alter the 
application of the rule. In light of the Supreme Court ruling in 
Menziesf this Court must afford Petitioner the right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. 
Third, while it is true that "statutory amendments that 
merely clarify an ambiguity in an original statute [must] be 
given retroactive effect," Evans & Sutherland, 953 P.2d at 440, 
they can only be "applied retroactively[] so long as they M o not 
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enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights.'" 
Keeganr 896 P.2d at 620 (quoting Board of Equalization, 864 P. 2d 
at 884). While not dispositive, the timing of the >xno effective 
assistance of counsel" amendment certainly suggests that it was 
intended not as a clarification of the prior PCRA, but as a 
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Menzies. In 
addition, the amendment nowhere includes language indicating that 
it was enacted for purposes of clarification. Moreover, as noted 
above, Petitioner had a vested right to the effective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel during his initial post-conviction 
proceedings which the amendment would eliminate if applied 
retroactively. 
Finally, the right to the effective assistance of counsel is 
a substantive right. In the Menzies decision, the Supreme Court 
set aside the trial court's judgment against the petitioner 
because the deficient performance of his attorney "effectively 
forfeited the entire post-conviction proceeding itself." 
Menziesr 2006 UT 81 at 51100. Clearly, post-conviction counsel's 
failure in that case to provide effective representation 
literally undermined every substantive right the petitioner was 
entitled to during the course of the proceedings. The fact that 
the failure to provide effective representation affected the 
petitioner's substantive rights is a good indication that the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel is itself a 
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substantive right. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is the Court's 
conclusion that the "no effective assistance of counsel" 
provision cannot retroactively apply to Petitioner's case and, 
therefore, that Petitioner had a statutory right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel during his initial post-
conviction proceedings. 
Despite this conclusion, however, it is not accurate that 
Petitioner's statutory right requires the Court to read into the 
PCRA an exception to the procedural bar for successive claims 
that were raised and addressed, or could have been, but were not, 
raised in a prior post-conviction petition based upon ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel. The statutory right to 
the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel is a 
legislatively created protection and, therefore, it is the 
Legislature that has the power, and the prerogative, to determine 
whether this statutory right constitutes an exception to the 
procedural bar rule with respect to successive post-conviction 
claims that were raised and addressed, or could have been, but 
were not, raised in a prior post-conviction proceeding. Indeed, 
language from the Menzies decision itself does not demonstrate 
otherwise and, in fact, supports this general principle. As 
previously explained, on appeal in Menzies the State presented 
the Supreme Court with the "infinite continuum of litigation" 
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argument contending " that ^writing an effect ive ass i s tance 
requirement in to sect ion [78-35a-202] would make cap i t a l pos t -
conviction l i t i g a t i o n interminable and end the f i n a l i t y of death 
sentences . ' 7 ' Id. at 184. In response to t h i s argument, the 
Supreme Court s ta ted t ha t , while n[w]e would be remiss in our 
cons t i tu t iona l ro le i f we were to allow f i n a l i t y to trump the 
i n t e r e s t s at stake in post-convict ion death penalty 
proceedings[,] . . . Utah's post-conviction l e g i s l a t i o n and 
associated rules contain appropriate l imi ta t ions to a s s i s t courts 
in streamlining post-convict ion review in death penal ty cases , " 
Id. For support, the Supreme Court c i ted to Section 78-35a-106, 
where the Legislature excluded from the PCRA any reference to 
ineffec t ive ass i s tance of post-conviction counsel as an exception 
to the procedural bar for successive claims tha t were ra ised and 
addressed, or could have been, but were not, ra ised in a p r io r 
post-convict ion p e t i t i o n . 6 
Based upon the foregoing analysis , i t i s the Court ' s 
6In add i t i on , in concluding t h a t the s t a t u t o r y r i g h t t o p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n 
counsel inc ludes t he r i g h t t o the e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counse l , the Supreme 
Court explained t h a t , by p rov id ing for t h i s r i g h t , i t b e l i e v e d the L e g i s l a t u r e 
had exp res s ly recognized the "high s t akes inherent in such p r o c e e d i n g s . " Menzies 
v, Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 182, 150 P. 3d 480. In order t o t ake s e r i o u s l y the 
L e g i s l a t u r e ' s p rov i s i on for t h e appointment of counsel , i t was e s s e n t i a l , i n the 
Supreme Cour t ' s view, t o conclude t h a t the r i g h t t o p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n counsel 
inc luded the r i g h t t o the e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counse l . See i d . ("We re fuse 
merely to pay l i p s e r v i c e t o t h i s l e g i s l a t i v e l y c r ea t ed p r o t e c t i o n by ho ld ing 
t h a t a p e t i t i o n e r in a p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n death pena l ty proceeding i s only e n t i t l e d 
t o i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of appointed counsel . Therefore , we hold t h a t [ the 
p e t i t i o n e r ] has a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t to e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel under Utah 
Code s e c t i o n 78-35a -202 . " ) . There was never any i n d i c a t i o n i n the Supreme 
C o u r t ' s reasoning t h a t t h i s conclusion was somehow c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y mandated. 
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conclusion that because the right to post-conviction counsel is a 
legislatively created protection, it is constitutionally 
permissible, and within the Legislature's power, to exclude from 
the PCRA an exception to the procedural bar for successive claims 
that were raised and addressed, or could have been, but were not, 
raised in a prior post-conviction petition based upon ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel. Therefore, Petitioner 
cannot rely on a statutory right to the effective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel to overcome the procedural bar for 
successive claims that were raised and addressed, or could have 
been, but were not, raised in a prior post-conviction proceeding. 
B, Petitioner's Post-Conviction Claims 
1. Timeliness 
The statute of limitations set forth in the PCRA required 
Petitioner to file his successive petition for post-conviction 
relief within one year from the time his cause of action accrued. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(1). In Petitioner's case, his 
post-conviction action accrued on October 5, 1998, the date on 
which the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review of 
his direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Thus, Petitioner 
had until October 5, 1999 to file his current post-conviction 
action. Because his petition was not filed until November 5, 
2007, it is over eight years too late, and therefore it is 
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untimely. With the exception of claim I,7 Pe t i t ioner does not 
d i r e c t l y contest the untimeliness of his successive p e t i t i o n 
other than to quote language from Julian indicat ing tha t "the 
mere passage of time can never j u s t i f y continued imprisonment of 
one who has been denied fundamental r i g h t s . " Julian, 966 P. 2d at 
254 (emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) . Rather, Pet i t ioner a s se r t s tha t the 
Court should excuse the untimeliness pursuant to the PCRA's 
" i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e " exception. As explained previously in 
Section I I I , A . l , a . , the Utah Supreme Court has spec i f i ca l ly held 
tha t a t r i a l court "presented with an untimely post-convict ion 
pe t i t i on must consider the i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e exception before 
disposing of the p e t i t i o n . " Johnson, 2006 UT 21 at 116. An 
analysis of what cons t i tu t e s an exception "in the i n t e r e s t s of 
j u s t i c e " involves more than simply making a determination tha t 
the successive claim i s non-frivolous. The Court must go one 
step further and examine both the meritoriousness of the 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s claim and the reason for [the] untimely f i l i n g . " 
Adams, 2005 UT 62 at 116. 
The apparent advantage of t h i s approach i s t ha t , by engaging 
in a meri ts analysis of each untimely successive claim, the pos t -
7 In claim 1, P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s t h a t he could only have brought t h i s claim 
a f t e r l e a r n i n g of the Utah Supreme C o u r t ' s use of an erroneous l e g a l s t andard to 
eva lua te whether he had been p re jud iced by t r i a l counse l ' s d e f i c i e n t performance 
during the pena l ty phase of t he t r i a l . Since the Supreme C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n 
aff i rming the d e n i a l of h i s i n i t i a l p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n p e t i t i o n was not en te red 
u n t i l January 26, 2007, he a s s e r t e d t h a t he had one year from t h a t da te t o r a i s e 
t h i s c la im. 
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conviction court will presumably be ensuring that "truly" 
legitimate claims are not overlooked, i.e., those claims "where 
xan obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of 
a constitutional right has occurred' that would make it 
^unconscionable' not to reexamine the issue." Gardner III, 2007 
UT 3 at 12 7. However, a merits review of claims is generally 
inconsistent with the purposes of the procedural bar rule- to 
promote finality, conserve judicial resources, and encourage the 
orderly and prompt administration of justice. See United States 
v. Wiseman, 297 F.3d 975, 979-80 (10th Cir. 2002) (procedural bar 
rule promotes "^the interests of judicial efficiency, 
conservation of scarce judicial resources, and orderly and prompt 
administration of justice.'" (quoting Hines v. United States, 971 
F.2d 506, 509 (10th Cir. 1992)). Indeed, in the case of 
successive claims that are untimely, this purpose is undermined 
by the interests of justice analysis which requires that a merits 
review of each claim be performed even for those claims which 
may, ultimately, be procedurally barred and, hence, would 
otherwise not require a merits review. 
In order to avoid having to engage in an unnecessary review 
of the merits of Petitioner's successive claims, the Court has 
opted to simply assume that Petitioner's successive petition was 
timely filed and consider first whether the successive claims are 
procedurally barred. If, and only if, the Court determines that 
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a claim would not be procedurally barred had it been timely filed 
will the Court then conduct an interests of justice analysis on 
that claim to determine whether the untimeliness of the claim 
should be excused. 
2. Claims that Were Raised and Addressed in a Prior 
Proceeding 
Petitioner candidly and commendably concedes that the 
following claims were raised and addressed in a prior proceeding: 
Claim 1, alleging that Petitioner's constitutionally 
deficient legal representation at the penalty phase of his 
capital trial requires reversal of his death sentence. This 
claim was previously raised as claim 1 in the direct appeal of 
his conviction and sentence, and as claims 4, 17, 18, and 21 in 
his initial post-conviction petition, and as claims 1, 3, and 10 
in the appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction 
petition. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 34); 
Claim 2, alleging that Petitioner's conviction and sentence 
of death were obtained in violation of his constitutional right 
to the competent assistance of mental health experts. This claim 
was previously raised as claim 1 in the direct appeal, and as 
claims 3 and 21 in his initial petition for post-conviction 
relief, and as claims 1 and 7 in the appeal from the denial of 
his initial post-conviction petition. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. 
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at 133-34); 
Claim 3, alleging that Petitioner's guilty plea is 
constitutionally defective. This claim was previously raised as 
claim 1 in the direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, and 
as claims 1, 1(a)(1), 1(a)(2), 1(a)(3), 2, and 17 in his initial 
petition for post-conviction relief, and as claim 2 in the appeal 
from the denial of his initial post-conviction petition. (See 
Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 140); 
Claim 4, alleging that Petitioner is actually innocent of 
Kaye Tiede's and Beth Potts' homicides and there is no factual 
basis for his guilty plea. This claim was previously raised as 
claims 17 and 18 in is initial petition for post-conviction 
relief, (See Pet'r Mem, in Supp. at 157); 
Claim 6, alleging that Petitioner's conviction and sentence 
are invalid because defense counsel labored under actual 
conflicts of interest that adversely impacted his representation 
of Petitioner. This claim was previously raised as claim 24 in 
his initial post-conviction petition and as claim 12 in the 
appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction petition. 
(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 190); 
Claim 7, alleging that Petitioner's penalty phase voir dire 
was infected by trial court error, prosecutorial misconduct, and 
the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. This claim was 
previously raised as claim 14 in his initial petition for post-
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conviction relief and as claims 5 and 6 in the appeal from the 
denial of his initial post-conviction petition. (See Petfr Mem. 
in Supp, at 201); 
Claim 8, alleging that Petitioner was prejudiced by trial 
counsel's constitutionally ineffective assistance throughout the 
penalty phase voir dire. This claim was previously raised as 
claim 14 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief and 
as claim 5 in the appeal from the denial of his initial post-
conviction petition. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 221)/ 
Claim 11, alleging that trial counsel did not submit written 
proposed voir dire questions to the court and failed to take 
steps to insure that the jury selection process would result in a 
fair and impartial jury. This claim was previously raised as 
claim 14 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief. 
(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 255); 
Claim 13, alleging that the trial court unconstitutionally 
limited the scope of voir dire and asked inappropriate questions 
regarding the religion practiced by the jurors. This claim was 
previously raised as claim 15 in the initial petition for post-
conviction relief. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 270); 
Claim 15, alleging that the trial court erred in giving jury 
instructions and a special verdict form that were 
unconstitutionally weighed in favor of aggravation over 
mitigation. This claim was previously raised as claims 7, 9, and 
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11 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief and as 
claim 4 in the appeal from the denial of his initial post-
conviction petition. (See Pet'r Mem, in Supp. at 294); 
Claim 16, alleging that the jury instructions contained no 
option for imposition or consideration of a life sentence in 
violation of Petitioner's constitutional rights. This claim was 
previously raised as claims 12 and 13 in the initial petition for 
post-conviction relief and as claim 4 in the appeal from the 
denial of his initial post-conviction petition, (See Pet'r Mem. 
in Supp, at 310); 
Claim 17, alleging that the reasonable doubt instruction was 
unconstitutional. This claim was previously raised as claim 6 in 
the initial petition for post-conviction relief and as claim 4 in 
the appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition. (See 
Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 322); 
Claim 18, alleging that the trial court erred in giving jury 
instructions at the penalty phase that improperly shifted the 
burden of proof to Petitioner. This claim was previously raised 
as claims 5 and 8 in the initial petition for post-conviction 
relief. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 327); 
Claim 20, alleging that Petitioner's conviction is 
unconstitutional because there was a complete breakdown in the 
adversarial process. This claim repeats the claims alleged in 
claim 1 and claim 6 of his current post-conviction petition. As 
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noted above, the allegations raised in these claims were 
previously raised as claims 1 in the direct appeal of his 
conviction and sentence, and as claims 4, 17, 18, 21, and 24 in 
his initial post-conviction petition, and as claims 1, 3, 10, and 
12 in the appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction 
petition. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 34, 190); 
Claim 22, alleging that Petitioner's constitutional rights 
were violated by the improper admission of the taped statement of 
Scott Manley. This claim was previously raised as claim 22 in 
the initial petition for post-conviction relief and as claim 8 in 
the appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction 
petition. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 350); 
Claim 23, alleging that Petitioner's convictions, 
confinement, and sentence are unconstitutional due to 
prosecutorial misconduct. This claim was previously raised as 
claim 23 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief and 
as claim 9 in the appeal from the denial of his initial post-
conviction petition. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 368); 
Claim 26, alleging that the instructions, taken as a whole, 
fail to narrow the category of persons eligible for the death 
penalty in violation of Petitioner's constitutional rights. This 
claim was previously raised as claim 10 in the initial petition 
for post-conviction relief. (See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 390); 
Claim 28, alleging that lethal injection violates 
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P e t i t i o n e r ' s Eighth Amendment r ight to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment. This claim was previously ra ised as claims 
20 and 25 in the i n i t i a l p e t i t i o n for post-convict ion r e l i e f and 
as claims 11 and 13 in the appeal from the denial of his pos t -
conviction p e t i t i o n . (See P e t ' r Mem. in Supp. at 401);8 
Claim 29, a l leging ineffect ive ass is tance of s t a t e counsel. 
With respect to the ineffec t ive assis tance of t r i a l and appel la te 
counsel, t h i s claim was previously raised as claim 19 in the 
i n i t i a l pe t i t i on for post-convict ion r e l i e f and as claim 10 in 
the appeal from the denial of his post-convict ion p e t i t i o n . (See 
P e t ' r Mem. in Supp. at 409); 
Claim 30, a l leg ing tha t Pet i t ioner was denied his 
cons t i tu t iona l r i gh t s because of the cumulative impact of e r r o r s . 
This claim was previously raised as claim 2 in the d i rec t appeal 
of h is conviction and sentence. (See Pe t ' r Mem. in Supp. at 
416) . 
All of the foregoing claims were raised and addressed in a 
p r io r proceeding, e i t h e r at t r i a l , on d i rec t appeal, in 
P e t i t i o n e r ' s i n i t i a l p e t i t i o n for post-conviction r e l i e f , or in 
his appeal from the denial of his i n i t i a l pe t i t i on for post-
8In add i t ion t o acknowledging t h a t t h i s claim was p r ev ious ly r a i s e in h i s 
i n i t i a l p e t i t i o n e r for p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f and in the appeal from the den i a l 
of h i s p e t i t i o n , in h i s memorandum in oppos i t ion to the S t a t e ' s motion t o 
d i s m i s s , he moved to withdraw t h i s claim on the b a s i s t h a t , M [ i ] n the wake of new 
developments, [ P e t i t i o n e r ] does not b e l i e v e t h a t the P e t i t i o n i s the proper forum 
for t h i s claim in i t s c u r r e n t form." ( P e t ' r Mem, in Opp, a t 123). 
-64-
conviction relief and, therefore, they are procedurally barred 
under the PCRA and no statutory exception exists that would 
permit the Court to consider the merits of these claims. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1) (b) and (d). See also Kell, 2008 UT 
62 at 113 (a post-conviction petitioner "is not eligible for 
relief on claims that were xraised or addressed' on direct 
appeal."). This is so even for claims that appellate counsel 
failed to raise in the most effective manner. See id. at $17 
(after opportunity to be heard on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
"presume[s] that [it] gave full consideration to the claims, 
regardless of whether [petitioner's] counsel raised them in the 
most effective manner."). See also State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 
889 (Utah 1989) (Supreme Court has, "after fully considering the 
substance of particular claims raised on appeal, summarily (and 
often without written analysis) dismissed the same as meritless 
or of no effect. . . . Accordingly, after fully reviewing every 
claim raised in [a] case, we discuss at length only those issues 
critical to th[e] appeal."). 
However, in Hurstf the Utah Supreme Court stated that a 
"ground for relief from a conviction or sentence that has once 
been fully and fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a prior [post-
conviction] proceeding should not be readjudicated unless it can 
be shown that there are ^unusual circumstances.'" Hurst, 777 
P.2d at 1036 (emphasis added). Broadly speaking, the Supreme 
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Court has defined "unusual circumstances" to mean circumstances 
"where an obvious in jus t i ce or a subs tant ia l and pre jud ic ia l 
denial of a cons t i tu t iona l r ight has occurred." Id, at 1035. 
Nevertheless, although i t remains unclear what, p rec ise ly r 
cons t i tu tes the fu l l range of "unusual circumstances," the 
Supreme Court provided several p o s s i b i l i t i e s , " [ f ]o r example, a 
pr ior adjudication i s not a bar to reexamination of a conviction 
if there has been a re t roac t ive change in the law, a subsequent 
discovery of suppressed evidence, or newly discovered evidence," 
Id. 
Pet i t ioner makes several arguments for the proposi t ion tha t 
unusual circumstances ex i s t that excuse the procedural bar as i t 
applies to the successive claims he ra i ses that have already been 
raised and addressed in a pr ior proceeding.9 
9In the s e c t i o n of h i s memorandum in oppos i t ion to the S t a t e ' s motion t o 
dismiss where he p r e s e n t s h i s d i scuss ion t h a t the claims t h a t were p r e v i o u s l y 
r a i s e d are not p rocedura l ly barred f P e t i t i o n e r r a i s e s two i s s u e s t h a t , in the 
Cour t ' s view, a re not r e l evan t t o whether "unusual c i rcumstances" e x i s t t h a t 
would excuse the procedura l b a r . 
F i r s t , P e t i t i o n e r informs the Court t h a t the Utah At torney Genera l ' s Office 
i s engaged in a two-pronged e f f o r t " to e l imina te the Utah Supreme Cour t ' s common 
law except ions t o f a i l u r e s t o r a i s e claims in p r i o r proceedings r e g a r d l e s s of the 
r e s u l t i n g u n f a i r n e s s . " ( P e t ' r Mem. in 0pp. a t 45) . The f i r s t prong i s the 
Attorney Genera l ' s u n i l a t e r a l a t tempt to amend the PCRA t o i t s advantage and t o 
the d isadvantage of p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n p e t i t i o n e r s . The second prong i s t o amend 
the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n t o allow the l e g i s l a t u r e , r a t h e r than the Supreme Court , 
t o def ine p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n procedures , r i g h t s , and remedies . Even i f what 
P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s i s t r u e , simply because the Attorney General may be seeking 
t o amend the PCRA, with or without the input and a s s i s t a n c e of o ther i n t e r e s t e d 
p a r t i e s , has no bear ing whatsoever on whether "unusual c i rcumstances" e x i s t t h a t 
would excuse the procedura l bar in t h i s case . Obviously, the Attorney G e n e r a l ' s 
Office i s e n t i t l e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e in the l e g i s l a t i v e process and seek to a f f e c t 
the laws of the s t a t e j u s t as any o ther o rgan iza t ion or governmental agency or 
i n d i v i d u a l i s e n t i t l e d to do. Moreover, P e t i t i o n e r ' s ba ld a s s e r t i o n t h a t the 
Attorney Gene ra l ' s motive i s t o "seek[] g r e a t e r power t o expedi te execut ions 
r e g a r d l e s s of t he mer i t s of the c l a i m s , " i d . a t 45, i s unhelpful and simply 
i r r e l e v a n t t o any d i scuss ion concerning the ex i s t ence of common law except ions 
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F i r s t , Pe t i t i one r argues tha t , a f te r having received 
adequate funds and performing a more thorough invest igat ion of 
the case than was previously performed by p r io r post-convict ion 
counsel, new fac t s not previously known were discovered which (1) 
es tab l i sh the denial of a cons t i tu t iona l r i gh t , (2) might have 
changed the outcome of the t r i a l , and (3) e s t ab l i sh the exis tence 
of fundamental unfairness in P e t i t i o n e r ' s conviction.10 (See 
Pe t ' r Mem. in Opp. at 48). P e t i t i o n e r ' s basic argument i s t h a t , 
on the basis of new evidence he discovered as a resu l t of more 
funding and a more thorough inves t iga t ion of his case, an 
t o the procedura l bar r u l e . 
Second, with r e s p e c t t o seve ra l of h i s success ive c la ims, inc lud ing c la ims 
a s s e r t i n g i s s u e s t h a t were r a i s e d and addressed in a p r i o r proceeding, P e t i t i o n e r 
argues t h a t " the PCRA has been c r a f t ed by the S t a t e t o i t s decided advantage . 
, . [because t ] h e S t a t e has made the o r i g i n a l t r i a l cour t the f i r s t s top [for 
p e t i t i o n e r s seeking p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f ] . " Id . a t 73, According t o 
P e t i t i o n e r , t h i s model c r e a t e s a c o n f l i c t because i t i s *commonsense t h a t 
a t t a c k i n g a j u d g e ' s d e c i s i o n s i s an i n e f f e c t i v e way of gaining an i m p a r t i a l 
hear ing from a c o u r t . " Id . As a r e s u l t , p r i o r p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n counsel was 
prevented from r a i s i n g c la ims , or was r equ i r ed t o "water down" claims, in o rde r 
t o avoid p o t e n t i a l l y r a i s i n g the i r e of the p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n judge who was the 
same judge who p r e s i d e d at P e t i t i o n e r ' s t r i a l . Contrary t o P e t i t i o n e r ' s 
a s s e r t i o n s , i t was not t he Attorney General who was the d r a f t e r of the r u l e t h a t 
r equ i red the t r i a l cour t t o p r e s ide over h i s p r i o r p e t i t i o n for p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n 
r e l i e f . Rather, i t was mandated by a r u l e of c i v i l procedure promulgated by the 
Utah Supreme Court . See Utah R. Civ, P. 65C{f). Furthermore, i t i s not 
commonsense, but more a jaded view of Utah ' s j u d i c i a l system, t h a t cha l l eng ing 
a j u d g e ' s dec i s ion p rec ludes an i m p a r t i a l hear ing on whether the j u d g e ' s p r i o r 
r u l i n g s or a c t i o n s were c o r r e c t . Judges are e t h i c a l l y r equ i red t o be i m p a r t i a l , 
r ega rd l e s s of t he i s s u e s t h a t a re being cons idered . See Utah Code of J u d i c i a l 
Conduct, Canon 1 and Canon 3(B)• P e t i t i o n e r has p resen ted no evidence whatsoever 
t h a t h i s p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n judge ac ted u n e t h i c a l l y or was incapable of being 
impa r t i a l when p r e s e n t e d with i s sues r e l a t i n g t o how the judge conducted the 
t r i a l . Again, t h i s argument i s unhelpful and i r r e l e v a n t to any d i s c u s s i o n 
concerning the e x i s t e n c e of common law except ions t o the procedura l bar r u l e . 
1 0 P e t i t i o n e r a l s o argues t h a t the c la ims were "overlooked in good f a i t h 
with no i n t e n t t o de lay or abuse the w r i t . " Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 1031 
(Utah 1989). This p a r t i c u l a r common law except ion c l e a r l y cannot apply t o the 
claims t ha t were r a i s e d and addressed i n a p r i o r proceeding . Obviously, i f t he 
claims were p r e v i o u s l y r a i s e d , they were not overlooked. 
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exception to the procedural bar exists for all of the claims he 
has raised in his successive post-conviction petition that were 
raised and address in a prior proceeding. Therefore, he 
contends, the Court should reconsider these previously raised 
claims in light of the new evidence. 
As noted above, in 1989 when the Hurst case was decided, the 
Supreme Court indicated that newly discovered evidence 
constitutes "unusual circumstances" under the common law that 
would justify reconsidering a previously adjudicated claim. 
However, in Gardner II, the Supreme Court explained that, with 
the .passage of the PCRA in 1996, the legislature effectively 
codified the common law "newly discovered evidence" exception to 
the procedural bar. See Gardner II, 2004 UT 42 at 114 
("Likewise, the [PCRA] also provides for relief on the basis of 
^newly discovered material evidence,' thereby incorporating the 
second Hurst factor."). See also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
104 (1) (e). In doing so, rather than identifying newly discovered 
evidence as an exception to the procedural bar rule, the 
legislature reformulated it as an independent statutory ground 
for post-conviction relief. As a result, technically there is no 
exception under the PCRA to the procedural bar rule on the basis 
of newly discovered evidence. 
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has held that "despite 
the statutory enactment of the majority of the Hurst factors, all 
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five common law exceptions retain their independent 
constitutional significance and may be examined by this court in 
our review of post-conviction petitions/' Gardner II, 2004 UT 42 
at 115, the Supreme Court also expressly stated that it will 
"defer to the legislature unless these fundamental safeguards are 
repealed or otherwise restricted." Id. Because the legislature 
has neither repealed nor otherwise restricted the PCRA's "newly 
discovered evidence'7 ground for relief since Gardner II was 
decided, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(1); Utah Code Ann. § 78-
35a-104(l) (1996), the requirements for relying upon newly 
discovered evidence under the PCRA and as a common law exception 
are co-extensive. It follows that because Petitioner has 
asserted an exception to the procedural bar rule on the basis "of 
new facts not previously known which show the denial of a 
constitutional right or might have changed the outcome of 
[Petitioner's] trial [, and] the existence of fundamental 
unfairness in [Petitioner's] conviction," (Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 
48) (emphasis added), he cannot overcome the procedural bar for 
the successive claims he raises that were raised and addressed in 
a prior proceeding unless he satisfies the requirements set forth 
in the PCRA for raising a ground for relief based upon newly 
discovered evidence. 
Under the PCRA, reliance upon newly discovered evidence 
requires a petitioner to establish that 
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(I) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's 
counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or 
sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any 
previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction 
proceeding, and the evidence could not have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely 
cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely 
impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly 
discovered material evidence demonstrates that no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found the 
petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the 
sentence received. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104 (1) (e) (I)-(iv). Nowhere in his 
pleadings does Petitioner specifically address any of these 
requirements for relying upon newly discovered evidence. At 
best, and entirely by implication, he suggests that the new 
evidence is material, is not merely cumulative, and is not merely 
impeachment. Significantly, however, Petitioner does not discuss 
nor demonstrate that the new evidence he now possesses is 
evidence that could not have been discovered through the exercise 
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of reasonable diligence and included in a prior post-conviction 
petition. That is, he does not affirmatively establish that the 
State, or any other governmental agency, purposefully withheld 
material evidence or failed to provide material evidence when 
requested. Moreover, there is no indication that the affidavits 
and additional reports submitted by Petitioner in his current 
successive petition could not have been presented in support of 
the claims he raised in his prior post-conviction proceeding. 
Rather than argue that the new evidence he now possesses could 
not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, Petitioner instead contends that the evidence was not 
discovered as a result of inadequate funding for prior post-
conviction counsel. 
There appears to be little question that prior post-
conviction counsel was frustrated at the funding mechanism in 
place at the time Petitioner's initial petition for post-
conviction relief was filed and that post-conviction counsel 
believed the funding provided was inadequate and permitted him to 
perform only a perfunctory investigation into Petitioner's case. 
Petitioner alleges that prior post-conviction counsel requested 
payments in excess of the funding caps from the Division of 
Finance ("Finance") pursuant to the administrative rules 
governing the payment of counsel, but that these requests were 
denied despite the fact that the post-conviction court authorized 
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the requested funding. Two separate judges deemed the funding to 
be reasonable and necessary. Initially, the funding available to 
prior post-conviction counsel was $25,000 in attorney fees and 
$10,000 in litigation expenses. Prior post-conviction counsel 
indicated to the post-conviction court that the $10,000 limit was 
insufficient to perform an adequate investigation and, 
ultimately, the court authorized up to $40,258.59 in litigation 
expenses beyond the $10,000 limit. Upon request from prior post-
conviction counsel for payment, Finance denied the request. 
Subsequently, Finance modified its rules and raised the 
amount of attorney fees by $5,000, for a maximum of $30,000, and 
the amount for litigation expenses by $10,000, for a maximum of 
$20,000. However, based upon the information provided by 
Petitioner and the State in their pleadings, it appears that, 
although the post-conviction court authorized up to $40,258.59 in 
litigation expenses beyond the $10,000 maximum at the time, prior 
post-conviction counsel ultimately only requested actual 
litigation expenses in the amount of $11,555,16, leaving unused 
the amount of $8,4 44.84 by the court's math. Even if incorrect, 
the principle is sound. Even if prior post-conviction counsel 
could not do all he wanted, funding in some amount existed to do 
more. Despite the apparent funding problems Petitioner argues 
existed during his prior post-conviction proceedings, it is 
difficult for the Court to conclude that, with unused litigation 
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funds still available in some amount, the new evidence that 
Petitioner now possesses is evidence that could not have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence as a 
result of insufficient funding. 
In any event, even if the Court were to conclude that the 
funding available hampered prior post-conviction counsel's 
ability to perform the type of investigation he believed was 
necessary in the case and, for that reason, the new evidence he 
now has not only was not discovered, but also could not have been 
discovered, Petitioner fails to discuss or demonstrate that, when 
viewed with all of the other evidence presented in the case, no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty of the 
offense to which he pleaded guilty or subject to the sentences of 
death he received following the penalty phase proceedings. 
Thus, because Petitioner has failed to satisfy all of the 
requirements set forth in 78-35a-104(e)(I)-(iv) for relying upon 
newly discovered evidence, either as an independent post-
conviction claim or as a common law exception to the procedural 
bar rule, the State is entitled to a dismissal of Petitioner's 
successive claims that were raised and addressed in a prior 
proceeding. 
Second, in addition to asserting an exception to the 
procedural bar on the basis of newly discovered evidence, 
Petitioner also specifically argues that ineffective assistance 
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of trial, appellate, and prior post-conviction counsel are common 
law exceptions to the procedural bar rule. (See Pet'r Mem. in 
Supp. at 32-33). Ineffective assistance of counsel is not one of 
the common law exceptions enumerated in Hurst and, although the 
list in Hurst was not intended to be exhaustive, see Gardner IIIf 
2007 UT 3 at fl8 (uWe later clarified that this list of ^good 
cause' exceptions is not exhaustive/'), it is also true that the 
Utah Supreme Court has never formally recognized ineffective 
assistance of counsel as a common law exception to the procedural 
bar rule. 
In any case, it is simply unclear to the Court how 
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel can possibly 
constitute a common law exception to the procedural bar of 
Petitioner's successive post-conviction claims that were already 
raised and addressed in a prior proceeding. For example, the 
fact that trial counsel may have ineffectively raised a claim 
that Petitioner now raises again in his successive petition is 
irrelevant to whether the claim was raised and addressed in a 
prior proceeding, although it would be relevant to an independent 
claim on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective in 
raising the claim. Thus, while trial counsel's ineffectiveness 
in raising a claim may itself constitute a separate claim on 
direct appeal, it does not constitute an exception to the 
procedural bar rule for successive post-conviction claims that 
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were raised and addressed in a prior proceeding. 
The same is true for ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel. The fact that appellate counsel may have ineffectively 
raised a claim that Petitioner now raises again in his successive 
petition is irrelevant to whether the claim was raised and 
addressed in a prior proceeding, although it would be relevant to 
an independent claim in an initial post-conviction petition that 
appellate counsel was ineffective in raising the claim. Thus, 
while appellate counsel's ineffectiveness in raising a claim may 
itself constitute a separate claim in an initial post-conviction 
petition, it does not constitute an exception to the procedural 
bar rule for successive post-conviction claims that were raised 
and addressed in a prior proceeding. 
As for Petitioner's assertion that ineffective assistance of 
prior post-conviction counsel constitutes a common law exception 
to the procedural bar rule, this argument also fails. As the 
Court concluded above in Section III.A.2.c, Petitioner did not 
demonstrate that a proper interpretation of the Utah Constitution 
includes a right to the effective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel. Therefore, Petitioner cannot assert a common law 
exception to the PCRA's procedural bar for claims that were 
raised and addressed in a prior proceeding based upon a state 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel because the Utah Constitution does not 
-75-
guarantee him this right. 
Moreover, the Court also concluded above that the right to 
the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel is a 
legislatively created protection. As a statutory right, rather 
than a common law right, Petitioner cannot rely upon this right 
as the basis for asserting a common law exception to the 
procedural bar rule for successive post-conviction claims that 
were raised and addressed in a prior proceeding. 
Therefore, because Petitioner has not demonstrated that 
ineffective assistance of trial, ,appellate, or post-conviction 
counsel constitute common law exceptions to the procedural bar 
rule, the State is entitled to the dismissal of Petitioner's 
successive claims that were raised and addressed in a prior 
proceeding. 
Finally, in the same section of his memorandum in support of 
the successive petition where Petitioner discusses the law 
governing common law exceptions to the procedural bar rule and 
where he specifically asserts that ineffective assistance of 
counsel constitutes a common law exception, he also appears to at 
least imply that the "severe funding limitations [that] ma[de] 
proper and thorough investigation impossible," (Pet'r Mem. in 
Supp. at 33), constitutes a common law exception to the 
procedural bar rule. If this is Petitioner's contention, it is, 
again, unclear to the Court how this is so. Common law 
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exceptions enumerated by the Supreme Court deal with the 
discovery of new or suppressed evidence, new law, and fundamental 
or constitutional errors. Lack of adequate funding for post-
conviction counsel may provide an explanation in support of 
Petitioner's allegations that prior post-conviction counsel was 
ineffective or why counsel was unable to do a constitutionally 
adequate investigation or why counsel failed to discover 
important evidence in the case. Indeed, in addressing his claim 
related to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, 
Petitioner asserts that u[b]ecause of the administrative rule 
which severely limit[ed] funding of both the defense and 
investigation of post-conviction cases, including the retention 
of the services of crucial and fundamental expert services, . . . 
[his prior post-conviction] counsel was unable to provide 
effective assistance of counsel."' (Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 415). 
See also Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at 120 n.3 (in the context of 
commenting on "the funds needed to secure [the petitioner] a 
proper post-conviction proceeding," the Utah Supreme Court noted 
that "it may be the case that the statutory [funding] scheme 
imposes a crippling burden on [the petitioner]."}. Thus, it is 
conceivable that the lack of adequate funding may result in 
constitutional or statutory violations. However, inadequate 
funding, in and of itself, is neither a violation of Petitioner's 
constitutional rights nor, so long as the proper funding rules 
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are followed, is it a violation of Petitioner's statutory rights. 
In the Court's view, the lack of adequate funding is not 
relevant to whether the procedural bar should be excused with 
respect to claims raised by Petitioner in his successive post-
conviction petition that were already raised and addressed in a 
prior proceeding• 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, all of Petitioner's 
successive claims listed above (all but Claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 
19, 21, 24, 25 and 27) that were already raised and addressed in 
a prior proceeding are procedurally barred under the PCRA and 
under the common law and Petitioner has not shown that any 
statutory or common law exceptions apply that would permit the 
Court to consider the merits of these claims. 
Therefore, the State is entitled to a dismissal of these 
claims, again, all but Claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 25 
and 27. 
3. Claims that Could Have Been, But Were Not, Raised in 
Petitioner's Prior Post-Conviction Petition 
The PCPA specifically precludes Petitioner from obtaining 
"relief . . . upon any ground that • . . could have been, but was 
not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(1)(d). Such claims are also 
precluded by the common law. See Gardner Ir 888 P. 2d at 613 
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("Issues that could and should have been raised on direct appeal, 
but were not, may not properly be raised in a habeas corpus 
proceeding absent unusual circumstances."). With respect to the 
following claims, they are all claims that could have been, but 
were not, raised in Petitioner's prior post-conviction petition: 
Claim 5, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
and trial court error in connection with Petitioner's motion to 
change venue; 
Claim 9, alleging that Petitioner was prejudiced by the 
trial court's error in failing to properly strike venire-members 
for cause during the penalty phase voir dire; 
Claim 10, alleging that the trial court failed to ask 
numerous voir dire questions resulting in a flawed jury selection 
process; 
Claim 12, alleging that Petitioner's jury venire was 
prejudicially biased by the trial court's introduction of the 
concept of "blood atonement" into the voir dire; 
Claim 14, alleging that the exclusion from the jury of 
persons who were not members of the LDS Church deprived 
Petitioner of the right to trial by a jury drawn from a 
representative cross-section of the community; 
Claim 19, alleging that the jury was prejudiced by it's 
consideration of extrinsic evidence in violation of the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the United States 
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Constitution; 
Claim 21, alleging that Petitioner's constitutional rights 
were violated by the improper admission of evidence at the 
penalty phase of his trial, including (1) the videotape made by 
Deli of Petitioner in the Tiede's cabin before the homicides, (2) 
allowing the prosecution to elicit and perform irrelevant and 
prejudicial in-court ^demonstrations," (3) opinion testimony from 
James Bell, (4) testimony from James Holland, (5) photographs of 
the Kaye Tiede and Beth Potts before their deaths, and (6) Linae 
Tiede's statement regarding Petitioner's purported devil worship; 
Claim 24, alleging that the State failed to disclose 
material exculpatory evidence; 
Claim 25, alleging that Petitioner's death sentence is 
disproportionate to his culpability and violates his 
constitutional rights; and 
Claim 27, alleging that Petitioner has been prejudiced in 
investigating and presenting post-conviction claims and in 
gathering additional evidence to prove his entitlement to relief 
as a result of an inadequate and unreliable appellate record. 
Petitioner nowhere argues that the foregoing claims are ones 
that could not have been known and raised in a prior post-
conviction petition. As explained previously in Section 
III.A,2.a., unlike the procedural bar rule that applies to 
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initial post-conviction petitions, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
106(1) ( c), which includes a statutory exception based upon 
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, see Utah 
Code Ann, § 78-35a-106(2), no exception based upon the 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is expressly 
included in the PCRA. Thus, any successive claim that was raised 
or that could have been raised, but was not, in a prior post-
conviction petition, is procedurally barred and no exception 
exists under the PCRA to excuse this failure• 
However, although no statutory exception applies to excuse 
the failure to raise these types of claims in a prior post-
conviction petition, because the common law exceptions have 
"independent constitutional significance," Gardner II, 2004 UT 42 
at $15, the common law exceptions may be relied upon in order to 
overcome the procedural bar. Petitioner asserts that four common 
law exceptions apply that excuse his procedural default, 
including the three that were previously discussed in Section 
II.B.: (1) the discovery of new evidence as a result of more 
funding and a more thorough investigation of the case, (2) 
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, (3) that 
severe funding limitations existed at the time Petitioner filed 
his prior post-conviction petition which made a proper and 
thorough investigation of his case impossible, and (4) all of the 
claims that were not previously raised were overlooked in good 
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faith with no intent to delay or abuse the post-conviction 
process. 
As an initial matter, the Utah Supreme Court has explained 
that before the post-conviction court is required to consider 
whether any of the common law exceptions apply to excuse the 
procedural bar, a determination must be made that the claims that 
could have been raised in a prior post-conviction petition, but 
were not, are not frivolous and were not withheld for tactical 
reasons. See Gardner III, 2001 UT 3 at 126 (because xx[f]rivolous 
claims, . . . and claims that are withheld for tactical reasons 
should be summarily denied[,] . . . a separate and distinct 
procedural determination for successive post-conviction claims 
[must be] made before [the trial court] reach[es] an analysis 
under the xgood cause' common law exceptions."). 
Other than merely asserting that his claims were overlooked 
in good faith, Petitioner nowhere demonstrates that they were not 
withheld for tactical reasons. It may well be that all of the 
claims he now raises which could have been raised in a prior 
post-conviction petition are non-frivolous in nature, but the 
Court must presume that post-conviction counsel had a legitimate 
tactical reason for not raising them in the prior petition. See 
Gentry, 540 U.S. at 5 ("When counsel focuses on some issues to 
the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he 
did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.'7). 
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As explained above, in order to overcome this presumption, 
Petitioner must show that '"there was no ^conceivable tactical 
basis for counsel's actions,'" Clark, 2004 UT 25 at 16 (quoting 
Bryant, 965 P.2d at 542) . Not only has Petitioner not even 
attempted to specifically meet his burden, it is unlikely that he 
could do so. 
All of the claims raised in Petitioner's successive petition 
that were not previously raised are claims for which a 
reasonable basis can be articulated as to why they were not 
raised in a prior proceeding. For example, given all of the 
circumstances of the case and the limitations in terms of time, 
funding, and resources, it is certainly plausible that these 
claims were not raised in the initial post-conviction petition 
because they were weaker or less persuasive than the other claims 
that were raised. Raising weaker claims would have distracted the 
post-conviction court from fuller consideration of the stronger 
claims. Raising weaker claims could well have been futile and 
resulted in a determination the claims were frivolous on their 
face. This could have been seen as reducing the effectiveness of 
the arguments as to the stronger claims. Any of these reasons 
constitute a conceivable tactical basis why post-conviction 
counsel would not have raised them in Petitioner's prior post-
conviction petition. 
Furthermore, in Petitioner's memorandum in support of his 
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successive petition, for every claim that could have been, but 
was not, raised in a prior post-conviction petition, Petitioner 
states that he fairly presented the issues associated with these 
successive claims N>in state court pleadings, briefs and 
associated filings, hearing, and argument." (Pet'r Mem, in Supp. 
at 174, 235, 252, 259, 277, 331, 338, 379, 385, and 394). If 
that is true, then even though the issues related to his current 
claims may not have been specifically and discretely raised as an 
independent claim in his prior post-conviction petition, they are 
issues that must have been known to prior post-conviction 
counsel. They are not, therefore, claims that were overlooked in 
good faith because the issues involved were present in various 
state court pleadings submitted or argued by Petitioner's prior 
trial, appellate, or post-conviction counsel. 
Because Petitioner has not satisfied his burden of 
demonstrating that the claims he now raises that could have been, 
but were not, raised in his prior post-conviction petition were 
not withheld for tactical reasons, the Court cannot consider 
whether any of the common law exceptions to the procedural bar 
rule apply to his successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
On this basis alone, the State is entitled to the dismissal of 
these claims. 
Nevertheless, even had Petitioner satisfied his burden of 
demonstrating that his claims were not withheld for tactical 
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reasons, he has not shown that any common law exceptions apply 
that would overcome the procedural bar. 
First, Petitioner asserts an exception based upon the 
discovery of new evidence that resulted from a more recent, and 
more thorough, investigation of the case because of increased 
funding available. As previously explained in Section II.B., 
however, because the statutory and common law exceptions for 
newly discovered evidence are co-extensive, in order to rely upon 
this common law exception, Petitioner must satisfy the strict 
requirements set forth in Section 78-35a-104 (e) (I)-(iv). 
Petitioner has not met this strict requirement. At best, and 
entirely by implication, his pleadings suggests that the new 
evidence he has discovered is material, is not merely cumulative, 
and is not merely impeachment. However, he does not discuss nor 
demonstrate that the new evidence he now possesses is evidence 
that could not have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence and included in a prior post-conviction 
petition. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104 (1) (f) (I) (". . . 
neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the 
evidence . . . in time to include the evidence in any previously 
filed . . . post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could 
not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence.''}. He argues that the lack of funding available for 
prior post-conviction counsel prevented counsel from performing a 
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constitutionally adequate investigation of Petitioner's case. 
This argument, however, is at least somewhat contradicted by the 
fact that unused litigation funds were still available at the 
conclusion of his prior post-conviction proceedings. 
Further, most of the claims do not involve "investigation" 
but relate to matters in the record-the change of venue issues, 
voir dire, the admission of certain evidence, the jury 
composition, and others. 
Moreover, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that, when 
viewed with all of the other evidence presented in the case, no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty of the 
offense to which he pleaded guilty or subject to the sentences of 
death he received following the penalty phase proceedings. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104 (1) (£) (iv), formerly 78-35a-104 (e) (M. 
. , viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered 
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact 
could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject 
to the sentence received."). Because Petitioner has failed to 
satisfy all of the requirements set forth in the PCRA, he cannot 
rely upon newly discovered evidence as a common law exception to 
the procedural bar rule. 
Second, Petitioner asserts an exception based upon the 
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel. As the 
Court concluded above in Section III.A.2,c, Petitioner cannot 
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assert a common law exception to the PCRA's procedural bar for 
claims that could have been, but were not, raised in his prior 
post-conviction petition based upon a state constitutional right 
to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel because 
the Utah Constitution does not guarantee him such a right. 
Moreover, although Petitioner has a statutory right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, because this is 
a legislatively created right, rather than a common law sight, 
Petitioner cannot rely upon this statutory right as the basis for 
asserting a common law exception to the procedural bar rule. 
Third, Petitioner argues that a common law exception exists 
based upon the severe funding limitations that existed at the 
time Petitioner filed his prior post-conviction petition, which 
made a proper and thorough investigation of his case impossible. 
As noted above, the lack of adequate funding for post-conviction 
counsel may provide an explanation in support of Petitioner's 
allegations that prior post-conviction counsel was ineffective or 
why counsel was unable to do a constitutionally adequate 
investigation or why counsel failed to discover allegedly 
important evidence in the case. However, inadequate funding, in 
and of itself, is neither a violation of Petitioner's 
constitutional rights nor, so long as the proper funding rules 
are followed, is it a violation of Petitioner's statutory rights. 
Thus, the lack of adequate funding is not a common law exception 
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to the procedural bar rule that excuses claims that could have 
been, but were not, raised, in a prior petition for post-
conviction relief. 
Moreover, as to this argument, it is an argument in this 
context that relates to the "infinite continuum of litigation" 
concept, only in this context it is and could be run amok. If 
$40,000 is provided for post-conviction proceedings, it can 
always be claimed that $60,000 was needed; if that is provided, 
$80,000 could be claimed as necessary, and there could never be 
an end to such a claim. There is never enough time or money. 
However, the argument is not directly made by Petitioner, but 
based on this notion, this cannot be a basis for a common law 
exception to the procedural bar rule. 
Finally, Petitioner argues that all of the claims he now 
raises that could have been, but were not, raised in his prior 
post-conviction petitioner are claims that were overlooked in 
good faith with no intent to delay the post-conviction process. 
Without question, this is a legitimate common law exception to 
the procedural bar rule that has been expressly recognized by the 
Utah Supreme Court. See Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1031 P A showing of 
good cause that justifies the filing of a successive claim may be 
established by showing . . . a claim overlooked in good faith 
with no intent to delay or abuse the writ."). However, the 
explanations Petitioner provides in his pleadings lead the Court 
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to believe that the claims were notf in fact, overlooked in good 
faith. As noted above, in Petitioner's memorandum in support of 
this successive petition, for each claim that could have been, 
but was not, raised in a prior post-conviction petition, he 
states that he fairly presented the issues associated with these 
claims "in state court pleadings, briefs and associated filings, 
hearing, and argument." (Pet'r Mem, in Supp. at 174, 235, 252, 
259, 277, 331, 338, 379, 385, and 394). Thus, the issues on the 
basis of which he now raises claims that were not raised in his 
prior post-conviction petition were apparently known, or should 
have been known, to prior post-conviction counsel. They are not, 
therefore, claims that the Court can conclude were overlooked in 
good faith. Again, many of the claims in this category are based 
on facts in the trial record, not facts that require an 
independent investigation beyond examination of the written 
record. 
Furthermore, even if the Court's inferences from the 
language Petitioner uses in his pleadings are not warranted, 
other than making the bald assertion that the claims were 
overlooked in good faith, Petitioner fails to provide a detailed 
argument explaining how the exception applies to his case or the 
reasons in support of this exception. As the State points out, 
Petitioner nowhere provides legal support for the proposition 
that the "overlooked in good faith" exception applies "merely 
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because the evidence [does] not establish that [Petitioner] held 
back his claim[s] for tactical purposes," (State's Mem. in Reply 
at 89-90), Indeed, in light of the Utah Supreme Court's view 
that exceptions to the procedural bar rule should only apply "in 
those rare and unusual cases in which ^an obvious injustice or a 
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has 
occurred,' making it unconscionable not to reexamine the issue,'' 
Model, 2008 UT 32 at 120 (emphasis added), if a procedural bar 
can be overcome merely by stating that a claim that could have 
been, but was not, raised in a prior post-conviction petition was 
overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay, the exception 
would effectively eviscerate the rule. 
Nevertheless, although Petitioner does not set forth a 
compelling basis for this argument, presumably the reasons he has 
in support of the "overlooked in good faith" exception are based 
upon his contention that new evidence exists that went 
undiscovered until recently because prior post-conviction counsel 
was either ineffective or insufficient funding was available to 
perform a constitutionally adequate investigation. 
Even these reasons, however, are insufficient for the Court 
to conclude that the "overlooked in good faith" exception applies 
in Petitioner's case. In the most recent decision from the Utah 
Supreme Court where the "overlooked in good faith" exception was 
addressed in the context of the discovery of new evidence, see 
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Tillman, 2005 UT 56. The Utah Supreme Court carefully set forth 
the grounds in support of the "overlooked in good faith" 
exception. There the Supreme Court held that the petitioner's 
post-conviction claim that the State had failed to disclose 
material exculpatory evidence "was overlooked in good faith with 
no intent to delay or abuse the post-conviction process," Id. at 
125, because (1) the petitioner "had no reason to believe that 
there [was] undisclosed [evidence] until the State revealed [its] 
existence some nineteen years later," and (2) the State had made 
"affirmative representations - • . that no such [evidence] 
existed." In Petitioner's case, he does not argue that he had 
no reason to believe that the new evidence he now possesses did 
not exist. Nor does he establish that the State, or any other 
governmental agency, affirmatively represented to his prior post-
conviction counsel that this new evidence did not exist. 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, all of Petitioner's 
claims that could have been, but were not, raised in his prior 
post-conviction petition are procedurally barred under the PCRA 
and under the common law and Petitioner has not shown that any 
statutory or common law exceptions apply that would permit the 
Court to consider the merits of these claims. 
Therefore, the State is entitled to a dismissal of these 
claims, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27. 
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4. Claim Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Prior Post-
Conviction Counsel 
In claim 29 of his successive petition, Petitioner argues 
that because the funding mechanism in place during his prior 
post-conviction proceedings "severely limit[ed the] funding of 
both the defense and investigation of post-conviction cases, ' 
including the retention of the services of crucial and 
fundamental expert services, and repeated necessity to litigate 
funding, [Petitioner's prior post-conviction] counsel was unable 
to provide effective assistance of counsel." (Pet'r Mem. in 
Supp, at 415)• This claim is not procedurally barred insofar as 
it is not a claim that was raised and addressed in a prior 
proceeding. Moreover, it is also not a claim that could have 
been, but was not, raised as a substantive claim in Petitioner's 
prior post-conviction petition. 
On the other hand, it is a claim that, at least in theory, 
could have been raised in a prior proceeding. That is, a claim 
of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel could have 
been raised in a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment, 
see, e.g., Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at 12 ("Following the dismissal of 
[the petitioner's] case, [post-conviction counsel] withdrew and 
new counsel was appointed. [The petitioner] then moved to set 
aside the district court's dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure."), or on appeal following the post-conviction 
court's dismissal of Petitioner's post-conviction petition* 
Practically speaking, however, this was not possible because 
prior post-conviction counsel continued his representation of 
Petitioner through the appeal of the dismissal of the post-
conviction petition. See Pascual v. Carver, 876 P. 2d 364, 366 
(Utah 1994) ("Counsel on appeal is not expected to allege his own 
ineffectiveness as counsel for the defendant at trial,"); 
Parsons, 871 P. 2d at 521 ("[TJrial counsel cannot reasonably be 
expected to raise the issue of his or her own incompetence on 
appeal."). However, given the circumstances this issue may have 
been properly raised on appeal, not as a per se claim that prior 
post-conviction counsel was ineffective, but as a claim that he 
was rendered ineffective by the inadequate funding. This court 
does not believe that such a claim would be precluded by the 
above authorities. 
Nevertheless, a claim of ineffective assistance of prior 
post-conviction counsel is not a valid basis for relief under the 
PCRA or the common law and, therefore, the State is entitled to a 
dismissal of this claim. 
As the State points out, when Petitioner filed his 
successive post-conviction petition, the PCRA provided Ma 
substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a 
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense." Utah Code Ann. § 
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78~35a-102 (1) (emphasis added). However, whether prior post-
conviction counsel was ineffective is immaterial to whether 
Petitioner's guilty pleas and the imposition of his death 
sentences complied with constitutional and statutory 
requirements. Because Petitioner's claim of ineffective 
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel is not a claim that 
challenges his conviction or sentence, it is not a cognizable 
ground for relief under the PCRA and, therefore, not a claim for 
which the PCRA can provide a legal remedy. 
Moreover, although the PCRA allows a petitioner to seek 
relief on the basis that he "had ineffective assistance of 
counsel in violation of the United States Constitution or the 
Utah Constitution," Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104 (1) (d), a claim of 
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel does not 
fall within the ambit of this ground for relief because 
Petitioner is not entitled to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel under either the federal or state 
constitutions. The United States Supreme Court has expressly 
held that, under the federal constitution, "[tjhere is no 
constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such 
proceedings." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 122, 152 (1991). 
See also Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at 184 (NXWe do, however, note that 
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the United States Supreme Court has previously declined to 
recognize a federal constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings."). 
In addition, as the Court previously discussed in Section 
III.A.2.C, Petitioner does not have a right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel under the Utah 
Constitution. Therefore, because Petitioner does not have a 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel under either the federal and state 
constitutions, he cannot seek post-conviction relief by asserting 
that he "had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of 
the United States Constitution or the Utah Constitution." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-104 (1) (d). 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, Petitioner's claim of 
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel is not a 
recognized ground for relief under the PCRA and, therefore, the 
State is entitled to a dismissal of this claim, claim 29. 
IV. Conclusion 
Almost nineteen years ago, Petitioner was charged with, 
pleaded guilty to, and was sentenced to death for the murders of 
Kay Tiede and Beth Potts. On direct appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court, Petitioner's guilty pleas and sentence of death for both 
murders were upheld. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition 
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for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty pleas and death 
sentence. After several years of litigation, the post-conviction 
trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment and 
denied post-conviction relief on all of Petitioner's claims. On 
appeal, the post-conviction court's grant of summary judgment was 
affirmed. Petitioner then sought relief in federal court. 
Although Petitioner's federal case was, and is, still pending, 
Petitioner filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief 
in state district court raising thirty separate claims• The 
State responded with a motion to dismiss. 
The parties' arguments for and against dismissal of the 
successive petition has required the Court to resolve numerous 
legal issues, including: (1) that the 2008 amendments to the 
PCRA, which removed the interests of justice exception to the 
time-bar, does not apply retroactively to Petitioner's case and, 
therefore, that Petitioner is entitled to rely on the interests 
of justice exception to argue that, if the filing of his 
successive post-conviction petition was untimely, it should be 
excused in the interests of justice; (2) that Petitioner has not 
shown that he has either a federal or state constitutional right 
to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel and, 
therefore, that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 
is not a common lav/ exception to the procedural bar rule; (3) 
that the 2008 amendments to the PCRA expressly stating that post-
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conviction petitioners do not have a statutory right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, does not apply 
retroactively to Petitioner's case and, therefore, in light of 
the Menzies decision, Petitioner had the statutory right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel during his 
initial post-conviction proceedings/ and (4) that because the 
statutory right to post-conviction counsel is a legislatively 
created protection, it is constitutionally permissible, and 
within the Utah Legislature's power, to exclude from the PCRA an 
exception to the procedural bar rule based upon ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel and, therefore, that 
Petitioner cannot rely on his statutory right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel to overcome the procedural 
bar for successive claims that could have been, but were not, 
raised in his prior post-conviction petition. 
Although the parties disagree on whether the untimeliness of 
Petitioner's successive post-conviction petition should be 
excused, in order to avoid performing a merits review of each 
claim to determine whether the interests of justice exception 
applies, which has the potential of being both unnecessary and 
counter-productive, the Court has proceeded on the assumption 
that Petitioner's successive petition is not time-barred. 
Relying on the foregoing legal conclusions, and after carefully 
considering all of Petitioner's claims, the Court concludes that 
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all of his claims, with the exception of his claim alleging 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, are 
procedurally barred either because they were raised and addressed 
in a prior proceeding or because they are claims that could have 
been, but were not, raised in his prior petition for post-
conviction relief. 
As for the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 
claim, the Court concludes that it is not a cognizable claim 
under the PCRA because it is not a challenge to Petitioner's 
conviction or sentence. Therefore, it is not a claim for which 
the PCRA can provide a legal remedy. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the 
State's motion to dismiss Petitioner's successive post-conviction 
petition. 
Order 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's Motion to Dismiss 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Relief 
Under the Utah Posr-Conviction Remedies Act is dismissed. 
This Ruling and Order constitute the final order of the 
Court. No further order is necessary to effectuate the Court's 
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decision. 
DATED th isjl day of , 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
Third Judicial District Courl 
>• 'S^cPj 
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Thomas B. Brunker 
Erin Riley 
Utah State Attorney General's Office 
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Addendum B 
I n t e r v i e w s S c o t t I* Man l e y tf&te of B i r t h ? November 1 1 . 1959 
t©* 1 2 / 2 6 / 9 0 
roes 3:22 P»M.; 
Conducting Ints Detective Joseph L» Offret, Summit County* Sheriff's Department 
Present 
'Ds»t, Offrets 
3r.:c5tt Manl eys 
Def. Off rest: 
Scott Manlev* 
Dst. Offrat& 
Scott Manl^v.j-
Det< Of f r cats-
Detective* Robert' L, Berry, • Summit Cointy Sheriff's, Department 
Representatives? Carl and Hank 
Apparently Scott, you know Mr. Von T&ylor* i« that right? 
Right 
How do yoKA know him, t©U. ras* what th|> circumstances are and 
how'you kno» him< 
We went in ths> Half Way Hpusaes together. 
How long have you known Von Taylor? 
Two* months 
Two m o n t h s , i s : t h a t a l l ? Now a p p a r e n t l y * we l l f i r s t of a l l 
s i a c e you ars?, -for- t h e r&card you arajj h*<ntfcuff eri' r i g h t h a r e 
and y o u ' v © . go t l-©g% i r o n s cfn and wheneve r s o m e b o d y ' s i n cur>t«cSy 
I ' v e gofc t o r s a t i tbtsro t h e i r r i e n i s s ofcf&y^ So- what" I want t o 
do i® r e a d y o u - y o u r r i g h t * a l l r i g h t J j u s t l i s t e n t o me. You 
have?, t h e r i g h t t o - r - e ^ i i - i s i l e n t , a n y t h i n g vou s a y c a n ar»c; w i l l 
b«h u'&ed a g a i n s t you ' ih c o u r t . You h ^ v e the* r i g h t t o l e g a l 
c p u n s e l , K you ' cJ&sirs? l agad > o u n s a l f and can n o t a f f o r d i t 
i t w i l l be oroviri^^ b e w a r e any q u e s t i o n i n g . Any t ime you 
ri©ci.d©-tp « t o p a n s w © n n g my qbe« t ions f s you r a n s t o p a n s w e r i n g 
my q u e s t i o n s even t h o u g h . ni-ayt)© you >4V**. answsrec j a few* ' Do 
you und^ru t iPn^ you r r i g h t s ? Do ytr-u v |ant ' t o t a l k ' t o m*:-> a b o u t 
*?*)t* Of • ' •r^t j 
*; n>t fe r^.n 1 evj 
? t « . Df- f j -^?" t f 
' O t'. t ?*'•' \>sr* * ;«•< V $ 
: c - t : t • % - » \ B ? v r 
V's^h f. C;.t&&£> 
Anyway vjh&t 1 want *:o d o , what t- -havpij 3 reamed, i s a p p ^ r ^ r t l v 
you had cc-mmun Ligation wxth Mr. Ttf.yj.tt>"} s»nd whe*r# wsr^r/'vcsir 
a p p a r e n t I v her <n«ide <a t e l ephone* c a l l * j So t h a t it dw<*n'1 
l a c k i ik© I 'm l#>d ing - my w i t n e s s , onojl t h i n g t h a t I wou ld l i k e 
you t o do S c o t t i<* t o . s a y your *u'. I njp.«K» .snd ^ps j l l i t a n d . 
your ' 'dfctfc ,pf .b;h"th "fep t h a t thw pers>Dn| t h a t t y p e s t h i s c a n 
;--:;>r:ogni2:£> y-.:n,?:- vcr/icev " ' ' 
Now let '«s .g-i?t b&ck- t o the. , i s s u e . ' Y o u f v ^ to.Sd me how vcru 
kn-o»* Vcsn. Taylor* ' T a l l M© a ^ o u i ' t ^ l ^ p h o r u ^ "cal in>, wh^n' yov. 
. r$vc~n y&d th>r?mv. ' 
I o n l y •Y*£-c#xv«sd one* f - ^ Von, 
; '•*> ;~ "j r :**. •::»•* 
:y cru-^ ..; ses?n- my. 
Tsy 3, or ^ a>i t r* 1 k i :'><;^  tci Hi-H; V, 
HO w.s.|> t a lK inc j i:o fr<e, V-^ n 
At tlisv i>c»m^  t l b ^ ypur. Rp ivai.; t^&rz?1? 
W^'i? nov rf:v. P0 was; 1^ 4} ki rig ;.?^ the? h 'al} .- Vor? and :^> v^^r^ 
oft Manleys No, it was right at the place. 
•t. Offrets At the Half Way House? 
ott Nanley: At that house. 
»t. Off ret: Well I know, but the one you're talking on? 
:ott Manley: Yeah, yeah, 
?t. Offretr Is it a pay phone? 
:ott Manley: Yeah 
*t. Offrets And it's at the Half Way House? 
rott Ma.nl eys Yeah 
St. Of fret: Do you know what the number is? 
rott Manleyu Mo, not really, 
at. Of frets Tell me what Half Way House you were at? 
cott Manley: Ah, I can't even think of the name of it. 
et. Offrets Is it Orange Street? 
cott Manley: No, uh tth 
itu Offret 5 Different one? 
cott Man1ey s I can ' t r®&d or wri te 
et„ Of fret: Is thi«» your- information? 
cott Man!) ey J That' s al 1 of i t« 
et. O^frat? Scott J, Marilev who is a r^xidetnt at the Fremont Community 
Correctional Center, 2588 West 2365 South, West Valley 
City, 84119. And it savs here phone number is 801-972-3651 
Is that the only phone you have B.CCJSSS to 9 
k:ott M&nleya There's a bunch of them there* 
)®t* Of fret 2 Is this the one you r*sc^iv&d the call on, do you know? 
Scott Manleys J don't 
)et. Offrets You don't know for sure, we'll find that out. 
5 c o 11 M & n I e y s 11 w a *s a n t h o p a y p h o n e* 
>et. Offretz Tell me, okay the phone ^ings, how did you know you had a 
te 3 ep hone c aI1? 
_~tt Manley; One of the z>t3.'$r member told me* 
) e t * 0f f• r • ;•? t s C o m e B n tf g o t y ou'? 
5cc 1; I M a n 1 e v t Come and aot me, 
Scott' Manleys No they *dn't. 
)et. Offrets Anyway you go to the phone? and then what happens* tell m e ? 
,cott Manleys Then he talked, tried to say a couple of words to ma and ah 
ha asked ma do I know who he is and I said yeah it's Von* 
And we start talking and he said you know I'm on escape and 
I>said no I didn't* 
>et. Offret: So at the time you're talking to him, you didn't know that 
he was an escapee? 
Icott Manleys No 
icott Manleys And ah we were still tail king and I said where are yoix now 
^nd he said he was at one o-f those cabins with handguns and 
this and that in there. Ah he was going to shoot some people* 
»et. O-f-frets About what time of day, can you remember? Was it morning, 
afternoon? 
.cott Man 1 ey 5? A-f ternoon , 
et. O-f-fret: In the a-f ternoon, any idea what time? Estimate if you can? 
cott Manleys I was still asleep, I didn't bother looking at my clock when 
I woke Lip ^ bwcaus® she woke me u,p< 
~*t* O-f-fret * What time do you have lunch? 
cott Manleys 11.5 30 
et« Offret: It was quite a bit later than that then? 
cott Manleys I don't know, yeah I think it was. I don't know about that. 
et, 0-f frets "?*©}, i ma specifically what he said if you can r&m?smh&r, as 
closely as possible, exactly what he told you on the phone. 
cott Manleys Well I asked him what is he going to do, you know, he told 
me he was at his mom's, away from his mom's cabin, but he 
told me he went to hi s mom's cabin„ 
et r Of fret s He said that he had been there, but when he was on the phone 
to you he wasn't there? 
c o 11 M a n I e y:: R i g h t , h e w a s a t a n o t h e r h o u s e • 
K) +• „ Off r e t» 0 k a y 
~ott Manleys And I was talking and then these two came uo« I asked him 
about? whet about the people coming. Who cares, they're 
wasted. And we heading cut, got to get a car &nti then head 
out». 
•t„ Offreti So the people that we're talking about that got killed weren't 
there yet? 
" c1.1 Ma n 1. e y * I t h i r. k t h s v we^e* 
i>t. 0f *f r et ? Why do you th.i nl-" t h ~>t ? 
»t.' CJffretn You could hear gun shots being -fired? 
*t„ Offret: Could you hear voices behind his? 
:ott Man]ey: I heard somebody talking. 
at. Offrets Did it sound like a man or woman? 
:ott Manleys I ain't so sure, could have been a man-
»t. Offret: Did he say anything about being with a friend? 
rott Manley: Yeah he told me all about him* 
et. Offret: Tell me what he told you. 
cott Manley: He told me ha got a friend here that escaped from Orange 
Street with him and they were just out, going to have some 
fun, go back ta New York 
et. Offret; Said they were going to go back to New York. But he said 
he killed these people, or did he say he was going to? 
cott Manley? He was going to. 
et. Offreti What about having somebody hostage? What about having 
somebody held hostage? 
cott Manleys Well he was saying something about that too. 
st. Offrets Remember it as closely as you can, it's really important 
that you remember that as closely as you can, what he said? 
Jcott Manley: He just said he was going to head out to New York. 
>et« Offret? Did he say he was going to take anybody with him? 
:;cott Manley: He told me he was going to wast© them ail, 
>et* Offretr He said he was going to waste them &3 I * Did he say how many 
he held wasted? 
Scott Man leys Four, he said he had four people,, 
)et. Of frets He had four people, and he -said he was goino bo waste them 
all? 
Sco t t Manley* Yeah 
!>et * Of f r e t ; Did he s a y he had k i l l e d f o u r p e o p l e or he had ic-Lir o e o p l e 
h o s t a g e ? 
S c o t t Man l e y : He didn't s a y n o t h i n g , l i k e you know he 9>aid he had f o u r 
oeon1e« 
"it, Of^rets Tell me what else he told you about the guy he was with? 
A n a. m e
 7 a n )' t h i n q 1 i k e t h a t ? 
"•Scott H a n l e y i No, he d i d s a y h i s name, b u t X c a n ' t , I 'm bad a t n a m ^ s , 
~* e t , O f f r f? z :• 0) =; a y 
")e»t« dffret: What the quys name sounds ]3^e° 
Jcott Manleys Yeah, No I mean I I now what the dude sound like that was 
t a]h ng besides Von. 
, e t . O f - f r e t : What d i d h e sound l i i e l ~ 
S c o t t Man "leys Somebody t h a t was h a v i n g a good t i m e , shoot-3 ng up the? h o u s e 
and s t u f f . 
>e t . Of f r e t : Dad t h e y ta l l - a b o u t d r i n k i n g or d r u g s o r a n y t h i n g 111 e t h a t 0 
j c o t t M*nle»y: No, the?y d i d n ' t «ay n o t h i n g a b o u t t h a t * Von d o n ' t d o d r u g s , 
>e>t * ( I f f r e t * He? does some d ran l . j n g t ! t o u g h " 
k r o t t Man1c?ys Yeah 
>et • Offr ra ts And you h e a r d s h o t s b e i n g f i r e d r t 
I c a t t Man1c*ys Yf*ah 
tet- Off r e t : Bid Von s a y t h a t he had b e e n s h o o t i n g or w h a t 0 
>cott l l a n l ^ y r No : t was t h e e t h e r dude wa«* s h o o t m g j n t h e h o u s e . 
»• t , n f f r -n t s Wh?t would you <say h e was s h o o t i n g , a , 2 2 , or a
 B 44 magnum0 
c o t t Manley? I would s a y a , 4 4 magnum* 
•*t • r f f r e t s E x a c t l v , r i g h t on th<3 n o s e , Did Von s-ay a n y t h i n g c»hout t h a t 
a t a ! ] **' 
c o t t Manl*»v" Von s a i d t ie -v nad one*. 
e l . O-ffj'etr Von c a i d t h e y hau 3 w h a t ? 
c o t t Man l e v : A , ^4 magnum and a bunch of e t h e r p i s t o l s 
*?t, H f f r r- +• * c i *»t e \ <r ~ 
c o t t Man 1cvs R i f l e : 
e t * ^ i r M : Pad ~io t a l 1 - b o u t <* , ^9~ 
r o L t *vL";m j<^y* fo Nh 
e»L. Q f f ' ^ t : What I 'd hs rav ^ h r n t ) i ~* Was i t t h e gun that- you <*n<.i him 
Mnc ^ i r p t i m e jind ha went b«3d and gut'" 
cot4" M " » n l e y r a on ' l I r ow •» 
H« OfFrt*ti f e u 1 d N~ou l d ^ r ^ ^ f ^ i t i f I shnwod t h a t gun bo yn *' 
"„o^  i VJ-*n! My: Yna^ 
_t4 C'rr rt: Tell no .^ {ro t ^'«ah how would he have come by yo3-»; oa:l and 
1" C l 1 1 ^ C t h 1 « n j * rt 
~ij* +• ^ » r U C V ! AJOll -r>n h<2 t o 1 fj f^ O f ' V H OE "tJLV^rj UJ ( h J f * " l L n d Ur) t ^ c " " * * , 
:otb Manley: Out in \..^^^r\m He ran to Ogden and . .at's what had me on the 
scary side* 
=?t. Offret: Okay, why? 
•ott Manley: Well there was a gun sitting there and he knew where it was 
and X knew right when he told me that he wanted to kill some 
people, you know it just tripped my mind, God I left a gun 
right in front of his nose. And he know's right where it 
is at. 
et. Offrets Where was it? 
cott Manley? It's out in a water thing, 
@t. Offret: Where is this thing at? 
cott Manley: Out there in town there, it's over by the cemetary, hut 
et> Offrets In Ogden? 
Icott Manley: Yeah 
>et. Qffrets Tell me, like did you throw it in a river. 
>c:ott Manley? Something like* I don't know, I call it a little ditch-
>et« Offret: An irrigation ditch or something like that? 
Scott Manleyt. Yeah but it had water in it. fishes* and stuff, 
)tm Offrets And you can't tell us more clossaly where it was, how da you 
get there? 
Scott Man leys All I know is from on© side of town it goes all the way up 
straight through. Sot a bridge where you cross, used to be 
working on the road, bridge goos right across. You just 
drive right down that road, that follows it ^r\<l just run 
riqht up t hrough * 
M r Of fret.- How come you threw it in there? 
•Scott Man ley? I got pan i cing„ 
Det» Offrett You got scared? 
8 c o 11 M a n 1 a y .1 Y a a h 
Det» O^fr^tt When were you up in Ogden with him? 
Scott Manley? A *nonth #nd three days ago. 
Det* Of •rets Quite a while ago then? How did you come by foxing in 
possession of this gun? 
'S c o 11 M a r: 1 e y y B o ugh t i t f r o m a -f r i e n d o f h i % » 
it» Hffret: And what is his -Friends n a m e 0 
Scott Man'.! ey r I coul dn ' t
 ? I di 6n ' t bother to 
D f» t. , Q f f r ••* t s D1 d v o u b u y it? 
let, Off rets And ho you throw it away 
>cott Man ley J He was with me. 
,«t, Of Frets When did he escape, do you know? 
»cott Manley5 What from the Half Way House? 
tet. Of f r et.- Yeah 
•co t t Mao]eys Ha bold me a week ago. 
>et« D f f r e t s T h a t ' s p r i o r t o t he c a l l you got'""* 
i c a t t Man leys Ra ght 
l e t . O f f r e t : And you got the c a l l Saturday a f t e r n o o n 0 
>cotl Man!eys He s a i d he wa& gone* for a week out of t h e Hal f Way House 
him and this o ther loc i . 
let* Qf- f re ts Did you know the other k i d ° 
)cotl- Man 3 eys No 
>vt* Of • f r e t : You d i d n ' t [now h i s name was Ed^zvd De3i,~* 
rco i t Man l e y : No 
>t. O f f r e t ; Never heard of him or mot hum0 
>cott ^ i .n leys Hate ht«> b u t t i f i d i d , 
>et« Offbeat: I f you were up i n Qqdon wa t h Von, what k ind of car d.id you 
h^ve n 
zo fc t Mv*n 1 ey s Car ? 
•et, n f ?**»(:: Yeeh d i d yon have a Cc^ *' Did Von fc©3 )• t o you ^ !u:ui* hAkn rg 
o ca r wh^n he t ^ H e d *o you on tne rh^n<?A 
co i i - Hf jn lev: No t h a t » what t h^v were w a i t i n g - o r . 
•t. Cn-rrplz A car*-* Wh-at dad they «3*y about thai- - W>at rsomeoody w«.+ s 
go ing t o b r i n g one up'" 
c o i l h-*n3ev- Th io x'» how he wns cay 3 rg j i% he* sa id ihac J h"y wrr e w c i t . n q 
i r r t*hjs, car t o come an t o r>m F?„ 
e t . Df f - e t > *>ay 
cot t ^ . n ^ r / n T n= I *>d hsm wrat ar*» vcu got'-.g t o do wif-h the noop] o'~' 
YDvi ^ - U ^ S»I-•*-*> the car « u n ' t t ^er** . whet are vou go ing t o do 
WNMI the car come 11 , people go ing L/j be j n i t ">nd hr* ro-ud 
wc-2 1 ^ T J V ' r ^ »;ov*'C: c ^  n^we ir.» t h o v ' r ^ go ing c he --t-'Ot. 
t3** « O f r r » t « Thai-''.- ^ h ^ h? v«r>j » jhou/.. • 1-, C-n n^ t n^^ - : v j l r ^ v Y<?"~ ro r r r n 
UP wi i h a c&r rt 
00M; ' ioMnys Y ^ « * oh ,oauj
 i *h*% 1 rvw » n^ir. rrcsv wore w u t i n q . 
-ott Manleys Well no their were presents laying all around, all around the 
house. And they -found $300.00 dollars in money from the 
presents, I h&ard a hunch of shit, that's all it was. And 
I didn't believe it* I didn't ran right off to the guards 
and the guards this and that. I waited until this one 
guard, because they all, all those guards ar& silly* There 
only one or two that you can talk to and get something got 
straight- I waited until this dude come in and I asked had 
the two people esc$,p®c\ and he said yes. And ah > I said one 
names Von to keep him 
et. Offret? Interested? 
icott Nan ley jj Ho not keep him interested, but I wanted to know was it 
Von Taylor. He said Von Taylor was gone. And I just 
spilled my guts. I said hey man, I'm going to -feel like 
shit if I just don't say that i-f they come, in the Half 
Way House too. Just I don't know. The next, day they're 
going to come in the Half Way House« 
>et. Qf^ret: They were going to come in the Half Way House after they 
le-ft these cabins and stuff? 
Scott Manley? Set me out. 
)et, Of f ret n Is that wh y he called you? 
•v-ott Manleys Yeah 
3et« Of fret 5 Did he want you to walk away and help him out or what? 
Did he ask you to do that? 
Scot t Manleys He d i d n ' t ask me t o k i l l nobody, cause I w o u l d n ' t . 
Det, Df f r e t s Well he d i d n ' t ask you t o k i l l anybody, what did he? want you 
t o c?o? 
Scott Manleys See he needs somebody, do you know what I'm trying to say- He 
wants power. 
Detn Off ret; So he's got to have a group of people to lead, he's got to 
b e t h © 1 & a d © r , i s t h a t i t ? 
Scott Man I ay 3 No he got to be a follower, Vc?n, he will shoot somebody 
it' s hard for me to e u p 3 a i n i t. 
Det, Offret5 So when he called and said thi$ on the pnone about killing 
t hese peop I e ,, you be 1 i eved h i m. 
Scott: ^anley? Yeah because I know Von* I've been around Von* 
Ijet u Of^r-ets havB you been around him when he shot anybody ei se'"--' 
"•'cott ^ an ley: Well no, but I knew hi^ > disl i '<&& and hsj said the next time 
that I ever* they're ns^r' going to take me back* to prison. 
They a i n '' t t a k i n g h i m , wo 11 t h <* y ' v & t a k «*r^ h i m b ac k , b u t they 
ain't nev»r going to let him ce>„ 
Det« O-ffr^ts Mow if I showed you the gun, describe the gun that ho might 
h& V'P nenI? hack and ;vi c:'•*od up , 
Scott Manley: It was a ,357, I know that -for a -fact. I tore it apart 
in three* places. I tore apart the, 
•et. Df-fret: Okay 
*ott Manley: I took that o-f-f and tossed it in the river, I'd take o-f-f the 
barrel and chuck that and then I tossed the rest o-f it. 
et- O-f-f ret * How long was the barrel, how many inches? 
cott Manley? It was a stub nose, 
et* O-f-f ret? Two inches, "four inches? 
cdtt Manleys Four inches 
at* O-f-f rets What kind o-f grips? 
st. Of-fretr Wood? 
cott Manleyz Just plain old cheap old* 
»t» O-f-f ret? I'm going to get a gun and I want you to look at it and 
tell me whether or not you have seen it before, okay? 
rott Manley; You ouys don't got Van up here do you? 
31 .i 0-f -f *s e t z He' ^  u o s t a i r s in the j a i 1» 
r o t t Manley? I -feel s o r r y -for you guys- He won ' t he t h e r e very loncu 
: t . O-f-f r e t ; Did you have b u l l e t s -for t h e gun? 
; o 1.1 *vJ. a n 1 e y 5 Mo 
?t, G-ffre+'i You didn't have any at all huh? 
: o 1 1 M a n 1 f? y s N o 
?t. O-f-f^ et: Does that look like the one? That's not: the one? 
o11 l^; an 1 By r. That •' s a . 33« 
»t. O-f-f ret s That's r-ight, it is a .33, not a .357. Just a long shot. 
Your gun is probably still in the water. 
a 11 M a p lev: I ' T, h oo i n g. 
tu O-f-f ret 5 I'm hoping it is too. Whv did you decide to tell yc{,ir P O ' s 
about this;? 
•vtt Manlevs Becauso; I ^as ^':arodn I didn't > I don't want to go to Court. 
Ok ay he c\-\n get ahold oi my people and I'm going to be out 
on t b e* % t r e ^  t & w i p ed ou t« 
t „ G-f-frets Wall T wr<nt you to testiTy against him- It's important 
that you do testify against him. You have evidence and 
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February 28, 1991 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Third District Court 
240 Bast 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Judge ISoel: 
Re: Von Taylor 
Pursuant to court order I have examined defendant Von Taylor in the Summit 
Gounty Jail on February 11, 1991, for the purpose of determining his state of 
mind at the time of the alleged commission of crines with which he is charged 
as it relates to a defense of insanity. This evaluation is based on a three 
hour interview with Mr. Taylor out of the presence of jail staff. 
I have also seen the following documents; 
1. Summit County Sheriffs Office narrative reports by these officers: 
A- Deputy Brad Wilde on December 22, 1990, with supplemental reports on 
December 23, and December 24. 
B. Deputy Carey Yates, presumably December 22, 1990, with supplemental 
report on December 23* 
C« Deputy Steve Stokes on December 22, 1990. 
D« Deputy Alan Siddoway on December 22, 1990, including a time loss of 
evidence collection. 
E. Officer Jay L. Of fret on December 22, 1990, with supplemental reports 
on December 23 (three reports), December 24, December 26, December 27 
(two), December 31 (two) and January 2, 1991. 
2. A case report by investigator Jim Bell, undated, describing activities of 
December 22, and December 23, 1990, 
3. Utah State Fire Marshall's investigative report by Marc G. {last narce 
illegible) dated January 3, 1991. 
4. Transcripts of interviews with victims. 
A. Detective sergeant Robert L. Berry interviewing LaNae Michelle Tiede 
on Decmaber 22, 1990. 
B. Deputy Alan Siddoway interviewing Rolf Tiede on December 22, 1990. 
5. ,!Rap sheet'1 on defendant Taylor dated December 22, 1990. 
6. Washington County Sheriffs Office report by Deputy Eugene Roberts on 
April 30, 1989, including a photcopied handwritten confession by 
Mr. Taylor, and supplemental report by Deputy Jim Webb on April 31, 1989. 
7. Medical examiner's reports of autopsy. Autopsy reports by Sharon I. 
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Schnittker,M.D., Assistant Medical Examiner, dated December 23, 1990, on 
these victims. 
A. Kay Tidwell Tiede. 
B. Beth Harmon Tidwell Potts. 
8. The Pre-sentence Investigation Report by David G. Christensen, 
Investigator, Adult Probation and Parole, dated June 9, 1989, including a 
letter to Corrections by the defendant's sister, Kaye Auble, dated May 29, 
1989, and by his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Thomas J. Taylor, dated May 25, 
1989. 
9, A 90 Day Diagnostic Report by Robyn Williams, Diagnostic Investigator, 
dated August 31, 1989, including a psychological evaluation by L. Donald 
Long, Ph.D. psychologist, dated August 11, 1989. 
Mr, Taylor is advised of the above-stated purpose of this interview and of its 
nonconfidentiality. He is told that information gained in the interview will 
be included in a report to the court to which both prosecuting and defense 
attorneys will have access. He is further told that this information may be 
used for him or against him in court, and that he is therefore not obligated 
to answer any question he chooses not to. He willingly answers all questions, 
except as noted below. 
IDENTIFYING INRDRMATTON: Von Lester Taylor is a 25-year-old unmarried 
Caucasian male from Ogden, Utah, who says he has no occupation but has worked 
in security and in construction. He is now incarcerated in the Surmdt County 
Jail. 
UNDERSTANDING OF CHARGES: The defendant lists the following charges against 
him: "Capital homicide, kidnapping, arson, evading an officer, attested 
homicide and aggravated robbery." 
HISTORY SUPPORTING CHARGES: Mr. Taylor has had charges filed against him as a 
result of an episode briefly ''summarized as follows: He and co-defendant 
Edward Deli walked away from the Orange Street halfway house in Salt Lake 
City, where they had been serving sentences. They hitchhiked to Oakley, where 
TaylorTs family had a cabin, with intent to proceed on soon to New York to 
find work in Deli's home state. They broke into his parents1 cabin, then a 
dozen others for supplies, doing extensive dairage. Finally, they broke into 
the cabin of the victims, who had a car which Taylor and Deli intended to 
steal for the trip to New York. Mr. Taylor and Mr. Delx are accused of 
murdering two people, a middle-aged woman and her elderly nother, sparing a 
young adult daughter. When the younger victim's husband and teenage daughter 
arrived, the man was also shot with fatal intent but not fatal results. The 
girls were kidnapped, and the defendants and their hostages became involved in 
a high speed chase with tte local police. The defendants were eventually 
apprehended when the chase ended in an auto accident. The cabin where the 
crirnes took place they had set on fire. 
Defendant Taylor gives the following long history of events prior to his 
arrest. On April 30, 1989 while intoxicated, Mr. Taylor burglarized the house 
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of a neighbor to his parents, armed with a firearm. He was caught by the 
owner of the home and jailed in the Washington County Jail upon pleading 
guilty. After a 90 day pre-sentencing evaluation, during which psychotherapy 
was recommended, he was sent to the Utah State Prison for over a year. He 
believes he should have been given a year in jail instead of prison, as this 
was his first major offense* Disgruntled, he says the only reason for his 
imprisonment was the judge1 s friendship with the man whose home he 
burglarized, (Actually, a year in prison had been recaimended by the 
pre-sentence investigator despite first offense, because a first degree felony 
with a gun and knife was involved.) He was paroled on October 23, 1990, 
In the Iron County unit of the Utah State Prison, he had several "write-ups," 
including his being kicked out of school for derogatory language toward a 
teacher he says he had proved wrong. He observes cynically, "They offer 
rehabilitation but don't let you do it," He had been in the prison's school 
program learning computers, math, English and German. He was kicked out of 
that program three days before his parole hearing, Ihera were none of the 
adverse consequences he had feared, as he was given a 90 day parole date 
anyway. He was returned to his home town and the Ninth Street halfway house 
in Ogden. After several weeks there he was seen by a parole officer in a 
variety department store in the sporting goods section. The officer who saw 
him reported that he had been near the gun display counter, a violation of 
parole, although he denies having any intent other than to look at sporting 
goods. He was transferred to the Orange Street halfway house in Salt Lake. 
The defendant describes the Orange Street experience as one where "they are 
playing a lot of games and (making) rules," Vttiile there he found a job 
grinding slag from steel girders, but was unsatisfied with the pay for the 
intensity of labor involved and quit after two days. This and other behavior 
lead to five "write-ups" which meant extra duty, marks on his record, and 
possibly an extension of his sentence. He had thought for several days about 
running from the half-way house, but was hesitant because of his expectation 
of more time in prison if caught. 
One day, while job searching with an inmate acquaintance, Edward Deli, they 
discussed and decided against returning. Having become fugatives, they rode a 
bus to Ogden where they stayed with Taylor!s brother for a night, then in a 
motel for a night. Deciding to hitchhike to New York where Deli grew up and 
where they hoped to get jobs, they found rides as far as Morgan, Because of 
the extreme cold, Taylor offered his parent1 s cabin in the Smith-Morehouse 
area near Oakley. Hitchhiking further to Beaver Springs, they stole three 
wheelers from a cabin, rode to his parent's cabin and broke in. He concedes 
they went to other cabins, broke windows and obtained food, liquor, and 
clothing. They felt safe frcsn the lawf the area being deserted except for one 
cabin with visitors. They arrived on Tuesday and stayed until the crime on 
Saturday took place. Bhey chose the Tiede cabin to burglarize, hoping to 
steal the occupants1 car for their trip to New York. Taylor had had a 
previous brief encounter with the middle-aged woman occupant who passed him on 
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the road and asked if he didn't have a snowmobile. His response was 
sarcastic. 
Seeing the burglar- alarm was not on, they broke into the Tiede cabin one night 
and waited until the next dayr expecting the visitors to return because of 
unopened presents under the Christmas tree. Some of the cabin occupants 
returned around mid-day. As the owner's 20-year-old daughter caite upstairs, 
he confronted her with a gun. Her mother and handicapped grandmother 
followed. From across the roan Taylor pointed a stolen pistol at them, and 
Deli a stolen rifle. He claims he didn't mean to shoot them and doesn't 
remember squeezing the trigger, but nevertheless did. The mother of the 
family was hit first and exclaimed "I've been shoti", Taylor then emptied his 
gun, a 38 pistol, at the victims, grabbed Deli's 44 pistol, and emptied it at 
them. He reloaded both guns and counted nine spent cartridges. 
He claims not to know why he shot them, cannot say why he didn't shoot their 
screaming daughter, and says he was not feeling anything. He didn't even feel 
like he had shot them. He adds that he doesn't know why he didn't shoot 
himself. Deli looked at him as if to say "what in hell are you doing?" Deli 
took the hysterically screaming girl to a back rocm rattier than accede to her 
request to call an ambulance. They surveyed the results of the shooting. One 
victim was shot through the head and Taylor observed bone fragments, brain 
matter and blood on the floor. They dragged the bodies of the two women out 
on the deck, and Taylor threw snow over the bodies and the remains on the 
floor. He was nauseated by the sight and went to the bathroom to throw up. 
They wanted to leave, but didn't knew what to do with the house or how to 
handle the other family members who the girl said were due soon. Concerned 
about fingerprints or other evidence, the defendant decided to "torch" the 
house, which he considered easier than wiping it down. He retrieved gasoline 
frari the garage, poured it around the upstairs and lit a natch. 
As they were getting ready to leave, the girl's father and sister arrived on 
snowmobiles, Taylor pulled the older girl inside and held a gun to her head, 
then called to her father to come in under threat that lie would kill the girl. 
He asked the man for money and when a billfold was produced, had him throw it 
on the ground. He cocked the gun, and there was brief discussion between Deli 
and himself over who would shoot the father. Taylor pointed the gun and shot 
him. The father fell. After taking the girls, who had witnessed the 
shooting, to the snowmobiles, he went back and shot the man one more "dme "to 
make sure", He then poured gasoline on the victim and assurtad he would be 
consumed in the house fire. 
By then he acknowledged feeling "pretty scared" with three dead people, smoke 
coning from the burning cabin, and "some guy (who) rode by on a snowmobile." 
He still hadn't really thought about what he had done, he says. The girls 
looked at him with an expression of fright and hate, wondering if they would 
be killed too. His colleague never questioned why he killed them. The 
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question of raping the girls didn't cross his mind, "I'm not into that," he 
says. 
The two men each got on a snowirobile with the girls driving. They reached the 
parking area where the older girl unlocked her father's Lincoln town car and 
gave Taylor the keys. Deli put two rifles, a pistol and two suitcases in the 
trunk. Then with Taylor driving, Deli in the back, and one girl in front and 
one in back, they drove away. 
At the gate they encountered a man who came toward them who the girls claimed 
not to know, but who in reality was their uncle. He drove toward Oakley and 
then toward Karoas. A police officer driving the opposite direction caught 
their attention. The officer turned to follow them, and they encountered a 
police pick-up truck blocking the road ahead. Taylor "punched it" and drove 
around the truck. They went through Kamas well over the upper limit 
registered by the speedometer, 100 miles per hour he estiinates, with the 
police officers in pursuit. Sliding through an intersection, they caire to a 
stop and were approached by the officers. Deli forced than back with a pistol 
pointed out the window. They sped down a Dugway road toward Park City and 
Heber City. As the road curved, he braked, hit a cement barrier, and lost 
control. The car coasted backward down an embankment and came to rest. 
Police officers were on the scene immediately. Taylor took Deli's gun, said 
it was time to die, and put the gun to his head. Deli grabbed the gun, got 
out of the car, and aiired it at the police. An officer fired and shattered a 
rear window. Taylor says he grabbed the gun from Deli again and threw it out 
the window. He could have shot the girls or himself, but says he "didn't want 
to shoot anyone anymore." They were arrested and jailed. 
He says he was treated as well by the police as anyone charged with murder 
could be. Asked hew he now feels about the crime, he says he is sorry he did 
it, but could not bring himself to ask forgiveness. He says he has.always 
been cold at funerals, assuming that "everyone will die sooner or later" and 
live on in the same place in an afterlife. 
Asked about his feelings over killing someone, he concedes he has killed 
soneone before, srabbing a person through the heart. He declines to talk 
further about the incident and was never charged. 
PAST CRIMINAL RECOBD; Mr. Taylor concedes having caused "a whole string of 
childhood mischief." In early to mid-teens he began using marijuana and 
cocaine. He sluffed school and participated in stealing cars for joy-riding 
and four-wheeling. Though almost caught several tines, he never was 
apprehended for this. He says he did it to go along with friends "if you can 
call them that," and participated "for scmsthing to do," His only prior 
criminal charge was for aggravated burglary. This resulted from an incident 
in St. George while he was staying alone in his parentTs heme. Under 
influence of marijuana and alcohol and looking for money, he burglarized the 
house of a neighbor he did not like because the neighbor, like his parents, 
was actively IDS* He needed money to pay off a loan for car repairs to the 
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credit union. Despite holding a gun on his neighbor, the neighbor lunged at 
him, subdued him, and summoned the police. He admitted burglarizing another 
neighbor's camper-trailer the previous night. 
PAST PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY; His written confession to the St, George burglary 
indicates msntal distress before the crime and after, eg, "totally going 
fucking crazy, I want to kill iryself to put this out of my life," "icy mind, it 
tells ms to die, die, die i 11???M "Man and dad don't know that I am going 
insane. . •" He was having serious mood swings and once tried to kill himself 
according to a brother, who wasn't sure if the attempt was genuine or a 
gesture for attention. Counseling was recommended by a psychologist who 
evaluated him in the Iron County Jail, (I have not seen the report of 
Dr. Kliarsky of Southwest Mental Health), He was placed in a holding cell 
briefly as a suicide risk. He did not participate in counseling, however. He 
has had psychological testing in confinement which, he says, revealed him to 
be extremely paranoid and borderline schizophrenic or depressed and suicidal. 
He is skeptical of the interpretation. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING: Dr. Long's evaluation, a part of the 90 day diagnostic 
report, showed his intellectual functioning was average with a full scale I.Q. 
of 110, in the average range, and Wide Range Achievement Tests in reading, 
spelling, and arithmetic, consistent with his I.Q. His MMPI test shewed him 
to be irritable, depressed, and shy. Pessimistic and dissatisfied, he was 
found to have strong dependency needs, a marked lack of social skills, and a 
feeling of inadequacy in social situations including those with the opposite 
sex. The test reflected inability to delay gratification or control impulses. 
His pattern was one of acting out/ then-avoiding responsibility, but afterward 
feeling guilty and anxious over his antisocial behavior, A propensity toward 
addiction was also found. Diagnosis was "Adjustment Disorder with Mixed 
Emotional Features and elements of Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder." 
There is no mention of paranoia or borderline schizophrenia in contrast to the 
defendant's belief, 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: A prominent scar on the cheek was incurred at age 
twelve on his father's farm in Idaho when an aerosol can exploded in a fire, 
the contents burning his face. Plastic surgery reduced, the extent of the 
scar, but a skin graft was recarnvanded and never done. He was bothered by the 
scar through most of his later childhood, and was sometimes ridiculed by peers 
who called him "snake face," among other names, referring to the tortuous 
shape of the scar. He was also self conscious over his very slender body 
habitus and inability to gain weight. At fourteen he fell out of a truck in 
which he was joy-riding, with his brother driving. The truck rolled several 
times, but his only injury was a nroad bum around the wrist,11 He was not 
scolded for this incident by his father until several years later. 
He was on no medications at the time of the present crimes and was using no 
drugs. He does smoke one pack of cigarettes per day and drinks alcohol only 
occasionally. He has drunk a lot at one time in the past, but says he has 
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never been drunk. (This contradicts his written confession to the St. George 
burglary in which he says he was depressed and drunk,) It was the social 
thing to do at parties he attended and brought acceptance by his peers. He 
claimed that when he drank he became crazy. He smoked marijuana regularly but 
not daily, sometimes alone, sometimes with others. This habit began at age 
thirteen or fourteen. It made him lightheaded and fearful at times, but he 
never hallucinated. He has occasionally felt bewildered at what someone was 
trying to talk over with him, but he insists that despite regular marijuana 
use, he still could still function well. He tried snorting and smoking 
cocaine a few years ago but didn't like it, 
FAMILY HISTORY: One brother has been in a treatment program for alcohol and 
drug abuse, No other psychiatric conditions are known to him. 
PAST PERSONAL HISTORY: Mr, Taylor was born in Murray, the eighth of eight 
children. His father, a-civilian aircraft maintenance worker in a classified ' 
job, traveled all over the world for the Air Force and made a "pretty good" 
living. He was stern in insisting his diildren work by mid-teens and bought a 
farm in Idaho for them to gain work experience and earn wages. If angry, he 
raised his voice and, rarely, spanked the defendant with a wooden spoon. He 
once threw him in a closet for sluffing school. He guesses he liked his 
father but was not close to him. His mother was a homemaker until his eighth 
year. She was Ma nag" about everything, and he was not close to her. Yet he 
is quoted in the St. George pre-sentence investigation report as saying they 
are "the best parents anybody could have or want." As the youngest child, he 
fought a lot with his older siblings, especially a brother two years older and 
a sister three years older. 
His brother eight years older had the most influence on him and he began 
smoking, drinking alcohol, and, using drugs in his teens partly in .admiration 
of his brother who was doing the same thing. 
In third grade he once became upset and "tore the class apart." Psychological 
help was reccsmended, a fact he did not know for many years. His parents 
asked for a class change instead of arranging treatment. His sister 
considered him a loner who was quiet, nonconforming, and a misfit since 
elementary school days, and in need of counseling for his defensive, negative 
outlook as a teen and young adult. His parents also found him avoidant and 
non-conforming, both within and outside his family though they considered him 
respectful, laving, and kind. Socially he had some friends in eleirentary 
school, but tended to keep to himself. The only close friends he remembers 
moved away. In junior high he became friendly with a few people, and by age 
16 had a lot of acquaintances, but not real friends. His neighborhood and IDS 
ward were upper middle class with "snobbish kids and parents who didn't work, 
for their money." He was alienated by their behavior, not so much by their 
beliefs. A turning point, he says, was the scarring of his face. He felt 
rejected and ridiculed by name-calling peers and still feels hate toward them. 
He went through his senior year of high school but didn't graduate because of 
failure to "apply myself/11 and problems doing math and English. He was in 
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special education classes in those two subjects. He received D- grades on 
average, except for special ed classes where he received C's or B's, The 
teachers were surprised if he came to class, he says. 
Though his other siblings are mostly religiously commit ted people, he gave up 
church attendance at sixteen. His parents believe he was driven away by a 
well-meaning but rigid leader who wouldn't tolerate his non-conforming dress. 
At that time, he discloses, he became interested in "black magic, satanism, or 
witchcraft" with friends. He attended black masses where small animals were 
sacrificed under the direction of an acquaintance who had been born into 
satanic religion, he says. He reports reading the satanic bible a few times 
and though not really believing what it said, found it more interesting than 
his parents Mormon religion. Though not serious about it, he did attend 
satanic rituals regularly on Saturdays for five years. He never conducted the 
service or performed the animal sacrifice, but did drink the animals1 blood. 
He says he was once invited to a service where a human was to be sacrificed, a 
three year old girl. He turned down the invitation, but says it did take 
place and he knows where it was done. His participation in satanic worship 
ended when the leader joined another coven. 
His understanding of satanic principles is that "they do all that Christians 
don't want you to do," e.g. blaspheming Christian "sacrament" through animal 
sacrifice, etc. He acknowledges feeling sorry for the animals the first few 
times but then getting used to it. His own belief is in neither Satan nor 
God, he says, explaining that "all worship is the same thing." He does 
believe in a spirit afterlife, and that everyone goes to the same place after 
death. He uses this idea to minimize the impact of his killings. Asked what 
should be done with someone who sacrifices a three-year-old child, he 
rationalized that "religions did it for thousands of years." Asked if someone 
sacrificed his own three-year-old girl, he replies "I would shoot the son-of a 
bitchi" His parents did not know of his satanic worship. 
He has held various jobs, but none for long. He had a 30b briefly in a 
variety store, worked construction for a time and was a security officer at 
the Freeport Center for a year. He felt unfairly fired fran that job when 
made to share blame for his co-worker's breaking a time clock. He 
acknowledges that, though his parents tried to instill a work ethic in him, he 
never liked working. He buirened a lot, lived with other people and sold drugs 
for a while. His parents supported him materially with roam and board through 
much of his adult life. 
He never had a serious girlfriend, saying he was never in a financial position 
to do so, but has been sexually active since age 16. He has never really 
desired a relationship with a girl other than personalities on T.V,, and 
doesn't know if he would want to be married. There has been no homosexual 
experience, though he "threatened to kill a guy" who approached him in prison. 
He expresses remorse for his crime and expects he will be sentenced to life in 
prison. Rather than spend his life in that way, he says, he will ask for the 
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death sentence and if given it, won't let his attorney appeal it. He won't 
sit on death row for years, he says. However, he is asking for a change of 
venue. It was his and his attorneyrs idea to plead insanity* Asked if he 
believes he is insane, he replies "No, but how can you determine? I shot two 
people with no motive, out of cold blood, with my gun, then Ed's/1 He has 
never been on trial before, having plea-bargained to a previous charge and 
received a one-to-fifteen year sentence of which he was to serve eighteen 
months. 
MENTAL STATOS: The defendant is a young adult Caucasian male of asthenic 
habitus with medium long, "frizzy" hair. He is wearing an orange jail-issued 
jumpsuit. Eye contact is fair, and speech flow and psychomotor behavior are 
normal. He is correctly oriented to time, person, place, and situation. 
Immediate recall is excellent, e.g. three of three words after five minutes. 
Recent memory is good, e.g., he can give the menu of last night's supper and 
joke about it. He can give sane detail about the most prominent of recent 
news events, the Persian Gulf war* Bemote memory is not as good, e.g. he can 
name none of his first six school teachers, though this may reflect his 
attitude towards school as much as rosmory* Fund of information is good, e.g. 
he can name the last five presidents in order without difficulty, and equally 
well, five cities of more than a million in population. Cognition is intact, 
e.g. he can spell "world11 backwards with no difficulty, and can correctly 
subtract 7fs serially from 100. He does this slowly, counting down in his 
head rather than mentally subtracting, and acts somewhat embarrassed about the 
process. He is able to do the mathematics of a simple story problem without 
difficulty. Responses to judgment questions are good, and to insight 
questions fair, e.g. we need senators and congressmen to "keep the U.S. 
running." He has no idea why newspapers can be sold for less than 1£ie cost of 
printing them. Affect is appropriate to thoughts, and mood he describes as 
"average, considering." He acknowledges depressed states when thinking about 
his crimes or dreaming about them, so that he tries to avoid such thoughts and 
to stay awake to avoid dreaming. He has flashbacks when awake once* in a 
while. He rates his mood as "half way" on a 1 to 10 scale, and he appears 
mildly depressed. Ho suicidal ideation is admitted. There are no delusions, 
hallucinations, disorder of thought form or thought content, ideas of 
reference or influence, thought insertion, thought control, blocking, 
perservation or other psychotic processes. Abstractive ability is fair, e.g. 
he can correctly give the meaning of a simple proverb, but has not heard of 
three mildly more complex ones, and can't abstract them. He is able to 
abstract the common elements of word pairs. Intelligence is estimated at 
average or perhaps mildly below. 
DATA FROM EECOEDS: Interviews with victims Bolf and LaNae Tiede generally 
corroborate the description of the crime the defendant has presented. 
Officers investigative reports also coincide with the information he gives. 
However, they describe destructive vandalism of other cabins rather than just 
breaking in to steal supplies. Most significantly, a statement by Taylor's 
acquaintance at a halfway house, Scott Manley, says Taylor told him of plans 
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not to just take the cabin occupants car but to kill them two hours before the 
shooting took place. 
DIAGNOSTIC IMPRESSION: 
Axis I: No mental illness (DMS-III RV71.09). History of Adjustment 
Disorder with Depressed Mood (309*00) • Mildly depressed mood now. 
Axis II: Antisocial Personality Disorder (301.70) with Schizoid Personality 
features (301.20). 
Axis III: No medical illness, 
OPINION: The examinee was able to intend the criminal acts with which he is 
charged and was not insane at the time of their coitttdssionf nor does he show 
signs of serious mental illness now, 
DISCUSSION: The examinee shows characteristic features of antisocial 
personality disorder* He has been unable to sustain consistent work behavior 
and has abandoned or been released fraei several jobs without realistic plans 
for others* He has failed to conform to social norms of lawful behavior by 
drug dealing
 r previous criminal acts and participation in satanic rituals 
including passive observation of cruelty to animals. He has behaved in 
reckless disregard of his own or others1 safety. He has often acted 
impulsively without forethought for consequences. He has shewn conduct 
disorder as a teenager, though most of it beginning at age 16, e.g. truancy, 
car theft for joy riding, early sexual activity/ drug abuse and satanic 
worship. His level of remorse for having killed and otherwise hurt others is 
shallow and superficial. 
Features of schizoid personality in the examinee's history include lack of 
close relationships within or outside his family, lack of dating experience, 
few sexual relationships and no marriage, choice of solitary activities, and 
constricted erotions. 
Mr. Taylor appears to have been a misfit in the family in which he was brought 
up. A learning disorder despite normal intelligence is the probable 
explanation for his poor school performance and need for special education 
classes. Already self-conscious regarding his social acceptance as axi early 
adolescent, he evidently lost his confidence further when burdened with a 
facial scar. Not comfortable in the social mainstream, it appears that he was 
better accepted by others outside the mainstream and took on their behavioral 
patterns, e.g. drug and alcohol use, smoking, sexual activity, all in defiance 
of his family's value system, and truancy from school, stealing cars, using 
them in dangerous ways for joy-riding and four-wheeling. He was apparently 
never the leader in such activitiesf but went along with friends "if you can 
call them that11 for something to do. 
Proneness to sensation seeking was also evident in his interest in satanic 
cult activities. He was apparently there more as an observer than a devoted 
participant. His history is not one of violent or physically injurious 
behavior until recent adult years, the animal sacrifice eliciting only his 
passive involvement. 
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As an adult he did not seem to make any satisfactory adjustment in a mature 
lifestyle, e.g. erratic and independable job history, dependence on parents 
well into adulthood, no stable relationship with a female or thought of 
marriage or family, no lasting friendships, and failure to complete any career 
preparation. Rather than see himself as responsible for this, he demonstrates 
a pattern of blaming others and regarding himself as the unfortunate victim of 
unfair treatment. 
Anger was apparently harbored and magnified* This, coupled with numbness to 
guilt and inability to empathize engendered by his teen antisocial and satanic 
cult experiences, made his violent behavior perhaps irore understandable• 
However, there is nothing here to suggest a seriously deprived childhood, 
victimisation by others1 abuse, or inability through nental illness or irental 
deficiency to understand the nature and consequences of his criminal behavior. 
On the contrary, his criminal acts appear to have been purposeful and at least 
well enough thought out to try to avoid the legal consequences. Though he 
does admit responsibility for the shooting, he minimizes that responsibility 
in the way he describes what took place, e.g. "I didn't msan to shoot them but 
I did" and "I don't remember squeezing the trigger but I did." "I don't know 
why, I was not feeling anything." Scare display of conscience is evident later 
in his grabbing the gun with which his cohort confronted the police and his 
not killing the girls because "I didn't want to shoot anyone anymore." 
The random property destruction in the cabins around Oakley, and the 
destruction of human life itself, is a level of violence sometimes seen with 
head injured or otherwise brain damaged people. However, he presents no 
history of head injury and no evidence for brain impairment other than sane 
degree of learning disability in math and English. Altered consciousness such 
as in an epileptic event could be considered in his saying he did not remember 
pulling the trigger* Hcwever, he remembers sufficient detail imnediately 
before and after the event to discount this possibility, and he gives no 
history of prior events suggestive of altered consciousness leading to violent 
behavior. Though he claims alcohol makes him go crazy, he denies being under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol when the killings took place. He may have 
had clinical depression at the tiire of his aggravated burglary charge in 
January 1990, as is suggested in his written confession, but nothing suggests 
other major mental illness despite his questioning his sanity then. In sum, 
his behavior is reflective of a personality disorder, but not of a n^ntal 
illness, and his state of mind was not so affected as no meet the requirements 
of the insanity test of the Utah Code. 
Sincerely, 
Louis A. Mcench, M.D. 
LAM/bn/jh 
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Thomas Brunker, #4804 
Erin Riley, #8375 
Assistant Attorneys General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, #4666 
Utah Attomey General 
Heber Wells Bldg. 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801)366-0180 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VON LESTER TAYLOR, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
ROBINA GILLESPIE LEVINE 
: AFFIDAVIT 
Judge Bruce Lubeck 
Case No. 070500645 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Robina Gillespie Levine, being first duly sworn testify as follows: 
1. I am presently employed in the Utah Attorney General's Office as a paralegal 
in the Criminal Justice Division. 
2, At the time that the State prosecuted Mr. Von Lester Taylor for capital murder, 
I worked on the defense team. I worked with Mr. Elliot Levine, Mr. Taylor's attorney, as 
a paralegal on the case. Summit County compensated me separately for my services on 
the case. 
3, Mr. Taylor's co-defendant, Stephen Deli, was tried before Mr. Taylor. 
4, As part of my duties on Mr. Taylor's defense team, I sat through the Deli trial, 
and, among other things, heard Mr. Deli testify. 
5, In his testimony, Mr, Deli admitted that he left the half-way house with Mr. 
Taylor and was involved in burglarizing the Tiede cabin with Mr, Taylor. 
6, However, Mr. Deli testified that Mr. Taylor did all of the shooting and that he 
(Deli) shot no one, Mr, Deli testified that Mr. Taylor began shooting out of the blue, and 
that Mr. Deli was surprised when Mr. Taylor began shooting. Mr, Deli testified that no 
argument, confrontation, or threats that preceded the shootings. 
DATED (</J?J(}<2JQl, 
Robina Gillespie Levine 
Subscribed and sworn before me Kt \n V\ ftryrfl 
TTotary Public 
My Commission Expires: 
Addendum E 
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U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI-Jury Trials Page 1 
C 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Constitution of the United States 
• • • • i\r= i Annotated 
Amendment VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs & Annos) 
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained 
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
Current through PL 111-237 (excluding P.L. 111-203, 111-211, and 111-226) approved 8-16-10 
Westlaw. (C) 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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UT CONST Art. 1, § 12 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 12 
C West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Constitution of Utah 
I^E 
Article I. Declaration of Rights 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of wit-
nesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before fi-
nal judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the func-
tion of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude 
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial 
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is al-
lowed as defined by statute or rule. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6, § 1, adopted at election Nov. 8, 1994, eff. Jan. 1, 1995. 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 12, UT CONST Art. 1, § 12 
Current with amendments included in the Utah State Bulletin, Number 
2010-13, dated July 1, 2010. 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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c 
Effective: March 9, 2006 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 28. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
K B ! part vi. Particular Proceedings 
mSBBm Chapter 154. Special Habeas Corpus Procedures in Capital Cases 
-+ § 2265. Certification and judicial review 
(a) Certification.— 
(1) In general.-If requested by an appropriate State official, the Attorney General of the United States shall de-
termine-
(A) whether the State has established a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reason-
able litigation expenses of competent counsel in State postconviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners 
who have been sentenced to death; 
(B) the date on which the mechanism described in subparagraph (A) was established; and 
(C) whether the State provides standards of competency for the appointment of counsel in proceedings de-
scribed m subparagraph (A). 
(2) Effective date.--The date the mechanism described in paragraph (1)(A) was established shall be the effective 
date of the certification under this subsection. 
(3) Only express requirements.-There are no requirements for certification or for application of this chapter 
other than those expressly stated in this chapter. 
(b) Regulations.-The Attorney General shall promulgate regulations to implement the certification procedure under 
subsection (a). 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
28 U.S.C.A. § 2265 Page 2 
(c) Review of certification.--
(1) In general.-The determination by the Attorney General regarding whether to certify a State under this section 
is subject to review exclusively as provided under chapter 158 of this title. 
(2) Venue.~The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction over mat-
ters under paragraph (1), subject to review by the Supreme Court under section 2350 of this title. 
(3) Standard of review.-The determination by the Attorney General regarding whether to certify a State under 
this section shall be subject to de novo review. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Added Pub.L. 109-177, Title V g 507(c)m. Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 250.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 
2006 Acts. House Conference Report No. 109-333, see 2006 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 184. 
Statement by President, see 2006 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. S7. 
References in Text 
Chapter 158 of this title, referred to in subsec. (c)(1), is Orders of Federal Agencies; Review, 28 U S.C.A. § 2341 et 
seq. 
Prior Provisions 
A prior section 2265, added Pub.L. 104-132, Title I, § 107(a), Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1223, relating to application 
to State unitary review procedure, was repealed by Pub.L. 109-177, Title V, § 507(c)(1), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 
250. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
American Digest System 
Criminal Law > - " —
 1 6 0 0 > 
Habeas Corpus ^-^ 690. 
Key Number System Topic Nos. U_0, 197. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-102 Page 1 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-102 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
™ — Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
§ Part 1. General Provisions 
§ 78B-9-102. Replacement of prior remedies 
(1) This chapter establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal 
offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided in Subsection 
(2). This chapter replaces all prior remedies for review, including extraordinary or common law writs. Proceedings 
under this chapter are civil and are governed by the rules of civil procedure. Procedural provisions for filing and 
commencement of a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) This chapter does not apply to: 
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense; 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; or 
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1166, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 2, eff. May 5. 2008. 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-104 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Kra 
Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
§ 78B-9-104. Grounds for relief-Retroactivity of rule 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person who has been convicted and sentenced for a 
criminal offense may file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or 
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah 
Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a statute that is in violation of the United 
States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally 
protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked in violation of the controlling statutory provisions; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel m violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Con-
stitution; 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time 
to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence 
could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-104 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable 
trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received; or 
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the United States Supreme Court, the 
Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals after conviction and sentence became final on direct appeal, 
and that: 
(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's conviction or sentence became final; or 
(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime for which the petitioner was 
convicted. 
(2) The court may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence unless the petitioner establishes that there would be 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, 
viewed with the evidence and facts introduced at trial or during sentencing. 
(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for 
which convicted except as provided in Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Post-
conviction Determination of Factual Innocence. Claims under Part 3 or Part 4 of this chapter may not be filed as part 
of a petition under this part, but shall be filed separately and in conformity with the provisions of Part 3 or Part 4. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1168. eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, g 3. eff May 5, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 153,? l,eff. 
March 25, 2010. 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-105 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
§ 78B-9-105. Burden of proof 
(1) The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to 
entitle the petitioner to relief. The court may not grant relief without determining that the petitioner is entitled to 
relief under the provisions of this chapter and in light of the entire record, including the record from the criminal 
case under review. 
(2) The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 78B-9-106, but once a ground 
has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008. c. 3, § 1169, eff. Feb. 7. 2008; Laws 2008. c. 288, § 4, eff. May 5. 2008. 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-106 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
• " " • Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
§ 78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief-Exception 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not, 
raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107, 
(2)(a) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, including during the state's appeal from 
an order granting post-conviction relief, unless the court determines that the state should have raised the time bar or 
procedural bar at an earlier time. 
(b) Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided that it gives the parties notice 
and an opportunity to be heard. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been 
but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-106 
(4) This section authorizes a merits review only to the extent required to address the exception set forth in Subsec-
tion (3). 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008. c. 3. S 1170. eff. Feb. 7. 2008: Laws 2008. c. 288. § 5. eff. Mav 5. 2008: Laws 2010. c. 48. S h eff. Mav 
11.2010. 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Kta 
Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. Genera! Provisions 
§ 78B-9-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme 
Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition for certio-
rari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of eviden-
tiary facts on which the petition is based; or 
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(l)(f) is established. 
(3) The limitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner was prevented from filing a petition 
due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity. The peti-
tioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to relief under this 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Subsection (3). 
(4) The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome of a petition asserting: 
(a) exoneration through DNA testing under Section 78B-9-303: or 
(b) factual innocence under Section 78B-9-401. 
(5) Sections 77-19-8. 78B-2-104, and 78B-2-111 do not extend the limitations period established in this section. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008. c. 3. § 1171. eff. Feb. 7. 2008: Laws 2008. c. 288. g 6. eff. May 5. 2008: Laws 2008. c. 358. g 1. eff. 
May 5. 2008. 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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C 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
• • — Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
§ 78B-9-109. Appointment of pro bono counsel 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request of an indigent peti-
tioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to represent the petitioner in the post-conviction court or on post-
conviction appeal. Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not be appointed to 
represent the petitioner under this section. 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the following factors: 
(a) whether the petition or the appeal contains factual allegations that will require an evidentiary hearing; and 
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for proper 
adjudication. 
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective cannot be the basis for relief in any sub-
sequent post-conviction petition. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008. c. 3, § 1173, eff Feb 7, 2008: Laws 2008, c. 288, § 8. eff. May 5, 2008. 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-102 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. Particular Proceedings 
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Copyright (c) 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed 
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved. 
78-35a-102 Replacement of prior remedies. 
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a 
criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided in 
Subsection (2). Procedural provisions for filing and commencement of a petition are found in Rule 65C. Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(2) This chapter does not apply to: 
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense; 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; or 
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-102, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 2. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Effective Dates. —Laws 1996, ch. 235 became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
25. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-102 
UT ST §78-35a-102 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. Particular Proceedings 
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Copyright (c) 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed 
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved. 
78-35a-104 Grounds for relief—Retroactivity of rule. 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has been convicted and sentenced for a 
criminal offense may file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or 
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah 
Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Con-
stitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was revoked in an unlawful manner; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Con-
stitution; or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time 
to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence 
could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable 
trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received. 
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule announced by the United States Supreme 
Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be gov-
erned by applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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U.C.A. 1953§78-35a-105 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. Particular Proceedings 
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Copyright (c) 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed 
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved. 
78-35a-105 Burden of proof. 
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to 
entitle the petitioner to relief. The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 78-
3 5a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove its existence by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-105, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 5. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Effective Dates. —Laws 1996, ch. 235 became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
25. 
U.C.A. 1953§78-35a-105 
UTST§78-35a-105 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-106 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. Particular Proceedings 
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Copyright (c) 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed 
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved. 
78-35a-106 Preclusion of relief—Exception. 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not, 
raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been 
but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-106, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 6. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Effective Dates. —Laws 1996, ch. 235 became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to Utah Const, Art VI, Sec. 
25. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-106 
UTST§78-35a-106 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-107 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. Particular Proceedings 
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Copyright (c) 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed 
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved. 
78-35a-107 Statute of limitations for post-conviction relief. 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme 
Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition for certio-
rari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed; or 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of eviden-
tiary facts on which the petition is based. 
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the 
time limitations. 
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period established in this section. 
History: C. 1953, 78-12-31.1, enacted by L. 1995, ch. 82, § 1; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 7. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repeals and Reenactments. —Laws 1995, ch. 82, § 1 repeals former § 78-12-31.1, as enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 
133, § 1, setting a three-month time limit on the right to petition for a habeas corpus writ, and enacts the present 
section, effective May 1, 1995. 
Amendment Notes. —The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, renumbered this section, which formerly 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. Particular Proceedings 
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Copyright (c) 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a division ofReed Elsevier Inc. and Reed 
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved. 
78-35a-109 Appointment of counsel. 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request of an indigent peti-
tioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis. Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal 
may not be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section. 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the following factors: 
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations that will require an evidentiary hearing; and 
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for proper 
adjudication. 
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective cannot be the basis for relief in any sub-
sequent post-conviction petition. 
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-109, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 9. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Effective Dates. —Laws 1996, ch. 235 became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
25. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-109 
UT ST §78-35a-109 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Rrs 
Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
f\ia 
Part 2. Capital Sentence Cases 
§ 78B-9-202. Appointment and payment of counsel in death penalty cases 
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and sentence has been affirmed on appeal shall 
be advised in open court, on the record, in a hearing scheduled no less than 30 days prior to the signing of the death 
warrant, of the provisions of this chapter allowing challenges to the conviction and death sentence and the appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent petitioners. 
(2)(a) If a petitioner requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall determine whether the petitioner is indigent 
and make findings on the record regarding the petitioner's indigency. If the court finds that the petitioner is indigent, 
it shall, subject to the provisions of Subsection (5), promptly appoint counsel who is qualified to represent petition-
ers in post-conviction death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Counsel 
who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not be appointed to represent the petitioner under 
this section. 
(b) A petitioner who wishes to reject the offer of counsel shall be advised on the record by the court of the conse-
quences of the rejection before the court may accept the rejection. 
(3) Attorney fees and litigation expenses incurred in providing the representation provided for in this section and 
that the court has determined are reasonable shall be paid from state funds by the Division of Finance according to 
rules established pursuant to Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(a) In determining whether the requested funds are reasonable, the court should consider: 
(i) the extent to which the petitioner requests funds to investigate and develop evidence and legal arguments that 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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duplicate the evidence presented and arguments raised in the criminal proceeding; and 
(ii) whether the petitioner has established that the requested funds are necessary to develop evidence and legal 
arguments that are reasonably likely to support post-conviction relief. 
(b) The court may authorize payment of attorney fees at a rate of $125 per hour up to a maximum of $60,000. The 
court may exceed the maximum only upon a showing of good cause as established in Subsections (3)(e) and (f). 
(c) The court may authorize litigation expenses up to a maximum of $20,000. The court may exceed the maximum 
only upon a showing of good cause as established in Subsections (3)(e) and (f). 
(d) The court may authorize the petitioner to apply ex parte for the funds permitted in Subsections (3)(b) and (c) 
upon a motion to proceed ex parte and if the petitioner establishes the need for confidentiality. The motion to pro-
ceed ex parte must be served on counsel representing the state, and the court may not grant the motion without 
giving the state an opportunity to respond. 
(e) In determining whether good cause exists to exceed the maximum sums established in Subsections (3)(b) and 
(c), the court shall consider: 
(i) the extent to which the work done to date and the further work identified by the petitioner duplicates work 
and investigation performed during the criminal case under review; and 
(ii) whether the petitioner has established that the work done to date and the further work identified is reasona-
bly likely to develop evidence or legal arguments that will support post-conviction relief. 
(f) The court may permit payment in excess of the maximum amounts established in Subsections (3)(b) and (c) 
only on the petitioner's motion, provided that: 
(i) if the court has granted a motion to file ex parte applications under Subsection (3)(d), the petitioner shall 
serve the motion to exceed the maximum amounts on an assistant attorney general employed in a division other 
than the one in which the attorney is employed who represents the state in the post-conviction case; if the court 
has not granted a motion to file ex parte applications, then the petitioner must serve the attorney representing 
the state in the post-conviction matter with the motion to exceed the maximum funds; 
(ii) if the motion proceeds under Subsection (3)(f)(i), the designated assistant attorney general may not disclose 
to the attorney representing the state in the post-conviction matter any material the petitioner provides in sup-
port of the motion except upon a determination by the court that the material is not protected by or that the peti-
tioner has waived the attorney client privilege or work product doctrine; and 
(iii) the court gives the state an opportunity to respond to the request for funds in excess of the maximum 
amounts provided in Subsections (3)(b) and (c). 
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as creating the right to the effective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel, and relief may not be granted on any claim that post-conviction counsel was ineffective. 
(5) If within 60 days of the request for counsel the court cannot find counsel willing to accept the appointment, the 
court shall notify the petitioner and the state's counsel in writing. In that event, the petitioner may elect to proceed 
pro se by serving written notice of that election on the court and state's counsel within 30 days of the court's notice 
that no counsel could be found. If within 30 days of its notice to the petitioner the court receives no notice that the 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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petitioner elects to proceed pro se, the court shall dismiss any pending post-conviction actions and vacate any execu-
tion stays, and the state may initiate proceedings under Section 77-19-9 to issue an execution warrant. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008. c. 3. § 1176. eff. Feb. 7, 2008: Laws 2008, c. 288. § 9. eff. May 5, 2008: Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2240, eff. 
May 5. 2008. 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-202 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. Particular Proceedings 
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES 
Copyright (c) 1953-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights 
reserved. 
78-35a-202 Appointment and payment of counsel in death penalty cases. 
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and sentence has been affirmed on appeal 
shall be advised in open court, on the record, in a hearing scheduled no less than 30 days prior to the signing of the 
death warrant, of the provisions of this chapter allowing challenges to the conviction and death sentence and the 
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. 
(2) (a) If a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall determine whether the defendant is indigent 
and make findings on the record regarding the defendant's indigency. If the court finds that the defendant is indi-
gent, it shall promptly appoint counsel who is qualified to represent defendants in death penalty cases as required 
by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(b) A defendant who wishes to reject the offer of counsel shall be advised on the record by the court of the conse-
quences of the rejection before the court may accept the rejection. 
(c) Costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation expenses incurred in providing the representation provided for in 
this section shall be paid from state funds by the Division of Finance according to rules established pursuant to Ti-
tle 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-202, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 76, § 2. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 76 became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 
25. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-202 
UT ST § 78-35a-202 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
KE! 
Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 4. Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence 
§ 78B-9-402. Petition for determination of factual innocence—Sufficient allegations-
Notification of victim 
(1) A person who has been convicted of a felony offense may petition the district court in the county in which the 
person was convicted for a hearing to establish that the person is factually innocent of the crime or crimes of which 
the person was convicted . 
(2)(a) The petition shall contain an assertion of factual innocence under oath by the petitioner, and shall aver, with 
supporting affidavits or other credible documents, that: 
(i) newly discovered material evidence exists that, if credible, establishes that the petitioner is factually inno-
cent; 
(ii) the specific evidence identified by the petitioner in the petition establishes innocence; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iv) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence;and 
(v) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered evidence demonstrates that the petitioner is factu-
ally innocent. 
(b) The court shall review the petition in accordance with the procedures in Subsection (9)(b), and make a finding 
that the petition has satisfied the requirements of Subsection (2)(a). If the court finds the petition does not meet all 
the requirements of Subsection (2)(a), it shall dismiss the petition without prejudice and send notice of the dis-
missal to the petitioner and the attorney general. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(3)(a) The petition shall also contain an averment that* 
(1) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or m time 
to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or postconviction motion, and the evidence 
could not have been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, or 
(n) a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exercise reasonable diligence m uncovering 
the evidence 
(b) Upon entry of a finding that the petition is sufficient under Subsection (2)(a\ the court shall then review the 
petition to determine if Subsection (3)(a) has been satisfied If the court finds that the requirements of Subsection 
(3)(a) have not been satisfied, it may dismiss the petition without prejudice and give notice to the petitioner and 
the attorney general of the dismissal, or the court may enter a finding that based upon the strength of the petition, 
the requirements of Subsection (3)(a) are waived in the interest of justice. 
(4) If the conviction for which the petitioner asserts factual innocence was based upon a plea of guilty, the petition 
shall contain the specific nature and content of the evidence that establishes factual innocence The court shall re-
view the evidence and may dismiss the petition at any time in the course of the proceedings, if the court finds that 
the evidence of factual innocence relies sole!) upon the recantation of testimony or prior statements made b> a wit-
ness against the petitioner, and the recantation appears to the court to be equivocal or self-serving 
(5) A person who has already obtained postconviction relief that vacated or reversed the person's conviction or sen-
tence may also file a petition under this part in the same manner and form as described above, if no retrial or appeal 
regarding this offense is pending 
(6) If some or all of the evidence alleged to be exonerating is biological evidence subject to DNA testing, the peti-
tioner shall seek DNA testing pursuant to Section 78B-9-301 
(7) Except as provided in Subsection (9), the petition shall be in compliance with and governed by Rule 65C, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall include the underlying criminal case number 
(8) After a petition is filed under this section, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and crime laboratory personnel 
shall cooperate m preserving evidence and m determining the sufficiency of the chain of custody of the evidence 
which is the subject of the petition 
(9)(a) A person who files a petition under this section shall serve notice of the petition and a copy of the petition 
upon the office of the prosecutor who obtained the conviction and upon the Utah attorney general 
(b) The assigned judge shall conduct an initial review of the petition If it is apparent to the court that the peti-
tioner is either merely rehtigating facts, issues, or evidence presented in previous proceedings or presenting issues 
that appear frivolous or speculative on their face, the court shall dismiss the petition, state the basis for the dis-
missal, and serve notice of dismissal upon the petitioner and the attorney general If, upon completion of the initial 
review the court does not dismiss the petition, it shall order the attorney geneial to file a response to the petition 
The attorney general shall, withm 30 days after receipt of the court's order, or within any additional period of time 
the court allows, answer or otherwise respond to all proceedings initiated under this part 
(c) After the time for response by the attorney general under Subsection (9)(b ( has passed, the court shall order a 
©2010 Thomson Reuters No Claim to Ong US Gov Works 
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hearing if it finds the petition meets the requirements of Subsections (2) and (3) and finds there is a bona fide and 
compelling issue of factual innocence regarding the charges of which the petitioner was convicted.No bona fide 
and compelling issue of factual innocence exists if the petitioner is merely relitigating facts, issues, or evidence 
presented in a previous proceeding or if the petitioner is unable to identify with sufficient specificity the nature 
and reliability of the newly discovered evidence that establishes the petitioner's factual innocence. 
(d) If the parties stipulate that the evidence establishes that the petitioner is factually innocent, the court may find 
the petitioner is factually innocent without holding a hearing. 
(10) The court may not grant a petition for a hearing under this part during the period in which criminal proceedings 
in the matter are pending before any trial or appellate court, unless stipulated to by the parties. 
(11) Any victim of a crime that is the subject of a petition under this part, and who has elected to receive notice un-
der Section 77-38-3, shall be notified by the state's attorney of any hearing regarding the petition. 
(12) A petition to determine factual innocence under this part, or Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, shall be 
filed separately from any petition for postconviction relief under Part 1, General Provisions. Separate petitions may 
be filed simultaneously in the same court. 
(13) The procedures governing the filing and adjudication of a petition to determine factual innocence apply to all 
petitions currently filed or pending and any new petitions filed on or after the effective date of this amendment. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 358. § 6, eff. May 5. 2008; Laws 2009, c. 301, g L eff. May 12. 2009; Laws 2010, c. 153. § 3. eff. 
March 25.2010. 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
mimm Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
wmmm 
S Part 4. Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence 
§ 78B-9-403. Requests for appointment of counsel—Appeals—Postconviction petitions 
(1) Subsections 78B-9-109(1) and (2), regarding the appointment of pro bono counsel, apply to any request for the 
appointment of counsel under this part. 
(2) Subsection 78B-9-109(3), regarding effectiveness of counsel, applies to subsequent postconviction petitions and 
to appeals under this part. 
CREDIT(S) 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
Kra 
Part 4. Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence 
§ 78B-9-404. Hearing upon petition—Procedures—Court determination of factual inno-
cence 
(l)(a) In any hearing conducted under this part, the Utah attorney general shall represent the state. 
(b) The burden is upon the petitioner to establish the petitioner's factual innocence by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 
(2) The court may consider: 
(a) evidence that was suppressed or would be suppressed at a criminal trial; and 
(b) hearsay evidence, and may consider that the evidence is hearsay m evaluating its weight and credibility. 
(3) In making its determination the court shall consider, in addition to the evidence presented at the hearing under 
this part, the record of the original criminal case and at any postconviction proceedings in the case. 
(4) If the court, after considering all the evidence, determines by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner: 
(a) is factually innocent of one or more offenses of which the petitioner was convicted, the court shall order that 
those convictions: 
(i) be vacated with prejudice; and 
(ii) be expunged from the petitioner's record; or 
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(b) did not commit one or more offenses of which the petitioner was convicted, but the court does not find by 
clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner did not commit any lesser included offenses relating to those of-
fenses, the court shall modify the original conviction and sentence of the petitioner as appropriate for the lesser 
included offense, whether or not the lesser included offense was originally submitted to the trier of fact. 
(5)(a) If the court, after considering all the evidence, does not determine by clear and convincing evidence that the 
petitioner is factually innocent of the offense or offenses the petitioner is challenging and does not find that Subsec-
tion (4)(b) applies, the court shall deny the petition regarding the offense or offenses. 
(b) If the court finds that the petition was brought in bad faith, it shall enter the finding on the record, and the peti-
tioner may not file a second or successive petition under this section without first applying to and obtaining per-
mission from the court which denied the prior petition. 
(6) At least 30 days prior to a hearing on a petition to determine factual innocence, the petitioner and the respondent 
shall exchange information regarding the e\idence each intends to present at the hearing. This information shall in-
clude: 
(a) a list of witnesses to be called at the hearing; and 
(b) a summary of the testimony or other evidence to be introduced through each witness, including any expert 
witnesses. 
(7) Each party is entitled to a copy of any expert report to be introduced or relied upon by that expert or another ex-
pert at least 30 days prior to hearing. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 358. § 8. eff. May 5. 2008; Laws 2010. c. 153, ? 4, eff March 25, 2010. 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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Chapter 3. Punishments (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Sentencing 
§ 76-3-207. Capital felony—Sentencing proceeding 
(l)(a) When a defendant has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a capital felony, there shall be further proceedings 
before the court or jury on the issue of sentence. 
(b) In the case of a plea of guilty to a capital felony, the sentencing proceedings shall be conducted before a jury 
or, upon request of the defendant and with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, by the 
court which accepted the plea. 
(c)(i) When a defendant has been found guilty of a capital felony, the proceedings shall be conducted before the 
court or jury which found the defendant guilty, provided the defendant may waive hearing before the jury with the 
approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, in which event the hearing shall be before the court. 
(ji) If circumstances make it impossible or impractical to reconvene the same jury for the sentencing proceed-
ings, the court may dismiss that jury and convene a new jury for the proceedings. 
(d) If a retrial of the sentencing proceedings is necessary as a consequence of a remand from an appellate court, 
the sentencing authority shall be determined as provided in Subsection (6). 
(2)(a) In capital sentencing proceedings, evidence may be presented on: 
(i) the nature and circumstances of the crime; 
(ii) the defendant's character, background, history, and mental and physical condition; 
(iii) the victim and the impact of the crime on the victim's family and community without comparison to other 
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persons or victims; and 
(iv) any other facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty that the court considers relevant to the sentence. 
(b) Any evidence the court considers to have probative force may be received regardless of its admissibility under 
the exclusionary rules of evidence. The state's attorney and the defendant shall be permitted to present argument 
for or against the sentence of death. 
(3) Aggravating circumstances include those outlined in Section 76-5-202. 
(4) Mitigating circumstances include: 
(a) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; 
(b) the homicide was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance; 
(c) the defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person; 
(d) at the time of the homicide, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirement of law was impaired as a result of a mental condition, intoxication, or in-
fluence of drugs, except that "mental condition" under this Subsection (4)(d) does not mean an abnormality mani-
fested primarily by repeated criminal conduct; 
(e) the youth of the defendant at the time of the crime; 
(f) the defendant was an accomplice in the homicide committed by another person and the defendant's participa-
tion was relatively minor; and 
(g) any other fact in mitigation of the penalty. 
(5)(a) The court or jury, as the case may be, shall retire to consider the penalty. Except as provided in Subsection 76-
3-207.5(2), in all proceedings before a jury, under this section, it shall be instructed as to the punishment to be im-
posed upon a unanimous decision for death and that the penalty of either an indeterminate prison term of not less 
than 25 years and which may be for life or life in prison without parole, shall be imposed if a unanimous decision for 
death is not found. 
(b) The death penalty shall only be imposed if, after considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, the jury is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total mitigation, and 
is further persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropri-
ate in the circumstances. If the jury reports unanimous agreement to impose the sentence of death, the court shall 
discharge the jury and shall impose the sentence of death. 
(c) If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous decision imposing the sentence of death, the jury shall then deter-
mine whether the penalty of life in prison without parole shall be imposed, except as provided in Subsection 76-3-
207.5(2). The penalty of life in prison without parole shall only be imposed if the jury determines that the sen-
tence of life in prison without parole is appropriate. If the jury reports agreement by 10 jurors or more to impose 
the sentence of life in prison without parole, the court shall discharge the jury and shall impose the sentence of life 
in prison without parole. If 10 jurors or more do not agree upon a sentence of life in prison without parole, the 
court shall discharge the jury and impose an indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years and which may be 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
U.C.A. 1953 §76-3-207 Page 3 
for life. 
(d) If the defendant waives hearing before the jury as to sentencing, with the approval of the court and the consent 
of the prosecution, the court shall determine the appropriate penalty according to the standards of Subsections 
(5)(b)and(c). 
(e) If the defendant is sentenced to more than one term of life in prison with or without the possibility of parole, or 
in addition to a sentence of life in prison with or without the possibility of parole the defendant is sentenced for 
other offenses which result in terms of imprisonment, the judge shall determine whether the terms of imprison-
ment shall be imposed as concurrent or consecutive sentences in accordance with Section 76-3-401. 
(6) Upon any appeal by the defendant where the sentence is of death, the appellate court, if it finds prejudicial error 
in the sentencing proceeding only, may set aside the sentence of death and remand the case to the trial court for new 
sentencing proceedings to the extent necessary to correct the error or errors. An error in the sentencing proceedings 
may not result in the reversal of the conviction of a capital felony. In cases of remand for new sentencing proceed-
ings, all exhibits and a transcript of all testimony and other evidence properly admitted in the prior trial and sentenc-
ing proceedings are admissible in the new sentencing proceedings, and if the sentencing proceeding was before a: 
(a) jury, a new jury shall be impaneled for the new sentencing proceeding unless the defendant waives the hearing 
before the jury with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, in which case the proceeding 
shall be held according to Subsection (6)(b) or (c), as applicable; 
(b) judge, the original trial judge shall conduct the new sentencing proceeding; or 
(c) judge, and the original trial judge is unable or unavailable to conduct a new sentencing proceeding, then an-
other judge shall be designated to conduct the new sentencing proceeding, and the new proceeding will be before 
a jury unless the defendant waives the hearing before the jury with the approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecution. 
(7) If the penalty of death is held to be unconstitutional by the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme 
Court, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death for a capital felony shall cause the 
person to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence the person to life in prison without parole. 
(8)(a) If the appellate court's final decision regarding any appeal of a sentence of death precludes the imposition of 
the death penalty due to mental retardation or subaverage general intellectual functioning under Section 77-15a-101, 
the court having jurisdiction over a defendant previously sentenced to death for a capital felony shall cause the de-
fendant to be brought before the sentencing court, and the court shall sentence the defendant to life in prison without 
parole. 
(b) If the appellate court precludes the imposition of the death penalty under Subsection (8)(a), but the appellate 
court finds that sentencing the defendant to life in prison without parole is likely to result in a manifest injustice, it 
may remand the case to the sentencing court for further sentencing proceedings to determine if the defendant 
should serve a sentence of life in prison without parole or an indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years 
and which may be for life. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-207; Laws 1982, c. 19, § 1; Laws 1991. c. 10. g 6: Laws 1992. c. 142. g 3: Laws 1995. c. 
352. $ 5. eff. May 1. 1995: Laws 1997. c. 286. § 1. eff May 5. 1997: Laws 1998. c. 137. § 1. eff. May 4. 1998: Laws 
2001. c. 209. § 5. eff. April 30. 2001: Laws 2002. c. 24. § 1. eff. May 6. 2002: Laws 2002. c. 26. g 1. eff. May 6. 
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Title 78B. Judicial Code 
! • • • Chapter 1. Juries and Witnesses 
Part 1. Jury and Witness Act 
§ 78B-1-103. Jurors selected from random cross section -Opportunity and obligation to 
serve 
(1) It is the policy of this state that: 
(a) persons selected for jury service be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the 
county: 
(b) all qualified citizens have the opportunity in accordance with this chapter to be considered for service; and 
(c) all qualified citizens are obligated to serve when summoned, unless excused. 
(2) A qualified citizen may not be excluded from jury service on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, 
age, occupation, disability, or economic status. 
CREDIT(S) 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 38. Rights of Crime Victims Act 
§ 77-38-9. Representative of victim—Court designation-Representation in cases involving 
minors—Photographs in homicide cases 
(l)(a) A victim of a crime may designate, with the approval of the court, a representative who may exercise the same 
rights that the victim is entitled to exercise under this chapter. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the victim may revoke the designation at any time. 
(c) In cases where the designation is in question, the court may require that the designation of the representative 
be made in writing by the victim. 
(2) In cases in which the victim is deceased or incapacitated, upon request from the victim's spouse, parent, child, or 
close friend, the court shall designate a representative or representatives of the victim to exercise the rights of a vic-
tim under this chapter on behalf of the victim. The responsible prosecuting agency may request a designation to the 
court. 
(3)(a) If the victim is a minor, the court in its discretion may allow the minor to exercise the rights of a victim under 
this chapter or may allow the victim's parent or other immediate family member to act as a representative of the vic-
tim. 
(b) The court may also, in its discretion, designate a person who is not a member of the immediate family to rep-
resent the interests of the minor. 
(4) The representative of a victim of a crime shall not be: 
(a) the accused or a person who appears to be accountable or otherwise criminally responsible for or criminally 
involved in the crime or conduct, a related crime or conduct, or a crime or act arising from the same conduct, 
criminal episode, or plan as the crime or conduct is defined under the laws of this state; 
(b) a person in the custody of or under detention of federal, state, or local authorities; or 
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(c) a person whom the court in its discretion considers to be otherwise inappropriate. 
(5) Any notices that are to be provided to a victim pursuant to this chapter shall be sent to the victim or the victim's 
lawful representative. 
(6) On behalf of the victim, the prosecutor may assert any right to which the victim is entitled under this chapter, 
unless the victim requests otherwise or exercises his own rights. 
(7) In any homicide prosecution, the prosecution may introduce a photograph of the victim taken before the homi-
cide to establish that the victim was a human being, the identity of the victim, and for other relevant purposes. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1994 c. 198, § 10; Laws 1995. c. 352, § 15. eff. May 1, 1995. 
Current through 2010 General Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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Part VIII. Provisional and Final Remedies and Special Proceedings 
RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
(a) Scope. This rule governs proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act, Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9. The Act sets forth the manner and extent to which a person may 
challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and sentence after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in 
a direct appeal under Article h Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, or the time to file such an appeal has expired. 
(b) Procedural defenses and merits review. Except as provided in paragraph (h), if the court comments on the 
merits of a post-conviction claim, it shall first clearly and expressly determine whether that claim is independently 
precluded under Section 78B-9-106. 
(c) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the dis-
trict court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms pro-
vided by the court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong 
county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
(d) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of 
the conviction or sentence. The petition shall state: 
(d)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration; 
(d)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in 
which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the peti-
tioner; 
(d)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief; 
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(d)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of probation has been re-
viewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the 
results of the appeal; 
(d)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other 
civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the 
results of the prior proceeding; and 
(d)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons why the evidence 
could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-
conviction petition. 
(e) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the petition: 
(e)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations; 
(e)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct appeal of the peti-
tioner's case; 
(e)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adju-
dicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and 
(e)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(f) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in the 
petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(g) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who sen-
tenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the 
normal course, 
(h) (1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the court 
that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, 
the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that 
the claim is frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner Proceedings on the claim shall 
terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law. 
(h) (2) A claim is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the pleadings and attach-
ments, it appears that: 
(h)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
(h)(2)(B) the claim has no arguable basis in fact; or 
(h)(2)(C) the claim challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing of the petition. 
(h)(3) If a claim is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to comply with the re-
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quirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days The court 
may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown 
(h)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a case where the peti-
tioner is sentenced to death 
(i) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition should not be 
summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk 
to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent If the petition is a chal-
lenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General In 
all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner 
(j) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after ser-
vice of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the 
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and shall 
serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b) Within 30 days (plus time al-
lowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may re-
spond by memorandum to the motion No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the 
court 
(k) Hearings. After pleadings are closed the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dis-
pose of the case The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay 
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition At the prehearing conference, the court may 
(k)(l) consider the formation and simplification of issues, 
(k)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents, and 
(k)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the evidentiary hear-
ing 
(I) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the peti-
tioner is not represented by counsel The prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video 
conferencing The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not other-
wise be present m court during the proceeding The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where 
the petitioner is confined 
(m) Discover); records. Discover) under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed b> the court upon motion of a party 
and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence 
that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent 
to obtain any relevant transcript or court records 
(n) Orders; stay. 
(n)(l) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and an appropriate order If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 
days Withm the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respon-
dent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action Thereafter the stay of the 
order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure 
©2010 Thomson Reuters NoClaimtoOng US Gov Works 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65C Page 4 
(n)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, the stay shall expire and 
the court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner. 
(n)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial court may enter any 
supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be nec-
essary and proper. 
(o) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems 
appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that 
prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Utah Code Title 78 A, 
Chapter 2, Part 3 governs the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any, to 
charge for fees and costs. 
(p) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of 
Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Adopted effective July I, 1996; amended effective November 1, 2008; January 4, 2010.] 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2010. 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
RULE 29. DISABILITY AND DISQUALIFICATION OF A JUDGE OR CHANGE OF 
VENUE 
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom a trial has begun is unable to continue 
with the trial, any other judge of that court or any judge assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council, 
upon certifying that the judge is familiar with the record of the trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed 
with and finish the trial, but if the assigned judge is satisfied that neither he nor another substitute judge can proceed 
with the trial, the judge may, in his discretion, grant a new trial. 
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom a defendant has been tried is unable to 
perform the duties required of the court after a verdict of guilty, any other judge of that court or any judge assigned 
by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council may perform those duties. 
(c)(1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to disqualify a judge. The motion shall be 
accompanied by a certificate that the motion is filed in good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating facts 
sufficient to show bias or prejudice, or conflict of interest. 
(c)(1)(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not later than 20 days after the last of the 
following: 
(c)(l)(B)(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge; 
(c)(l)(B)(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or 
(c)(l)(B)(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
learned of the grounds upon which the motion is based. 
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a hearing, the motion shall be filed as soon as practicable. 
(c)(1)(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certificate under Rule IK Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
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subjects the party or attorney to the procedures and sanctions of Rule 11. No party may file more than one motion to 
disqualify in an action. 
(c)(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without further hearing, enter an order 
granting the motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge. The judge shall take no further ac-
tion in the case until the motion is decided. If the judge grants the motion, the order shall direct the presiding judge 
of the court or, if the court has no presiding judge, the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to assign another 
judge to the action or hearing. Assignment injustice court cases shall be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-
138. The presiding judge of the court, any judge of the district, any judge of a court of like jurisdiction, or the 
presiding officer of the Judicial Council may serve as the reviewing judge. 
(c)(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely filed, filed in good faith and legally 
sufficient, the reviewing judge shall assign another judge to the action or hearing or request the presiding judge or 
the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to do so. Assignment injustice court cases shall be in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-5-138. 
(c)(3)(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the reviewing judge may consider any part of the record of the ac-
tion and may request of the judge who is the subject of the motion and affidavit an affidavit responsive to questions 
posed by the reviewing judge. 
(c)(3)(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a timely manner. 
(d)(1) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in 
the jurisdiction where the action is pending, either may, by motion, supported by an affidavit setting forth facts, ask 
to have the trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction. 
(d)(2) If the court is satisfied that the representations made in the affidavit are true and justify transfer of the case, 
the court shall enter an order for the removal of the case to the court of another jurisdiction free from the objection 
and all records pertaining to the case shall be transferred forthwith to the court in the other county. If the court is not 
satisfied that the representations so made justify transfer of the case, the court shall either enter an order denying the 
transfer or order a formal hearing in court to resolve the matter and receive further evidence with respect to the al-
leged prejudice. 
(e) When a change of judge or place of trial is ordered all documents of record concerning the case shall be trans-
ferred without delay to the judge who shall hear the case. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective July 22, 1999; November 1, 2002; November 1, 2006.] 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2010. 
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Article VI. Witnesses 
RULE 606. COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS 
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that jury in the trial of the case in which 
the juror is sitting. If the juror is called so to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object 
out of the presence of the jury. 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a 
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the 
effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent 
from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a 
juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's 
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affi-
davit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from 
testifying be received for these purposes. 
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Article XI. Miscellaneous Rules 
RULE 1101. APPLICABILITY OF RULES 
(a) Courts and magistrates. These rules apply to all actions and proceedings in the courts of this state except as 
otherwise provided in Subdivisions (b) and (c). 
(b) Rules inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not apply in the following situations: 
(1) Preliminary questions of fact which are to be determined under Rule 104(a); 
(2) Grand jury proceedings; 
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings for extradition, sentencing or granting or revocation of probation, issuance of war-
rants for arrest, criminal summonses and search warrants and proceedings with respect to release on bail or other-
wise; 
(4) Contempt proceedings in which the court may act summarily. 
(c) In a criminal preliminary examination, reliable hearsay shall be admissible as provided under Rule 1102. 
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